

ब्रह्मसूत्रचतुःसूत्री

श्रीशाङ्करभाष्यसहिता

# BRAHMASŪTRA-CATUHSŪTRĪ

The First Four Aphorisms of Brahmasūtras

along with Śaṅkarācārya's Commentary

with English Translation, Notes and Index

BY

*Vidyāśaṅkāra* PANDIT HAR DUTT SHARMA,

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
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
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
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## PREFACE

In the following pages, an attempt is made to present the text of the Śrī Śaṅkarācārya's Bhāṣya on Brahma-Sūtra-Catuḥsūtrī in English version along with explanatory and critical notes. This portion of the Bhāṣya is rightly considered to give a gist of the entire *Advaita* Philosophy in a nutshell and hence it contains many knotty problems which are stumbling blocks to a beginner. I have attempted to elucidate all these points, but at the same time have avoided unnecessary discussions. Although, there exists a very excellent edition of Catuḥsūtrī by Dr. Kunhan Raja and Prof. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (and some passages have been borrowed from it verbatim), yet, being restricted to the Bhāmati only, it labours under the disadvantage that it is not easy for a beginner to follow. In the present work, I have not only consulted the excellent translation of Dr. Thibat (S. B. E.), but have introduced the explanations found in the Ānandagiri's Tīkā, Ratnaprabhā and the commentaries contained in the excellent edition of Catuḥsūtrī by M. M. Anantakṛṣṇa Sastri published at Calcutta. My aim has been to clear the difficult points and for that purpose, help had to be taken from whatever source it was available.

The explanation of the five *Khyātis* is taken from Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan's book—The Philosophy of Advaita.

I have avoided giving quotation marks to the portions borrowed, since that would only bother the reader.

But I take this opportunity of acknowledging my debt specially to Messrs. Kunhan Raja, Suryanarayana Sastri and Mahadevan.

If this work proves useful to those for whom it is written, I shall consider myself amply repaid.

In the end it is but in the fitness of things that on my behalf and on behalf of the scholarly world I should thank Dr. N. G. Sardesai who has published this book during these days when the cost of paper, printing, etc. is so great.

Hindu Chhlege,  
Delhi.  
1st Sept. 1940.

HAR DUTT SHRAMA

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॥ श्रीहरिः शरणं मम ॥

## श्रीशाङ्करभाष्यसहिता

ब्रह्मसूत्रचतुःसूत्री

अथ भाष्योपोद्धातः

युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोर्विषयविषयिणोस्तमः प्रकाशवद्विरुद्ध-  
स्वभावयोरितरेतरभावानुपपत्तौ सिद्धायाम् ।—(भाष्यम्)

Of the spheres of the two notions of "Thou" and "I", the object and the subject, with their natures opposed to each other like darkness and light, when it is established that one cannot intelligibly be of the nature of the other;

### NOTES

The words युष्मद् and अस्मद् here stand for विषय and विषयिन् respectively. The विषय or the object is of the nature of non-intelligence (जडस्वभाव). The objects or विषयs are बुद्धि, इन्द्रिय, देह, etc. They are called विषयs because they bind the intelligent आत्मन्, that is to say, make it determine through their own form ('एते हि चिदात्मानं विषिण्वन्ति अवब्रजन्ति; स्वेन रूपेण निरूपणीयं कुर्वन्ति।' भट्टप्रती ॥ 'स्वेन रूपेण निरूपणीयं कुर्वन्ति', i.e., स्वेन रूपेण अवभासयन्ति । [ऋजुप्रकाशिका]. The विषयs present the चैतन्य as of the nature of जड). The विषयिन् or the subject is the Self, and is of the nature of intelligence. Thus विषयs, viz., देह, इन्द्रिय, etc. are जड, and विषयिन्, viz., आत्मन् is चैतन.

Here, the question arises that why and how are the विषय and विषयिन्, युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरs? When we talk of

our body etc. we call it इदं शरीरम्, अयं देहः, इयं बुद्धिः. Similarly, when we speak of आत्मन् we refer to it as अहम्. Hence, the proper phraseology for the भाष्यकार was इदमस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोः and not युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोः।

To this we reply :—

The words युष्मद् and अस्मद् have been employed in order to indicate the absolute difference between the contrasted aspects of experience. The contrast between जड and चेतन is more clearly brought about by the words त्वम् and अहम् than by the words इदम् and अहम्. Language allows of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and the third persons, e.g. एते वयम्, इमे वयम्, आत्महे or अयस्महम् ('It is I', etc.), but not of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and second persons.

अत्यन्तवैलक्षण्ये दृष्टान्तः—'तमः प्रकाशवद्विरुद्धस्वभावयोः।' The भाष्यकार illustrates the absolute difference between the opposed notions of देह and आत्मन् by 'darkness and light'. Never indeed can one understand such utterly different things as light and darkness each to be of the nature of the other. Hence, the भाष्यकार says—इतरेतरभावानुपपत्तौ सिद्धायाम्. That is, the identity between देह and आत्मन् is अनुपपन्न, unintelligible. We cannot *cognise* देह or जड to be of the nature of आत्मन् or चेतन.

तद्धर्माणामपि सुतरामितरेतरभावानुपपत्तिः।—(भाष्यम्)

All the less can their respective attributes be identified.

### NOTES

An objector here says—Granted that there can be no reciprocal identity between the धर्मिन्s (substrates), viz., the Self and the Non-Self. There may occur yet the reciprocal



super-imposition of their attributes such as जाड्य and चैतन्य, अनित्यत्व and नित्यत्व. For instance, the crystal (स्कटिक) is apprehended as different from जपापुष्प, a red flower; yet, on account of its absolute transparency, there arises the illusion of redness in the experience 'red crystal', when the red flower is reflected in the crystal.

To this, the भाष्यकार says—तद्वर्माणामपि, etc. The idea is this : it is indeed a substance with colour, which, on account of its absolute transparency takes on the reflection of another substance with colour, though apprehended as different from itself. The intelligent Self, however, is the colourless or formless subject and cannot take on the reflection of the object. Hence, if these two substrates (देह and आत्मन्) being apprehended as absolutely distinct are unrelated, their attributes are even more clearly unrelated, they being further removed from each other by the interposition of their respective substrates.

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इत्यतः अस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरे विषयिणि चिदात्मके युष्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरस्य विषयस्य तद्वर्माणां चाध्यासः, तद्विपर्ययेण विषयिणस्तद्वर्माणां च विषयेऽध्यासो मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तम् ।—( भाष्यम् )

Hence, the superimposition of the object, the sphere of the concept of 'Thou' and of its attributes, on the subject, the intelligent Self, the sphere of the concept of 'I', and conversely, the superimposition of the subject and its attributes on the object, can properly be only an illusion.

### NOTES

This superimposition of the Self on the Non-Self were really impossible if only the true nature of the Self were manifest in the experience of the "I". This, however, is

not so. In the Scriptures the true nature of the Self is defined as समस्तोपाध्यनवच्छिन्नम् (undefined by any limiting conditions), अनन्तानन्दचैतन्यैकरसम् (of the one consistency of endless bliss and intelligence), उदासीनम् (indifferent), एकम् (one), अद्वितीयम् (without a second) आत्मतत्त्वम्. But our experience of 'I' is प्रादेशिक (finite) and अनेकविधशोकदुःखादि-प्रपञ्चोपप्लुत (confounded by a multitude of griefs and sorrows). How can this experience of 'I' have the true nature of the Self for its sphere?

Hence, if we knew the true nature of the Self then its superimposition on the Non-Self or *vice versa* would be wrong.

तथाप्यन्योऽन्यस्मिन्नन्योऽन्यात्मकतामन्योऽन्यधर्माश्च अध्यस्य इतरेतराविवेकेन<sup>१</sup> अत्यन्तविविक्तयोर्धर्मधर्मिणोः, मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः, सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य, 'अहमिदम्, ममेदम्,' इति नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः ।—( भाष्यम् )

Yet, it is on the part of a man a natural procedure—which has its cause in illusory cognition—not to distinguish the two entities (object and subject) and their respective attributes, although they are absolutely distinct, but to superimpose upon each the characteristic nature and the attributes of the other, and thus coupling the Real and the Unreal, to make use of such expressions as 'I am this', and 'This is mine'.

### NOTES

The नैसर्गिक लोकव्यवहार takes the form of superimposition of the Self on the Non-Self; for example, अहमिदं शरीरम्. Similarly, the attributes of the Non-Self (body), viz, जन्म, मरण, जरा, व्याधि, etc., are superimposed on the Self; and conversely, the attributes of the Self (आत्मन्), viz., चैतन्य, etc., are superimposed on the body. We are in the habit



of using such an expression as ममेदं जरामरणपुत्रपशुस्वान्यादि— Mine are these—old age, death, son, cow, ownership etc. And this व्यवहार is मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्त, due to wrong knowledge मिथ्याज्ञान is अध्यास or illusory cognition or superimposition. This मिथ्याज्ञान is caused by इतरेतराविवेक (non-discrimination of each from the other) of the अत्यन्तविविक्तधर्मिणोः (absolutely distinct substrates) and अत्यन्तविविक्ततद्धर्मयोः (of their attributes which are absolutely distinct).

आह—कोऽयमध्यासो नामेति । उच्यते—स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्व-  
दृष्टावभासः ।—(भाष्यम् )

It may be asked : What is this thing called superimposition? The reply is : The apparent presentation, in the form of remembrance, to consciousness of something previously observed, in some other thing (place).

### NOTES

Here, the भाष्यकार gives the definition of अध्यास or superimposition. Let us try to understand each term of the definition before examining it. अवभास is अवसन्नः अवमतो वा भासः, i.e., the appearance which is अवसन्न (terminated) or अवमत (depreciated). अवसाद (termination) or अवमान (depreciation) is its sublation (दाध) by another cognition (प्रत्ययान्तर).

पूर्वदृष्ट means something previously observed. The thing which is going to be superimposed must have been दृष्ट, seen, 'before' (पूर्व). It is not seen now. Hence, what is now seen cannot be imposed; now, it does not really exist, but is unreal.

परत्र, in some other thing or elsewhere, indicates that the thing which is the locus or base of superimposition, is real.

स्मृतिरूपः should be expounded as स्मृतेः रूपमिव रूपमस्य— Its nature is like the nature of recollection or remembrance स्मृति or recollection is different from प्रत्यभिज्ञान or recognition. In the former, the object remembered is not present whereas, in the latter the object is before us.

Let us illustrate this अध्यास. The stock example is शुक्लौ रजतमानम् or रजौ सर्पमानम्. When we mistake silver in the nacre, then we have an example of superimposition. What actually happens is—we had seen silver and remember its qualities of brightness, whiteness, etc. Now we see nacre possessed of whiteness, brightness. We are at once reminded of silver and superimpose the mistaken notion on nacre. The superimposition is of the nature of recollection स्मृतिरूप. It is पूर्वदृष्टावभास, the appearance of silver seen before. And it is परत्र, namely its locus (अधिकरण) is nacre, which is real. Silver, which was seen before, though real in its own nature (स्वरूपेण सदापि), is yet, as superimposed (आरोपणीयतया), indetermineable (अनिर्वाच्य) and hence unreal (अनृत or मिथ्या), because, there arises बाध (sublation) of रजतज्ञान, by a subsequent cognition (उत्तरज्ञान).

This brings us to the most important topic of Indian Philosophy, namely the nature of cognition of this world (प्रपञ्चज्ञान). What is this प्रपञ्च, is it सत् (real) or असत् (unreal)? All schools agree on the point that the world is not what it seems. Its essence is different from its appearance. Its appearance is delusion of भ्रम, मिथ्याज्ञान which is sublated or बाधित by a subsequent cognition. According to the Advaita Vedāntins, this प्रपञ्च is अनिर्वाचनीय (indeterminable) and सदसद्विलक्षण different from real (or unreal).

Delusion (भ्रम) and sublation (बाध) or the theories of Error are explained by the adherents of the different schools of Indian thought in different ways. The Advaitin's



theory of error results as a logical consequence from the refutation of rival theories. If nacre-silver (शुक्लौ रजतम्) were real, its cognition could not be delusive; nor could there be sublation for it. If silver even as it appears be absolutely real, it would be apprehended even by those free from defect, दोष (of अम). Further, there is the sublating cognition 'this is not silver', which makes known the non-existence of silver in all three times (त्रिकालबाध) in the locus (here, शुक्ति) where it was recognised. Therefore, because nacre-silver is not apprehended by those without defect and because, it is sublated by the cognition of nacre, the silver that appears in delusion cannot be real. Nor can it be unreal, since it is cognised. If it were unreal, then, as in the case of human horn, there would be no cognition thereof. Hence, there would be neither delusion nor sublation. Delusion and sublation are, however, established in experience. Error is an incontrovertible fact of experience. Neither the theories which regard the object of error as real nor the doctrine which considers it to be unreal can adequately explain error. Because of cognition, the silver which is seen in delusion is not unreal; because of sublation it is not real. And it cannot be both real and unreal, because of contradiction. Hence, it must be stated that nacre-silver is अनिर्वचनीयम्, indeterminable either as real or as unreal. Since the cognised silver is indeterminable, the *cognition* cannot legitimately be determinate. Therefore, erroneous cognition is also indeterminable.

The view of the Advaitin is called अनिर्वचनीयव्याप्ति. व्याप्ति is दर्शन or cognition, literally. There are five theories of error (erroneous cognition or व्याप्ति) including the one of the Advaitin :—

आत्मव्याप्तिरसत्त्व्याप्तिरव्याप्तिः व्याप्तिरन्यथा ।

तथानिर्वचनव्याप्तिरित्येतत् व्याप्तिपञ्चकम् ॥

(1) आत्मख्याति, (2) असख्याति, (3) ख्याति, (4) अन्यथा-  
ख्याति, and (5) अनिर्वचनख्याति.

The first four theories can be grouped under two classes:—(A) सख्याति and (B) असख्याति. According to the theory of असख्याति which is advocated by the शून्यवादी—माध्यमिक (बौद्ध), in error there is cognition of (असत्) the unreal. The doctrines that go under the class of सख्याति hold that in error there is the cognition of (सत्) the real; and they are three—(1) आत्मख्याति, the view of the विज्ञानवादी बौद्धs who are subjectionists; (2) ख्याति, the doctrine of ग्राभाकरs who regard all knowledge as true, and (3) अन्यथाख्याति, the theory of the सादृश and नैयायिकs who hold that what is given in erroneous knowledge is otherwise than in the mode in which it is presented. According to the अद्वैतिन्, the cognition is neither सत् nor असत्, but is अनिर्वचनीय. Hence his view is called अनिर्वचनीयख्याति.

The भाष्यकार makes a passing reference to the four theories of the opponents of वेदान्त, but he does not enter into the detailed examination and refutation of these theories. In fact, he even does not say as to which theory belongs to whom, but merely states the theories. They are, however, elaborately explained by the different commentators at length. We shall examine them briefly as we proceed further.

तं केचिद्—‘अन्यत्र अन्यधर्माध्यासः’ इति वदन्ति ।—(भाष्यम्)

Some define that (अध्यास) as the superimposition of the attributes of one thing on another thing.

### NOTES

In this line the भाष्यकार states the views of अन्यथाख्याति and आत्मख्याति. अन्यत्र means in the nacre, etc. अन्यधर्मस्य means the attributes of रजत, etc. अध्यास means superimposi-



tion. The अन्यथाख्यातिवादिन्s maintain that in the act of अध्यास the attributes of one thing, silver for instance, are superimposed on a different thing existing in a different place, nacre for instance. Here, the real object appears to be अन्यथा or otherwise, i.e., different from what it is. Hence, it is called अन्यथाख्याति. Nacre which is real appears as of the nature of another real, silver. So, in fact, both शुक्ति and रजत are real. Delusion lies in apprehending शुक्ति as रजत, and which शुक्ति is not शुक्ति is certainly not silver; and in delusion it is silver that appears, and not nacre. As there is the *manifestation* or प्रकाशमानता of silver, you cannot call it unreal or असत्.

To this the वेदान्तिन् replies, न प्रकाशमानता सत्त्वम्—it is not the manifestation alone that constitutes reality,—येन देहेन्द्रियादेः प्रकाशमानतया सद्भावो भवेत्—in which case bodies, organs, etc., by the very fact of manifestation would become real. We find that रज्जु appears as सर्प. But do you mean that रज्जु becomes सर्प or endowed with the attributes of सर्प? Similarly, शुक्ति appears as रजत, but शुक्ति does not become रजत् itself or endowed with the attributes of रजत्. If that were so, one would conclude in the case of a mirage (मरीचिका) that it is गङ्गा, and proceeding thereto should be able to quench one's thirst by drinking that water. Hence, of what is superimposed (रजत for instance), even though manifest, absolute reality cannot be admitted.

This was the view-point of the भाट्ट मीमांसकs. According to the सौत्रान्तिक (बौद्ध) teaching, the line of the भाष्य means—अध्यास is the superimposition of the attributes of another (अन्यधर्मस्य) elsewhere. Here, silver is of the nature of ज्ञान. It is ज्ञानाकार. In अध्यास, the modification, in the form of silver, of the internal organ (बुद्धिरूपात्मनो धर्मस्य रजतस्य) is superimposed on the external thing शुक्ति, and thus itself

appears external. According to सौत्रान्तिक the external objects have a real existence. Here शुक्ति is really existent. This अम or delusion that this शुक्ति appears as रजत is really nothing but that the आन्तरज्ञान of रजत has become बाह्य. That is, we possess the notion of रजत in our mind. Here that notion has as if come out and presented itself. This is called आत्मख्याति. The विज्ञानवादिन् does not admit the reality of external objects. According to him the reality consists in a series of momentary cognitions (क्षणिकज्ञान), particular perishing psychical presentations. There is no difference whatever between an object and the cognition thereof. There is no reality over and above cognition. Because of the invariability of the simultaneous presentation of blue and its cognition, there is no difference between the two. If blue were different from the cognition of blue (यदि नीलं नीलज्ञानाद् भिन्नम्), then it would not be manifest in the cognition (तर्हि नीलज्ञाने नीलं नैवावभासेत). Thus, it must be admitted that momentary cognitions alone are objects. That cognition is momentary is established by perception (प्रत्यक्ष). Just as the नीलज्ञान makes known also the exclusion of other colours (अन्यवर्णासम्बन्ध), similarly, the cognition which appears as present intimates its non-relation to the times past and future. Thus the विज्ञानवादिन् reduces what appears to the man in the street as the block universe into a series of momentary cognitions.

The विज्ञानवादिन्'s theory of error is rooted in his subjectivistic metaphysics. The silver which appears in delusion is real, he admits; but it is real not as existing outside in space, but as a mode of mind. Error consists in regarding what is mental as material. When cognitions are mistaken to be facts in the external world, error results. What is negated by sublation is the externality of रजत.



To this the वेदान्तिन् replies : The statement, that the silver which appears in delusion is not external, conflicts with the cognition of silver as external. If there could be the cognition of externality ( बाह्यत्व ) in what is nonexternal ( अबाह्य, i. e. आन्तर ), then, there is the possibility of the cognition of intellect ( बुद्धि ) in what is non-intellect ( अबुद्धि, i. e., the external objects ). But such an admission would be cutting at the very root of the विज्ञानवाद, according to which there is no real other than the intellect or its product. Moreover, delusion and sublation are unintelligible in the view of आत्मख्याति. For, all cognitions whatsoever should be illusory ( ज्ञातृमात्रक or मिथ्या ) or all of them non-illusory ( सत्य ). In either case there can be no sublation ( बाध ). Admitting that there is an illusory form of cognition, is it self-cognised ( स्वयंप्रकाश ) or other-cognised ( अन्यसंवेद्य ) ? If it be self-cognised, it cannot be illusory, since it is apprehended as it is ( न हि यस्त्वयं ख्याति तदन्यथा ख्यातिः A cognition cannot manifest its own nature as well as the otherwiseness of its own nature ). If it be other-cognised ( अन्यसंवेद्य ), there is the abandonment of the theory of self-apprehension ( स्वयंप्रकाशत्व or स्वसंवेद्यत्व ). And for a single cognition, contradictory natures—self-cognisedness and non-self-cognisedness—are not possible. In this manner, the doctrine of आत्मख्याति leads to a blind alley, and instead of explaining delusion and sublation it makes them unintelligible.

केचित्तु—‘यत्र यदध्यासः, तद्विवेकाग्रहनिबन्धनो भ्रमः’ इति ।  
—( भाष्यम् )

Others, again, define superimposition as the delusion founded on the non-apprehension of the distinctness of that which is superimposed from that on which it is superimposed.

## NOTES

यत्र=शुक्तौ । यदध्यासः=यस्य रजतादेः अध्यासः । तद्विवेकाग्रह-  
निवन्धनः=तयोः अर्थयोः (शुक्तिरजतयोः) तद्वियोः (शुक्तिज्ञानरज-  
ज्ञानयोः) च यः विवेकः, अन्योऽन्यवैलक्षण्यम्, तस्य यः आग्रहः (non-  
apprehension) स निवन्धनं कारणं यस्य सः भ्रमः । that is, because  
we are unable to comprehend the fact that silver is absolu-  
tely distinct from nacre, we superimpose silver on nacre. '

This is the theory of अख्याति (non-apprehension) as  
advocated by the followers of प्रभाकर School of Mīmāṃsā.  
According to them there is no invalid (मिथ्या) cognition  
( यथार्थं सर्वविज्ञानम् ). A cognition may be less than true, it  
can never be untrue. Hence, in this view of the nature of  
cognitions, there is no room for logical error. The प्रभाकर  
recognises only a two-fold classification of cognition into valid  
cognition and memory ( यथार्थज्ञान and स्मृति ). He does not  
recognise delusive cognition ( भ्रमात्मकज्ञान ) as a third class.  
Instead of regarding delusion as a single cognition, he  
considers it to be a composite of two cognitions. In the case  
of " This is silver " ( इदं रजतम् ) the "this" ( इदम् ) is percep-  
tually cognised ( प्रत्यक्ष ) and the "silver" ( रजतम् ) is  
remembered. The cognition of "this" ( इदम् ) is perceptual  
( प्रत्यक्ष ), because there is sense-contact ( इन्द्रियसंयोग ) with  
what is in front ( पुरोऽवस्थितपदार्थं, viz., शुक्ति ). The cognition  
of silver, however, is a memory being generated by sense-  
impression ( इन्द्रियसंस्कार ) called up by similarity ( सादृश्य )  
etc. Neither of these cognitions is untrue. But because of a  
defect in the instrument, the conceit of memory-ness is lost  
( स्मरणाभिमानं प्रभुषितं भवति ) and the two cognitions and their  
respective contents are not discriminated. There is the non-  
apprehension of their non-relation ( असंसर्गाग्रह ), and conse-  
quently, what is usually called error results.



To this the वेदान्तिन् replies that in the view of अख्याति-  
 delusion and sublation cannot intelligibly be explained. The अख्यातिवादिन् regards the silver which is presented in  
 delusion as the remembered (स्मृत). But just as in the case  
 of the cognition of real silver, the illusory silver is presented  
 as existing in front (पुरोवर्तित्वेन). Moreover, the प्राभाकार-  
 holds that अविवेक is non-apprehension of non-relation  
 (असंसर्गाग्रह), that delusion is the result of not cognising  
 "this" (इदम्) and "silver" (रजतम्) to be non-related.  
 But such असंसर्गाग्रह cannot be as between apprehension  
 (ग्रहण) and memory (स्मृति). In the cognition "I am a man"  
 (अहं मनुष्योऽस्मि) which is a delusion (because अहं denotes  
 आत्मा and मनुष्य denotes देहादि), there is असंसर्गाग्रह (non-  
 apprehension of non-relation) as between two ज्ञानs (apprehen-  
 sions) and not as between apprehension (ग्रहण) and memory  
 (स्मृति). Again, the presentation of silver as existing in  
 front is said to be effected by non-discrimination (अविवेक).  
 But अविवेक cannot be the cause of delusion. The non-discri-  
 mination (अविवेक) cannot be between two things apprehen-  
 ded; for in the dream-state, which is a delusion, nothing  
 other than the self is apprehended. Since there do not exist  
 two apprehended things, there is the contingency of the  
 dream-state being not a delusion. Nor can there be अविवेक  
 (non-discrimination) between the apprehended and the  
 remembered; for in the dream, when there is non-discri-  
 mination of the remembered blue (स्मृतं नीलम्) from the  
 apprehended self (आत्मनः), there is the contingency of the  
 presentation of the dream cognition in the form "I am blue  
 etc." (अहं नीलः). Nor can the non-discrimination be  
 between the remembered; for, then, everything would be  
 presented as mediate (परस्परया) and not as immediate (साक्षात्)  
 in delusion. Since the conceit of remembrance (स्मरणाभिमान)  
 which is to be lost in order that there may be non-dis-

discrimination (अविवेक) is not determined, and since non-discrimination itself is not proved either as between apprehension and memory or as between the apprehended and the remembered, the theory of अख्याति or non-apprehension stands condemned.

अन्ये तु “यत्र यदध्यासः, तस्यैव विपरीतधर्मत्वकल्पनाम्”  
आचक्षते इति ।—(भाष्यम्)

Others, however, say that when there is superimposition of one on another, there is an assumption in the latter of an opposite attribute.

### NOTES

यत्र=शुक्तिशकलादौ; यस्य-रजतादेः अध्यासः, तस्यैव-अधिष्ठानस्य।  
शुक्तिकाशकलादेः, विपरीतधर्मत्वकल्पनाम्-रजतत्वधर्मकल्पनाम्, आचक्षते ।  
that is, when on शुक्ति there is imposition of रजत, there is the attribution of the properties of silver (रजत), which are opposed to that very शुक्ति.

This is the असख्याति of the माध्यमिक बौद्धs who are called शून्यवादिन्s also. According to them unreality is ultimate (सर्वं शून्यम्). The error consists in the cognition of the unreal (असत्) as real (सत्). In fact, not to speak of रजत in the शुक्तिका, even शुक्तिका is unreal. There is no substrate whatever for the delusive cognition (अमात्मक ज्ञानं) as for other valid cognitions (सम्यक् ज्ञानs). If it be asked: When the substrate (here शुक्ति) itself is non-existent, how can there be any अध्यास on it? The शून्यवादिन् replies: Yes, it is possible to have substrateless delusion, as in the case of केशोष्क (= the appearance of a bright woolly mass when the closed eye is pressed with the finger-tip). So, what actually happens is—शून्यस्य शुक्त्यात्मना, विवर्तमानस्य रजतरूपेण विवर्तता (ऋजुविवरण)—Nullity first appears as शुक्ति; then शुक्ति is apprehended as रजत. रजत is of the nature of विपरीतत्व of शुक्ति; it is of the nature



of शुक्ल्यभाव. The error consists in apprehending रजत which is असत्. The silver that appears in delusion is unreal, since it is sublated (बाधित) and sublation is not possible of what is real.

To this the वेदान्तिन् replies :—The cognition of non-existent (असत्) is an impossibility. Of the non-existent, since its very nature is not established, there can be no cognition. There can be no cognition without a substrate. The शून्यवादिन् quoted the cognition of केशोण्डूक as an example of substrateless cognition. But he is wrong. The rays of light are the substrate of केशोण्डूक.

Thus, it is established that the only reasonable ख्याति is the अनिर्वचनीयख्याति of the Advaitins.

If it be asked—Let there be these differences among inquirers; What of that in the present context? To this the भाष्यकार replies—

सर्वथापि त्वन्यस्यान्यधर्माविभासतां न व्यभिचरति ।—( भाष्यम् )

But all these definitions agree in so far as they represent superimposition as the apparent presentation of the attributes of one thing in another thing.

### NOTES

9 The literal translation of the line of the भाष्य will be :—But in any case, it (i.e. अभ्यास) does not depart (न व्यभिचरति) from the property of one appearing (अवभासता) as having the attributes of another. भामतीकार explains the line—अन्यस्यान्यधर्मकल्पना अनृतता, सा च अनिर्वचनीयतेऽयमस्तादुपपादितम् । तेन सर्वेषामेव परीक्षकाणां मते अन्यस्यान्यधर्मकल्पनानिर्वचनीयावश्यं भाविनीत्यनिर्वचनीयता सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तः ।

“The assumption of the attributes of one thing in the case of another, that is untruth (अनृतता); we have explained above that, that is indeterminability (अनिर्वचनीयता). From

that it would follow that in the systems of all inquirers this indeterminable assumption of the attributes of one thing in another has necessarily to find a place; hence this indeterminability is an accepted doctrine in all systems."

In the अध्यास example इदं रजतम्, silver is apprehended as प्रत्यक्ष. That is, in the शुक्ति we have an अपरोक्ष (direct apprehension) of रजत. That रजत cannot be called सत्, although it exists really in देशान्तर (another place) or in बुद्धि. It cannot be called शून्य, for we have its प्रत्यक्ष. Nor can we call it असत् as we have its प्रत्यक्ष. Hence, we shall have to call it as सदसद्भ्यामनिर्वचनीयम्.

तथा च लोकेऽनुभवः—'शुक्तिका हि रजतवदवभासते, एकश्चन्द्रः स द्वितीयवद्' इति ।—( भाष्यम् )

And thus is our experience in the world—nacre appears as if it were silver; the moon, though one appears as if having a second.

### NOTES

Not only philosophical inquiries know of this untruth, but it is the experience of even a layman. After the sublation ( बाध ) of his delusion ( भ्रम ), even a man in the street recognises that this is nacre and not silver. But if the opponent were to urge that all right, I shall recognise your opinion. The experience shows that we can have the delusion of one thing in another thing. But where can you show the एकस्य त्वभिन्नस्य भेदभ्रमः (the delusion in the shape of regarding one and the same thing as two different objects)? Unless you establish this, you cannot prove the delusion in the nature of regarding the अभिन्न जीवस (not different from one another) as भिन्न or the delusion of regarding ब्रह्मन् as different from आत्मन्. To this, we reply—Yes. We can show that experience confirms our view when we see two moons instead of one.



कथं पुनः प्रत्यगात्मन्यविषयेऽध्यासो विषयतद्धर्माणाम् ? सर्वो हि पुरोऽवस्थिते विषये विषयान्तरमध्यस्यति । युष्मत्प्रत्ययापेतस्य च प्रत्यगात्मनोऽविषयत्वं ब्रवीषि ।—( भाष्यम् )

But how is it possible that on the inner Self which is a non-object there should be superimposed objects and their attributes? For, everyone superimposes an object on another object that is present before him; and you say that the inner Self, which is outside the concept of 'Thou', is a non-object.

### NOTES

The word प्रत्यक् means 'internal' or 'inner'. That inner Self cannot be an *Object* of Cognition. Only those which are परार्थानुप्रकाश—are manifested by others, but are not self-manifest—, can be विषय. आत्मन् is स्वप्रकाश or स्वाधीनप्रकाश, is self-manifest. does not depend upon another for its manifestation (Self-luminous). That is, आत्मन् is the subjective factor in all Cognition. He is the Cogniser of all cognitions. It is not like घट etc. which depend on another for cognition. Hence आत्मन् cannot become an object (विषय). A विषय has already been defined as युष्मत्प्रत्ययगोचर, belonging to the sphere of the concept of 'Thou'. Then how can there be superimposition on आत्मन् ? एतदुक्तं भवति—यत्परार्थानुप्रकाशमंशयैश्च तस्मात्प्रकाशग्रहे कारणदोषवशाच्च विशेषाग्रहे अन्यथा प्रकाशते । प्रत्यगात्मा तु अपरार्थानुप्रकाशतया न स्वज्ञाने कारणान्यपेक्षते, येन तदाश्रयैः । दोषैर्दूष्येत । न चांशवान्, येन कश्चिदस्यांशो गृह्येत, कश्चिन्न गृह्येत । न हि तदेव तदानीमेव गृहीतमगृहीतं च संभवतीति न स्वयंप्रकाशतापक्षेऽध्यासः । सदातनेऽप्यप्रकाशे पुरोऽवस्थितत्वस्य अपरोक्षत्वस्याभावाच्चाध्यासः । न हि शुक्तौ अपुरः स्थाितायां रजतमध्यस्यति 'इदं रजतम्' इति । तस्मादत्यन्तग्रहे अत्यन्ताग्रहे च नाध्यास इति सिद्धम् । (भामती)

The sense is this—that, whose manifestation depends on another and which has parts, appears other than what it is, because we apprehend its general nature and not its special nature and because there is some defect in the organs of cognition. The inner Self, however, does not depend on another for its manifestation and, therefore, does not require any organs to manifest itself. It is only when it had required organs to cognise it, that आत्मन् could become defective on account of some defect in the organs. Moreover, the आत्मन् has no parts, so that we could apprehend it in some parts but not in others. It cannot, verily, happen that the same thing is at the same time and by itself both apprehended and not apprehended. Hence, if we grant आत्मन् to be स्वयंप्रकाश, there can be no superimposition. And even if it be never manifest, there can be no superimposition, since it is not before us, i. e., is not immediately experienced. You cannot superimpose silver in the form 'this is silver', when शुक्ति is not present before us. Hence, it follows that there can be no superimposition, whether there is complete apprehension or total non-apprehension of आत्मन्.

उच्यते—न तावदयमेकान्तेनाविषयः, अस्मत्प्रत्ययविषयत्वात् । अपरोक्षत्वाच्च प्रत्यगात्मप्रसिद्धेः । न चायमस्ति नियमः पुरोऽवस्थित एव विषये विषयान्तरमध्यसितव्यमिति । अप्रत्यक्षेऽपि ह्याज्ञाशे बालास्तलमलिनताद्यव्यस्यन्ति । एवमविरुद्धः प्रत्यगात्मन्यप्यनात्माध्यासः ।  
—( भाष्यम् )

We reply—It is not a non-object in an absolute sense. For, it is the object of the concept of 'I,' and the inner Self is well-known to exist on account of its immediate (intuitive) presentation. And there is no rule that an object can be superimposed only on such other object



as is before us. For, non-discerning men superimpose on the ether, though not perceptible, surface, impurity etc. Similarly, there is no contradiction in the superimposition of the non-self even on the inner Self.

### NOTES

भामतीकार says—सत्यं प्रत्यगात्मा स्वयंप्रकाशत्वादविषयोऽनंशश्च । तथापि अनिर्वचनीयानाद्यविद्यापरिकल्पितबुद्धिमनःसूक्ष्मस्थूलशरीरेन्द्रिया. वच्छेदकभेदेन अनवच्छिन्नोऽपि वस्तुतोऽवच्छिन्न इव, अभिन्नोऽपि चिन्न इव, अकर्तापि कर्तेव, अमोक्तापि मोक्तेव, अविषयोऽप्यस्मत्प्रत्ययविषय इव, जीवभावमापन्नः अवभासते, नम इव घटमणिकमल्लिकाद्युपाध्यवच्छेदभेदेन भिन्नमिवानेकविधधर्मकमिवेति ।

True, the inner Self being self-manifest is not an object and is without parts; but yet, having attained to the state of the जीव, though not really defined by the particular defining conditions imposed by indeterminable beginningless Neuroscience such as the intellect, the mind, the subtle and gross bodies and the organs, the आत्मन् appears to be defined; though not different, he appears as if different; though not an agent, he appears as agent; though not an enjoyer, he appears as enjoyer; and though not an object, he appears as the object of the concept of 'I' or Ego; just as the ether because of differences defined by adjuncts such as pot, jewel, basin etc., appears as different and possessing diverse attributes.

Again आत्मन् is अपरोक्ष—His realisation is immediate. You cannot deny, therefore, the existence of आत्मन्. This is said in reply to the question in the mind of the student, How can be an अभ्यास of a प्रत्यक्षवस्तु ( an object which can there be apprehended by perception ) in an अप्रत्यक्षपदार्थे ( an object which cannot be apprehended ) ?

अवश्यं चिदात्मा अपरोक्षोऽभ्युपेतव्यः, तदप्रभायां सर्वस्याप्रथनेन जगदान्यप्रसङ्गात् ।—( भामती)

The intelligent self should necessarily be admitted to be immediately perceived, since from the non-manifestation thereof would follow the non-manifestation of everything and the blindness of the universe.

Moreover, you cannot lay it down as a rule that superimposition is possible only on that thing which is पुरोऽवस्थित, that is, अपरोक्ष ( directly perceived ). Do not such people as have no discrimination superimpose surface, impurity etc. on the ether which is not directly perceived.

Ether ( आकाश ), though a substance, is yet devoid of form and touch ( रूप and स्पर्श ); hence it cannot be cognised by an external sense. Nor can it be cognised by the mind, since the unaided mind does not act in respect of what is external. Hence, ether is not perceived.

The word बालाः means अविवेकिनः—Those who possess no discriminative knowledge. तल्ल means surface. मलिनता is impurity.

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तमेतमेवंलक्षणमध्यासं पण्डिता 'अविद्या' इति मन्यन्ते, तद्विवेकेन च वस्तुस्वरूपावधारणं विद्यामाहुः। तत्रैवं सति यत्र यदध्यासः तत्कृतेन दोषेण गुणेन वा अणुमात्रेणापि स न संबध्यते । तमेतमविद्याख्यमात्मानात्मनोरितरेतराध्यासं पुरस्कृत्य सर्वे प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारा लौकिकाः प्रवृत्ताः, सर्वाणि च शास्त्राणि विधिप्रतिषेधमोक्षपराणि ।—( भाष्यम् )

This superimposition thus defined, wise men consider to be Nescience ( अविद्या ), and the ascertainment of the true nature of that which is ( the Self ) by means of the discrimination of that ( which is superimposed on the Self ), they call knowledge ( विद्या ). There being such knowledge neither the Self nor the Non-Self are affect-



ed in the least by any blemish or (good) quality produced by their mutual superimposition. It is in the wake of this aforementioned mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self, which is designated Nescience, that there proceed all empirical usages of the world relating to valid knowledge and the means thereof, and all the sacred teachings relating to injunction, prohibition and release.

### NOTES

The भाष्यकार defines this particular kind of अव्यास instead of giving its general nature alone. Why? Because : अविद्या or Nescience is the seed of all अनर्थ or evil. The superimposition of the Non-Self on the inner Self is alone the cause of all evils, not the delusion of silver etc., hence that alone is Nescience, since, in the absence of the knowledge of its nature (i.e. अविद्यास्वरूप), it cannot be removed, that alone is expounded and not superimposition in general.

विद्या is निर्विचिकित्सं ज्ञानम्, knowledge not subject to doubts प्रत्यगात्मनि खलु अत्यन्तविविक्ते बुद्ध्यादिभ्यः बुद्ध्यादिभेदाग्रहनिमित्तो बुद्ध्याद्यात्मत्वतद्भाष्यासः। तत्र श्रवणमननादिभिर्यद्विवेकज्ञानं तेन विवेकाग्रहे निवर्तिते, अध्यासापवाधात्मकं वस्तुस्वरूपावधारणं विद्या चिदात्मरूपं स्वरूपे व्यवतिष्ठत इत्यर्थः।—(भामती). The inner Self is absolutely distinct from intellect etc. When we are unable to apprehend this distinction between the Self and intellect etc., then we superimpose the nature and attributes of intellect etc., on the Self. But when study (of the वेदान्त), reflection etc., produce the knowledge of the distinctness (of the Self from the Non-Self), then the non-apprehension of this distinctness is removed. This results in the sublation of Nescience. That which sublates the Nescience

is विद्या or knowledge, viz., the apprehension of the true nature of what is ( the Self ). That is, then the nature of the intelligent Self stands forth in its nature.

We should not think that अविद्या is so deep-rooted and has got so deep impressions, that even though sublated by विद्या, it will come up again. For, तत्रैवं सति, when the true nature of the Self is realised, यत्र यदध्यासः तत्कृतेन दोषेण गुणेन वा अणुमात्रेणापि स न संबध्यते—then neither the Self nor the Non-Self, either of which had formerly been superimposed on the other, can be affected in the least by good or bad qualities of each other. एतदुक्तं भवति—तत्त्वावधारणाभ्यासस्य हि स्वभाव एव स तादृशः, यदनादिमपि निरुद्धनिविडवासनमपि मिथ्या-प्रत्ययमपनयति । तत्त्वपक्षपातो हि स्वभावो धियाम्, यथाहूर्वाद्या अपि—

निरुपद्रवभूतार्थस्वभावस्य विपर्ययैः ।

न बाधोऽयत्नवत्त्वेऽपि बुद्धेस्तत्पक्षपाततः ॥

इति । विशेषतस्तु चिदात्मस्वभावस्य तत्त्वज्ञानस्य अत्यस्तान्तरङ्गस्य कुतोऽनिर्वाच्यया अविद्यया बाध इति ।—( भासती )

The sense is :—The very nature of the repeated ascertainment of truth is that it removes illusory or wrong cognition, even when that wrong cognition is beginningless, deep-rooted and has deep impressions. The very nature of intellect is to be partial to truth. As even outsiders say :—

There can be no sublation ( बाध ) of the essential nature of things unaffected by error; for, the intellect, even though making no effort, has a partiality for it. More particularly, there can be no sublation of the wholly internal (intimate) knowledge of the truth, which is of the nature of the intelligent Self, by Nescience, which is indeterminate.



Making this अव्यास as the basis, all our व्यवहारs proceed. The व्यवहारs are of three kinds :—

(1) लौकिक—Usages in the ordinary every-day life.

(2) कर्मशास्त्रीय—Usages based on the scriptures which lay down विधिs (injunctions) or निषेधs (prohibitions). They are to be found in ऋग्वेद, etc.

(3) मोक्षशास्त्रीय—Based on the वेदान्त works propounding ब्रह्मन्, and free from विधि and निषेध, and they lead to मोक्ष.

कथं पुनरविद्यावद्विषयाणि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि चेति ? उच्यते—देहेन्द्रियादिष्वहंमर्माभिमानहीनस्य प्रमातृत्वानुपपत्तौ प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः । न हीन्द्रियाण्यनुपादाय प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः संभवति । न चाधिष्ठानमन्तरेण इन्द्रियाणां व्यापारः संभवति । न च अनध्यस्तात्मभावेन देहेन कश्चिद् व्याप्रियते । न चैतस्मिन् सर्वस्मिन्नसति आत्मनोऽसङ्गस्य प्रमातृत्वमुपपद्यते । न च प्रमातृत्वमन्तरेण प्रमाणप्रवृत्तिरस्ति । तस्मादविद्यावद्विषयाण्येव प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि चेति ।—( भाष्यम् )

But how can the means of valid knowledge such as perception, ( inference ) etc., and scriptural texts have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience ? The reply is : If a person is devoid of the conceit ( erroneous notion ) of ' I ' and ' mine ' in his body, senses, etc., he cannot be a knower ( प्रमाता ); and under these circumstances the operation of the means of valid knowledge is not possible. For without the employment of the senses, perception and the other means of valid knowledge cannot operate. And the functioning of the senses is not possible without control. Nor does anybody act by means of a body on which

the nature of the Self is not superimposed. And when none of these ( conditions ) is present, the unattached Self cannot become a knower. And without a knower there can be no operation of the means of valid knowledge. Hence perception and the other means of valid knowledge, and the scriptural texts have reference to that which is characterised by Nescience.

### NOTES

प्रमाण is defined as प्रमाकरणं प्रमाणम्—That which is the करण 'means' of प्रमा 'valid knowledge'. Now, the function of the means of valid knowledge is to determine truth and reality. How can these प्रमाणs be dependent on Nescience? And how can the शास्त्रs also be dependent on Nescience? To this the भाष्यकार replies : देहेन्द्रियादिषु, etc. ८

अहमभिमान—is the conceit or erroneous notion in the shape of establishing an identity between देहादि and आत्मन्. समाभिमान is the superimposition of the idea of possession (belonging to body, etc.) on the Self; it is the अभ्यास of the धर्मs or attributes of body on the Self.

The idea is प्रमातृत्वं हि प्रमां प्रति कर्तृत्वम् । तच्च स्वातन्त्र्यम् । स्वातन्त्र्यं च प्रमातुरितकारकाप्रयोज्यस्य समस्तकारकप्रयोक्तृत्वम् । तदनेन प्रमाकरणं प्रमाणं प्रयोजनीयम् । न च स्वव्यापारमन्तरेण करणं प्रयोक्तुमर्हती । न च कूटस्थनित्यश्चिदात्मा अपरिणामी स्वतोव्यापारकम् । तस्मात् व्यापारवद्बुद्ध्यादितादात्म्याध्यसात् व्यापारवत्तया प्रमाणमधिष्ठातुमर्हतीति भवत्यविद्यावत्पुरुषविषयत्वमविद्यावत्पुरुषाश्रयत्वं च प्रमाणानामिति ।— ( भाष्यम् ) । To be a knower is to be an agent in respect of knowledge. To be an agent is to be independent. And independence lies in the fact that the knower himself is not subject to the operation of any instrument, but operates all the instruments. So, it is he ( the knower ) who should use the प्रमाणs, the means of valid knowledge. Nor can an instrument be incited without activity on an agent's part.



Nor can the unchangeable, eternal, intelligent Self, which is incapable of transformation, be active of itself. Hence, being active by the superimposition of the nature of the intellect etc., which are active, the Self can control the means of valid knowledge; therefore, the means of valid knowledge have reference to, i. e., are located in the person characterised by Nescience.

And the व्यवहार in the shape of प्रत्यक्ष, etc., cannot result without the employment of इन्द्रियसु not function of themselves? Why do they require a knower? To this we reply—न चाधिष्ठानमन्तरेण (without an अधिष्ठान, superintendence, guidance, control) इन्द्रियाणां व्यापारः। Never do the instruments function in respect of their objects without being controlled by an agent. And इन्द्रियसु are instruments.

Again, if you say—Let body be the controller, then we reply—No. न चानध्यस्तात्मभावेन देहेन कश्चिद् व्यापियते... A body cannot do anything unless the Self is superimposed on it. For, otherwise, functioning would result even in सुषुप्ति—dreamless sleep.

And unless there is this mutual superimposition between the Self and the Non-Self, the unattached Self cannot be understood to become the knower. And unless the Self as the knower is recognised, there can be no activity of the means of valid knowledge.

Let us see how the Self and the Non-Self are mutually superimposed. What is the nature of प्रमा or valid knowledge? If it is pure and eternal intelligence then it should require no प्रमाता (or knower) for its आश्रय; and then, the इन्द्रियसु or instruments of knowledge would also become useless. If प्रमा is merely the functioning of internal organ alone, without any consciousness or intelligence, then there will be no cognition. For, the functions of जडान्तःकरण must also

be जड. Hence प्रमा or valid knowledge is a variety of the modification of internal organ ( अन्तःकरणपरिणामभेद ), directed towards the object known, and is of the nature of intelligence ( चित्स्वभाव ) residing in the agent. And how could a modification of the inert ( जड ) internal organ ( अन्तःकरण ) be of the nature of intelligence, if the intelligent Self were not superimposed thereon ? How, again, could this have the intelligent Self as agent, if the functioning internal organs were not superimposed on the intelligent Self ? Hence, from reciprocal superimposition, there results the fruit called valid knowledge, which resides in the intelligent Self as agent; when that results, there results knowership.

Therefore, अविद्यावद्विषयाण्येव प्रत्यक्षादीनि, etc.

पञ्चादिभिर्वाविशेषात् । यथा हि पञ्चादयः शब्दादिभिः श्रोत्रादीनां सम्बन्धे सति, शब्दादिविज्ञाने प्रतिकूले जाते ततो निवर्तन्ते, अनुकूले च प्रवर्तन्ते; यथा दण्डोद्यतवरं पुरुषमभिमुखमुपलभ्य ' मां हन्तुमयमिच्छति ' इति पलायितुमारभन्ते, हरितवृण्पूर्णपाणिमुपलभ्य तं प्रति अभिमुखीभवन्ति; एवं पुरुषा अपि द्युत्पत्तिचिन्ताः क्रूरदृष्टीनाक्रोशतः खड्गोद्यतकरान् बलवत उपलभ्य ततो निवर्तन्ते, तद्विपरीतान् प्रति प्रवर्तन्ते । अतः समानः पञ्चादिभिः पुरुषाणां प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारः । पञ्चादीनां च प्रसिद्ध एव अविवेकपूर्वकः प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः । तत्सामान्यदर्शनाद् द्युत्पत्तिमतामपि पुरुषाणां प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारस्तत्कालः समान इति निश्चीयते ।--( भाष्यम् )

( That human cognitional activity has for its presupposition the superimposition described above ), follows also from the non-difference in that respect of men from animals. For instance, animals etc., when their sense of hearing etc., are brought into contact with sound etc., that



is unfavourable, recede from them, and if it is favourable, approach them; and as they, seeing a man approach with a raised stick in his hand, begin to run away thinking, 'he desires to beat me,' but seeing him with his hand filled with green grass, proceed towards him; in the same way, men too—who possess a higher intelligence—run away when they see strong fierce-looking fellows drawing near with shouts and brandishing swords; while they approach persons of an opposite character. Therefore, men and animals follow the same course of procedure with reference to means and objects of valid knowledge. And it is well-known that the empirical usage relating to perception, etc. is based on non-discrimination. And since we see a similarity to them, it is concluded that even in the case of men possessing higher intelligence, empirical usage pertaining to perception etc., is for the time-being, similar.

### NOTES

यश्चादिभिश्चाविशेषात्—Even wise men behave like animals with regard to perception, etc. For, what is wisdom or विद्वत्त्व ?—Is it the *realisation* in the shape of अहं ब्रह्मास्मि, or is it only a *logical conviction* about the distinctness of the Self from the Non-Self? With regard to व्यवहार in the case of the first alternative, it will be pointed out later on—बाधिताध्यासानुवृत्त्या व्यवहारः ( The empirical usage is based upon the continuation of the sublated delusion ). In the second alternative, we know that conviction based upon mediate (परोक्ष) reasoning cannot uproot an immediate (अपरोक्ष) error (आन्ति). Hence, even discriminating people are similar to animals at the time of व्यवहार. Both act under superimposed conditions.

This is elucidated in the lines यथा हि etc. शब्दादिभिः श्रोत्रादीनां संबन्धे सति, that is, when they cognise a sound.

by means of the contact of organ of hearing with its object, they recede from it if the sound is unfavourable, but approach it if it is favourable.

Here the श्रोत्रादीनां शब्दादिभिः संबन्धः is the direct perception ( प्रत्यक्ष ). The fruit of that प्रत्यक्ष ( perception ) is the condition of sound ( शब्दादिविज्ञान . The प्रतिकूलत्व or अनुकूलत्व of the sound is the fruit of अनुमान ( inference ). The process is—after cognising the nature of the sound, and remembering the unfavourableness of a similar sound previously cognised, we can infer the unfavourableness of the present sound. Thus, this passage gives both the प्रमाणs, viz., प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान. This is illustrated in the remaining lines of this paragraph.

तत्कालः—सं व्यवहारकाल इव कालो यस्य सः । That is व्यवहार-समये, व्युत्पन्नानामपि पुत्रां तादृशमेव अविद्यावरवं यादृशं पशूनामिदमर्थः—intelligent people, in their व्यवहार, are as much under the influence of Nescience as the animals.

शास्त्रीये तु व्यवहारे यद्यपि बुद्धिपूर्वकारी नाविदित्वा आत्मनः परलोकसंबन्धमधिक्रियते, तथापि न वेदान्तवेद्यम्, अशनयाद्यतीतम्, अपेतब्रह्मक्षत्रादिभेदम्, असंसार्यात्मतत्त्वमधिकारेऽपेक्ष्यते, अनुप-योगाद्, अधिकारविरोधाच्च । प्राक् च तथाभूतात्मविज्ञानात् प्रवर्तमानं शास्त्रमविद्यावद्विषयत्वं नातिवर्तते । तथा हि—‘ ब्राह्मणो यजेत ’ इत्यादीनि शास्त्राण्यात्मनि वर्णाश्रमवयोऽवस्थादिविशेषाध्यासमाश्रित्य प्रवर्तन्ते ।—( भाष्यम् )

But in the case of that empirical usage which is found-  
ed on the Veda, although no person with fore-thought, unless he knows the relation of the Self to the other world, will consider himself eligible for it, still, the true Self that can be known only from the Vedānta texts



as free from hunger etc., divested of differentiations like Brāhmaṇa, Kṣattiya, etc., and transcending transmigration, is not required for eligibility; for, the true Self is of no service and is opposed to eligibility. And before such knowledge of the Self has arisen, the Vedic texts continue in their operation, to have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience. For instance, texts like—'A Brāhmaṇa shall sacrifice'—are operative only when based on the superimposition on the Self of differentiations like, caste, order of life, age, etc.

### NOTES

If it be asked—let there be अध्यास in लौकिकव्यवहार; but how can there be any अध्यास in शास्त्रीयव्यवहार? In such injunctions as—ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत, the person directed is fully conscious that स्वर्ग cannot be attained by the body. This body is burnt to ashes after death. Hence, it is the आत्मन् who is going to attain the स्वर्ग. Thus, a बुद्धिपूर्वकारी—a person who acts after due reflection—knows that आत्मन् is connected with परलोक. He is fully cognisant of the fact that देह cannot go to स्वर्ग. Hence, when the Vedic texts order such a person (a बुद्धिपूर्वकारी), then they are not taking into consideration the देहात्माध्यास, but आत्मन् alone. So, how can you say that even in शास्त्रीयव्यवहार there is अध्यास, and it is founded on Nescience?

To this we reply—We can grant that शास्त्रs take into consideration the आत्मन् and not the देह. But what kind of आत्मन् do the शास्त्रs speak of? Not that kind of आत्मन् as is taught in the Vedāntas. The Self taught in the Vedānta texts is free from all such desires as hunger, etc. Such a Self, being free from the desire for स्वर्ग, cannot be eligible for Sacred teaching of the शास्त्रs. Again, the Self taught in the Upanisads etc., is free from all such distinctions as ब्राह्मण,

क्षत्रिय, etc. Such a Self cannot form the subject-matter of injunction like ब्राह्मणो यजेत etc. Moreover, the Self taught in the Vedāntas is अवसारी, beyond transmigration. But the आत्मन् enjoined to act in the Śāstras is he that wants to go to स्वर्ग. Thus, it is clear that the Self taught in the Vedānta texts is not eligible for the activities enjoined in the Vedic texts; nor is the Vedāntic Self of any use there.

And before such a Self as taught in the Vedānta texts is realised, any sacred teaching that functions does so with regard to objects dependent on अविद्या. All what they talk about is characterised by अविद्या. Hence, the आत्मन् that they talk about is अध्यस्त or superimposed. What is superimposed on the आत्मन्? The भाष्यकार replies—वर्णाश्रम etc. भामती illustrates the different अध्यास as follows :—

वर्णाध्यासः 'भूजा राजसूयेन यजेत' इत्यादि. । आश्रयाध्यासः 'गृहस्थः सदृशीं भार्यां विन्देत्' इत्यादिः । वयोऽध्यासः 'कृष्णकेशोऽग्नीनादधीत' (He whose hair is black is to tend the fires) इत्यादिः । अवस्था-ध्यासः 'अप्रतिसमाधेयव्याधीनां जलादिप्रवेशेन प्राणत्यागः' (persons who are suffering from incurable diseases should give up their life by entering water, etc.) इत्यादिः ।

'अध्यासो नाम अतस्मिन्स्तद्बुद्धिः' इत्युच्यते । तद्यथा—पुत्रभार्या-दिषु विकलेषु सकलेषु वा 'अहमेव विकलः, सकलो वा' इति बाह्यधर्मानात्मन्यध्यस्यति, तथा देहधर्मान् 'स्थूलोऽहम्, कृशोऽहम्, गौरोऽहम्, तिष्ठामि, गच्छामि, लङ्घयामि च', इति; तथेन्द्रियधर्मान् 'मूकः काणः, क्लीबो, बधिरोऽन्धोऽहम्' इति; तथान्तःकरणधर्मान् कामसंकल्पविचिकित्साध्यवसायादीन् । एवमहंप्रत्ययिनमशेषस्वप्रचार-साक्षिणि प्रत्यगात्मन्यध्यस्य तं च प्रत्यगात्मानं सर्वसाक्षिणं तद्विपर्ये-येणान्तःकरणादिष्वध्यस्यति ।—( भाष्यम् )

We have already said that superimposition is the cognition as something of what is not that. For instance, a man



superimposes the attributes of external things on his Self if he thinks himself as sound or unsound when his wife, son, etc. are sound or unsound; similarly, he superimposes the attributes of his body on his Self if he thinks himself fat, lean, fair, standing, going or jumping; similarly, he superimposes the attributes of senses on his Self when he regards himself as dumb, or one-eyed, impotent, deaf or blind; similarly, he superimposes on his own Self the attributes of the internal organ like desire, resolve, doubt, determination etc. In this way after superimposing the denotation of the concept of "I" on the inner Self that is the witness of its entire activities, and *vice versa* one superimposes that inner Self, the witness of all, on the internal organ, etc.

### NOTES

The भाष्यकार having thus established the nature of अभ्यास in the shape of the reciprocal superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self, and having strengthened this theory by establishing the अभ्यास as the means of the operation of प्रमाणप्रेमयव्यवहार, he reminds us of the definition of अभ्यास in order to show that it is the cause of all evil.—अभ्यासो नाम अतस्मिन् etc. Now he gives the various sorts of अभ्यास :

(1) of external things on the Self, as the soundness or unsoundness of wife, son, etc., is considered to be his own soundness or unsoundness by a man. पञ्चपादिका illustrates it as follows :—If a person gives clothes, ornaments, etc., to the child of a neighbour, then the father considers himself obliged, the donor of gifts is also actuated by the feeling that he is obliging the father of the child and not the child itself.

(2) of the attributes of the body on the Self, like fatness, etc.

(3) of the attributes of the sense-organs on the Self, like deafness, dumbness, etc.

(4) of the attributes of अन्तःकरण (internal organ) on the Self, like desire, resolve, etc.

Thus we see in this arrangement the increasing intimacy of the succeeding अध्यास. These four instances illustrate the धर्माध्यास—the superimposition of the attributes on the Self.

In the next line एवमहंप्रत्ययिनं, etc., the भाष्यकार states the अध्यास of धर्मिन् or substrate.

अहंप्रत्ययिनम्, that is—अहंप्रत्ययो वृत्तिर्यस्मिन्नन्तःकरणादौ, सोऽयमहंप्रत्ययी. The अन्तःकरण or the internal organ has the notion of 'I' or Ego. This Ego is superimposed on the inner Self, which is the witness of all the modifications (अशेषप्रचारः) of the अन्तःकरण, internal organ (here denoted by the word स्व); conversely, the आत्मन् is superimposed on the inner Self.

Here भामतीकार defines जीव...अन्तःकरणाद्यवच्छिन्नः प्रत्यगात्म इदमनिदंरूपश्चेतनः कर्ता भोक्ता कार्यकारणविद्याद्वयाधारोऽहंकारास्पदं संसारी सर्वानर्थसंभारभाजनं इतरेतराध्यासोपादानः । — जीवात्मा is the inner Self, but अवच्छिन्न (i.e., circumstanced, limited or defined) by अन्तःकरण. The जीवात्मा is again that चेतन or intelligent being which is इदमनिदंरूप, compounded of the 'this' (चैतन्य or चिच्छक्ति) and the 'Non-this' (जडता or अचित्त्व). He is the agent and the enjoyer. He is the आधार or substrate of the two kinds of Nesciences, अविद्या, namely the कार्याविद्या (resulting from the succession of erroneous impressions) and the कारणाविद्या (the beginningless अविद्या, the prime cause of all भ्रमः). He is अहंकारास्पदं, the substrate of the notion of 'I'. He is संसारी, that is, transmigrating from one birth to another. He is the receptacle of all woes. And, lastly, he is the material cause of reciprocal superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self.

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एवमयमनादिरनन्तो नैसर्गिकोऽध्यासो मिथ्याप्रत्ययरूपः कर्तृत्व-  
भोक्तृत्वप्रवर्तकः सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्षः । अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहृणाय  
आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते । यथा चायमर्थः  
सर्वेषां वेदान्तानां, तथा वयमस्यां शारीरकमीमांसायां प्रदर्श-  
यिष्यामः ।—( आद्यम् )

Thus, this beginningless and endless natural super-  
imposition, of the nature of illusory cognition, which causes  
agency, enjoyership, etc., is directly experienced by the  
entire world. It is for the removal of this cause of evil,  
for the attainment of the knowledge of the oneness of the  
Self, that the study of the Vedānta texts is commenced.  
That all the Vedānta texts have this purport, we shall show  
in this Sārīraka-mīmāṃsā.

### NOTES

अनादिरनन्तः—that is, impossible to be removed except by  
true knowledge. The cause of its अनाद्यनन्तत्व is that it is  
नैसर्गिक, natural. मिथ्याप्रत्ययरूपः means अनिर्वचनीय, indeter-  
minable.

आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये—For obtaining the knowledge that  
nothing else is true except the One Self. This Self is  
entirely dissociated from the universe. Its nature is आनन्दरूप  
The वेदान्त texts destroy अध्यास from its very root and  
certainly bring about the attainment of the knowledge about  
the Self.

शारीरकमीमांसा—शरीरमेव शरीरकम्=body. तत्र निवासी शारीरको  
जीवात्मा—शारीरक means the जीव who resides in the body.  
तेस्य त्वंपदामिधेयस्य तत्पदामिधेयपरमात्मरूपतया या मीमांसा सा  
तथोक्ता । (आमती). In the महावाक्य 'तत् त्वं असि' (तत्त्वमसि),  
the word त्वम् stands for the जीवात्मन् and तत् for परमात्मन्  
The purpose of the मीमांसा (inquiry) is that the जीव who goes  
under the designation of त्वम् is of the nature of परमात्मन्  
who is designated by the word तत्.

अत्र...3

Here a question arises as to how this introductory भाष्य is connected with the text of the सूत्रs.

The definition of भाष्य is—

सूत्रार्थो वर्ण्यते यत्र वाक्यैः सूत्रानुकारिभिः ।

स्वपदानि च वर्ण्यन्ते भाष्यं भाष्यविदो विदुः ॥

That is, in the भाष्य, the words of the सूत्रs as well as the words coming in the भाष्य should be thoroughly explained. The sense of the first सूत्र, अथातो ब्रह्माज्ज्ञासा is —साधनचतुष्टयसम्पन्नस्य मोक्षसाधनब्रह्मज्ञानाय वेदान्तवाक्यविचारः कर्तव्यः—Here the Vedānta texts should be discussed in order that a person who is endowed with the four साधन (इहामूत्रफलभोगाविराग etc.) might get the ब्रह्मज्ञान which will lead to salvation. But the introductory भाष्य does not touch this idea. Hence, the relation of this भाष्य with the सूत्रs should be established.

To this reply :—We divide this introductory भाष्य into two parts :

(1) युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोः etc. to अहमिदं ममेदमिति नैस. गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः ।

(2) अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणाय आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते ।

Now, the first part tells us the विषय or the Subject-matter of this शास्त्र; and the second part indicates the प्रयोजन or the purpose for which this शास्त्र should be studied. But, if it be asked, how only these two portions lay down the विषय and प्रयोजन? We reply—because they bring forth the idea of अध्यास which is the cause of the study of this शास्त्र.

If it be asked again—Well, अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणाय आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते, this line alone can give us the विषय and प्रयोजन. अनर्थहेतोः प्रहाणाय is our प्रयोजन and



आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपात्ति is our विषय. Still, we do not understand the utility of the remaining भाष्य. What do you say to this?

We reply :—The सूत्रs lay down ब्रह्मज्ञान as the destroyer of the cause of अनर्थ (अनर्थहेतु). ज्ञान (knowledge) destroys अज्ञान (ignorance). If the idea of कर्तृत्व and भोक्तृत्व (in the आत्मन्) is due to अज्ञान, then only we can say that ब्रह्मज्ञान is the destroyer of the अनर्थहेतु. Thus the सूत्रकार himself, indicating that ब्रह्मज्ञान is the destroyer of अनर्थहेतु, suggests that the notion of कर्तृत्व, भोक्तृत्व etc. is due to अविद्या. This introductory भाष्य establishes that अविद्या is the cause of the notion of कर्तृत्व भोक्तृत्व etc. This अविद्या is caused by अध्यास. Hence, we see the utility and the connection with the सूत्रs, of this introductory भाष्य.

In the following lines M. M. Anantakṛṣṇa Shastri gives us the views of the different भाष्यs on the वेदान्तसूत्रs

“अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा” इत्यादि “अनावृत्तिः शब्दात्” इत्यन्तं चतुरध्यायात्मकं ब्रह्ममीमांसाशास्त्रमिति श्रीशंकरभगवत्पादादिप्रतानुयायिनः “अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा” इत्यादि विंशत्यध्यायात्मकं तदिति भगवद्भामा-  
नुजादिप्रतानुयायिनः । तत्र भास्कराचार्याः ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चयवादिनः, भगव-  
द्भामानुजादयः शंकरभगवत्पादाश्च ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चयासंभववादिनः ।  
ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चयो नाम ज्ञानवत्कर्मणोऽपि मोक्षोपयोग इति तदुभयसम-  
प्राधान्यमेव । अयमेव भास्कराचार्यसिद्धान्तः ।

भगवद्भामानुजादयस्तु मन्वते...सत्यं न विरोधो ज्ञानकर्मणोः, तथापि, तु न तयोः समप्राधान्यम् । शास्त्राणि मुक्तिसाधनं ब्रह्मोपासनामात्रं प्रति-  
पादयन्ति, न तु कर्माणि । कर्म तु चित्तशुद्धिद्वारा ब्रह्मज्ञानोपकारकमात्रं  
तदङ्गमेव भवितुमर्हति, न तु मोक्षसाधनमपि । उपकारकत्वं च कर्मणो  
ऽनुष्ठानद्वारा तज्जन्मन्येव संभवति न तु जन्मान्तरीयानुष्ठानेन जन्मान्तर  
उपकारो भवति । तत्तज्जन्मनि कर्मानुष्ठानं च कर्मविचारं विना नोपपद्यत  
इति मीमांसैकत्ववाद एवेति ।

शंकरभगवत्पादास्तु-ब्रह्मज्ञानं मोक्षसाधनं प्रमाणपरतन्त्रसाक्षात्कार-  
रूपमेव, नतु पुरुषतन्त्रमुपासनारूपम् । तत्र च कर्मणो न सहभावो न  
वोपकारकत्वमपि । अधिकारिणां चित्तशुद्धयाधानमात्रेण कर्मणां पर्यवसानम्,  
जन्मान्तरीयानुष्ठानेनापि कर्मं चित्तशुद्धिद्वारोपकरिष्यति । धर्मजिज्ञासायाः  
प्रागप्यधीतवेदान्तो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायामधिकरोति । देवतानां स्वयंप्रतिभात-  
वेदान्तानां कथमन्यथा कर्मानधिकारिणां ब्रह्मविद्यायामधिकारः ? कथं वा च  
ब्रह्मचर्यादेव संन्यस्तानां ब्रह्मविद्याप्रवृत्तिः सप्रयोजनाः ? यदि कर्म-  
स्वरूपविचाराधिकार-तदनुष्ठानादि नियतमधिकारिधर्मः स्यात्, यदि वा  
पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसे अभिन्ने भवेताम्, इति ज्ञानकर्मासमुच्चयेऽपि शास्त्रभेद  
एव प्रामाणिकः, न तु तदेकत्वम् ।

शुद्धाद्वैतमतानुयायिनो ब्रह्मभाचार्या द्वैतसम्प्रदायाचार्या मध्वाचार्या  
णपि शास्त्रभेदसिद्धान्तमेवानुसरन्ति । तत्र प्रथममते भक्तिप्राधान्यस्यैव  
विवक्षितत्वात् कर्मज्ञानभक्तीनां सर्वेषां साधनानां पुरुषोत्तमज्ञानोत्पत्ताव-  
पेक्षणेऽपि न विशिष्टः कश्चन संबन्धः कर्ममात्रस्य ज्ञानेन सह वर्तते ।  
द्वितीयमते तु सत्यमस्ति कर्मणो ज्ञानोपकारकत्वम्, तथापि शास्त्रैक्यं तु  
नावश्यकमिति वस्तुस्थितिः । सर्वथा तु ब्रह्ममीमांसाशास्त्रमेव वेदान्तशास्त्रम् ।

(Extract from प्रदीप,—a commentary on शाङ्करभाष्य pub-  
lished from Calcutta along with other eight commentaries).

इति भाष्योपोद्घातः

## अथ प्रथमं जिज्ञासाधिकरणम्

—The first topic dealing with जिज्ञासा or Desire to know  
(Brahman).

वेदान्तमीमांसाशास्त्रस्य व्याचिन्तयितव्यस्येदमादिमं सूत्रम् ।—  
(भाष्यम्)

अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ॥ १ ॥ १ ॥ १ ॥



तत्राथशब्दः आनन्तर्यार्थः परिगृह्यते, नाधिकारार्थः, ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया अनधिकार्यत्वात् । मङ्गलस्य च वाक्यार्थे समन्वयाभावात् । अर्थान्तर-  
प्रयुक्त एव ह्यथशब्दः श्रुत्या मङ्गलप्रयोजनो भवति । पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षायाश्च  
फलत आनन्तर्याव्यतिरेकात् । सति च आनन्तर्यार्थत्वे, यथा धर्म-  
जिज्ञासा पूर्ववृत्तं वेदाध्ययनं नियमेनापेक्षते, एवं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासापि  
यत्पूर्ववृत्तं नियमेनापेक्षते, तद्वक्तव्यम् । स्वाध्यायानन्तर्यं तु समानम् ।  
—( भाष्यम् )

Of this sacred teaching with the Enquiry into Vedānta (texts), which is proposed to be explained, the first aphorism is as follows :—

**Then therefore the Desire to know Brahman. I.i.1.**

The word अथ (then) is taken in the sense of "immediate succession"<sup>१</sup> and not in the sense of "what is begun"; for the desire to know Brahman cannot be what is begun. And the sense of "auspiciousness" has no syntactical relation with the sense of the sentence. Rather, the word अथ, when used in another sense even, can bring about auspiciousness by the mere sound of it. And "reference to what has gone before", does not differ in effect from immediate succession. And when the meaning is "immediate succession", just as the desire to know Religious Duty relates invariably to the study of the Vedas that has gone before, similarly, there must be stated something which has gone before, to which the desire to know Brahman too invariably relates. Immediate succession to the study of one's own Veda is, however, common.

### NOTES

The word अथ has four senses :—

- (1) आनन्तर्यम्—Immediate succession.
- (2) अधिकारः—What is begun.
- (3) मङ्गलम्—Auspiciousness.

(4) पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षा or प्रकृतादर्थादर्थान्तरत्वम्—Reference to what has gone before.

The भाष्यकार accepts the first meaning and rejects the other three. This meaning is accepted by शबरस्वामिन् also in his भाष्य on पूर्वमीमांसासूत्र of जैमिनी. It would be interesting to compare शाबरभाष्य here which must have been before शङ्कराचार्य when he wrote his शारीरकमीमांसा. In fact many of the words, phrases and ideas are taken verbatim from शाबरभाष्य by शङ्कराचार्य. For comparison, a few extracts are given below —

### शाबरभाष्यम् ।

तत्र लोकेऽयमथशब्दो वृत्तादनन्तरस्य प्रक्रियाथो ह्यः । न चेह किंचिद्वृत्तमुपलभ्यते । भवितव्यं तु तेन यस्मिन् मत्यनन्तरं भर्मजिज्ञासाऽवकल्पते । तथाहि—प्रसिद्धपदार्थकः स कल्पितो भवति । तत्तु वेदाध्ययनम् । तस्मिन् हि सति माऽवकल्पते नैतदेवम् । अन्यस्यापि कर्मणोऽनन्तरं धर्मजिज्ञासा युक्ता प्रागपि च वेदाध्ययनात् । उच्यते—तादृशीं तु धर्मजिज्ञासामधिकृत्याथशब्दं प्रयुक्तगनाचार्यो या वेदाध्ययनमन्तरेण न संभवति ।.....इष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनं नाम ।

धर्मः प्रसिद्धो वा स्यादप्रसिद्धो वा । स चेत्प्रसिद्धो न जिज्ञासितव्यः अथाप्रसिद्धो नतराम् । धर्मं प्रति हि विप्रतिपक्षा बहुविदः । केचिदन्यं धर्ममाहुः केचिदन्यम् । सोऽयमविचार्य प्रवर्तमानः केचिदेवीपाददानो विहन्येत, अनर्थं च ऋच्छेत् ।

### शांकरभाष्यम् ।

तत्राथशब्द आनन्तार्यार्थः परिगृह्यते नाधिकाशार्थः । पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षयाश्च फलन आनन्तर्यव्यतिरेकात् । सति चानन्तार्यार्थत्वे यथा धर्मजिज्ञासा पूर्ववृत्तं वेदाध्यायनं नियमे नापेक्षतेः एवं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासापि यत्पूर्ववृत्तं नियमेनापेक्षते, तद्वक्तव्यम् । स्वाध्यायानन्तर्यतु समानम् । नन्विह कर्मावबोधनान्तर्यं विशेषः । धर्मजिज्ञासायाः प्रागप्यधीतवेदान्तस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपपत्तेः । तस्मात्किमपि वक्तव्यं, यदनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपदिश्यत इति ।

तत्पुनर्ब्रह्म प्रसिद्धमप्रसिद्धं वा स्यात् । यदि प्रसिद्धं, न जिज्ञासितव्यम् । अथाप्रसिद्धं, नैव शक्यं जिज्ञासितुमिति । तद्विशेषं प्रति विप्रतीपत्तेः ।.....एवं बहवो विप्रतीपक्षा युक्तीवाक्यतदाभाससमाश्रयाः सन्तः । तत्राविचार्य यत्किंचित्प्रतिपद्यमानो निःश्रेयसात्प्रतिहन्येतानर्थं च इयात् ।



The भाष्यकार says that we cannot take the word अथ in the sense of अधिकार—"What is begun", as is done in such sentences as अथ शब्दानुशासनम् or अथ योगानुशासनम्. Why?—Because the *desire to know* Brahman is not something which can be begun. Nobody can begin a 'desire'. The word जिज्ञासा can have two senses—(1) ज्ञानेच्छा—desire to know, and (2) विचार or सीमांसा, inquiry. If we take the first sense then the meaning of the सूत्र (while we take the word अथ in the sense of "What is begun") will be—"The desire to know Brahman is begun", which is absurd. We do not start desire in every section, 'but inquiry' actuated by desire. We cannot take the other sense of inquiry also. For, then the सूत्र will mean "Then, therefore, the inquiry into Brahman". In this sense, we shall have to supply the word कर्तव्या (should be done). If we supply the word कर्तव्या reading the सूत्र as अतो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्या, the word अथ becomes redundant. Hence, we should not take the word अथ in the sense of "what is begun," but in the sense of "immediate succession" or sequence.

As regards the sense of मङ्गल, we cannot take it primarily. For, then the सूत्र will stand as मङ्गलं, अतो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा. Here, the word मङ्गल has no relation with the meaning of the sentence. We cannot understand the aphorism as—therefore, the desire to know Brahman is *auspiciousness*. As regards the view that the सूत्रकार has used the word अथ in the sense of auspiciousness, for, मङ्गलाचरण should be done in the beginning of his work, we say, No. Even when the word अथ indicates another sense, it can suggest मङ्गल by its very pronouncement.

Now, पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षा or 'what has gone before' also cannot be the sense of अथ. Because, पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षा does not "in effect" differ from आनन्तर्य. भामतीकार explains it as follows

न वयमानन्तर्यार्थतां व्यसनितया रोचयामहे. किं तु ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाहेतु-  
भूतपूर्वप्रकृतसिद्धये । सा च पूर्वप्रकृतार्थापेक्षत्वेऽप्यथशब्दस्य सिध्यतीति  
व्यर्थं आनन्तर्यार्थत्वावधारणाग्रहोऽस्माकमिति । तदिदमुक्तम् 'फलतः' इति ।  
परमार्थतस्तु कल्पान्तरोपन्यासे पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षा, न चेह कल्पान्तरोपन्यास  
इति पारिशेष्यादानन्तर्यार्थं एवेति युक्तम् ।—

We are not obstinate about आनन्तर्यार्थं. That is, it is not  
due to our obstinacy that we stick to the sense of "imme-  
diate succession" of the word अथ. All what we want to  
secure by this sense is—some antecedent factor (something  
which has gone before), which will serve as the *cause* of the  
desire to know Brahman. Of course, that sense can be got  
even when we take the word अथ meaning "depending on  
what has gone before". Therefore, any obstinacy on our  
part to fix अथ in the sense of आनन्तर्य would be vain. Hence  
भाष्यकार uses the word फलतः — in effect. Really speaking  
we depend on what has gone before when we are stating any  
alternative (or another view). And since, here, there is no  
alternate view stated, we must take the view of "immediate  
succession" alone.

Now, when we have fixed "immediate succession" as  
the sense of अथ we must state that on which our जिज्ञासा in-  
variably depends. In धर्मजिज्ञासा, शबरस्वामिन् says — भवितव्यं  
तु तेन यस्मिन् सत्यनन्तरं धर्मजिज्ञासाऽवकल्पते । तत्तु वेदाध्ययनम् ।  
तस्मिन् हि सति साऽवकल्पते ।—The study of the Vedas is the  
required event, after the accomplishment of which inquiry  
into धर्म can follow. If it be said, let वेदाध्ययन precede our  
inquiry also, we say No. For, says मामतीकार—तथा च 'अथातो  
धर्मजिज्ञासा' इत्यनेनैव गतमिति नेदं सूत्रमारब्धव्यम्. धर्मशब्दस्य वेदार्थं  
मात्रोपलक्षणतया धर्मवद् ब्रह्मणोऽपि वेदार्थत्वाविशेषेण वेदाध्ययनानन्तर्यो  
पदेऽसांभ्यादित्यर्थः—

This आनन्तर्य (succession to वेदाध्ययन) is understood even



from the सूत्र, अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा. Hence, there will be no necessity to begin the present सूत्र 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा'. For the word धर्म used in अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा, comprehends the entire sense of the Vedas; and like धर्मजिज्ञासा, even ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा is the sense of the Vedas; the teaching about आनन्तर्य (immediate succession) to the study of the Vedas applies equally to both.

नन्विह कर्मावबोधानन्तर्यं विशेषः । न, धर्मजिज्ञासायाः प्रागपि अर्धीतवेदान्तस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपपत्तेः । यथा च हृदयाद्यवदानानामानन्तर्यनियमः, क्रमस्य विवक्षितत्वात्, न तथेह क्रमो विवक्षितः । शेषशेषित्वे अधिकृताधिकारे वा प्रमाणाभावात्, धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः ;  
— (भाष्यम्)

Now, what is here distinctive is immediate succession to a knowledge of ritual (which is acquired by means of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā). (To this we reply ) No; because, it is, possible for a man to have the desire to know Brahman, if he has studied the Vedānta texts, even prior to a desire to know Religious Duty. And there is the rule of immediate succession in respect of the cutting of heart, etc., because, there, the order of succession is intended to be declared; but here no similar order of succession is intended to be declared; for, there is no authority for the relationship of subsidiary and principal or of eligibility of the person already eligible as between the desire to know Religious Duty and Brahman.

## NOTES

In the last section, it was pointed out that स्वाध्यायानन्तर्य would not satisfy us. Invariable priority of स्वाध्याय will then become common to धर्मजिज्ञासा as well as ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा, the two entirely different sciences. And unless we point

out something special, the two sciences will become one. Here, the opponent comes with another explanation. He says that the real purport of स्वाध्याय is कर्मविबोधन. As it is said by शबरस्वामिन् in his भाष्य on I. i. I. — दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मविबोधनं नाम—The useful purpose served by the study of the Veda has been found to be that it makes known to us our duties. Hence, स्वाध्यायान्तर्य—immediate succession to the study of the Vedas—will serve this special purpose here that nobody who has not already acquired the knowledge of the ritual and performed it will be eligible for the study of the वेदान्त texts. That is, the study of the Purvamīmāṃsā must necessarily precede the ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा. Moreover, there is the श्रुति passage in our support :—‘तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन । ब्राह्मणा विविदिषद्भित्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसाऽनाशकेनेति’ ‘The Brāhmanas desire to know him (आत्मन्) by the study of the Vedas, by sacrifice by charity, by penance of fasting.’ So, here we see that the performance of यज्ञs, etc., is the means to आत्मसाक्षात्कार. Hence, ब्रह्मविचार should, in the fitness of things follow कर्मविचार.

To this we reply : No. For, a person, though not performing religious rites, can yet be of purified intellect, because of rites performed in a prior existence. There is no need for the observance of ritual for him even for bringing about वैराग्य in his mind. Because, rituals performed in previous birth will lead to वैराग्य. It is such a person that the श्रुति has in mind when it says — यदि वेतथा ब्रह्मचर्यादेव प्रव्रजेत्. As regards the श्रुति — ‘जायमानो वै ब्राह्मणस्त्रिभिर्ऋणवाञ्छायते’—‘A Brāhmana is born with three obligations,’—and the स्मृति—

ऋणानि त्रीण्यपाकृत्य मनो मोक्षे निवेशयेत् ॥ (मनु. ६-३५)

‘Having discharged three obligations, a person should devote his mind to salvation.’ we reply that these passages



refer to that person who is entering the गृहस्थ stage. [The three ऋणस or obligations are (1) to the gods, (discharged by performing sacrifices), (2) to the manes, (discharged by begetting sons), and (3) to the sages, (discharged by the study of the Vedas and observance of Brahmacharya)]. Otherwise, these passages will stand in opposition to the श्रुति passage यदि वेत्तव्या ब्रह्मचर्यादेव प्रव्रजेत्. And the discharge of these obligations even for a गृहस्थ are prescribed for the purification of his intellect.

तस्मात्तस्यानन्तर्यमथशब्दार्थः यद्विनाब्रह्मजिज्ञासा न भवति, अस्मिन्सु सति भवन्ती भवत्येव । न चेत्थं कर्मावबोधः । तस्मान्न कर्मावबोधानन्तर्य-मत्राथशब्दार्थः ।—(भामती).

Hence the word अथ denotes the 'immediate succession' to that in the absence which the desire to know Brahman does not arise, but in the presence of which it does arise. And the knowledge of Ritual is not of this nature. Therefore, the word अथ here does not signify the immediate succession to the knowledge of ritual.

If it be said that we find a kind of order of sequence in the following passages according to which the three obligations must be discharged before entering samnyāsa. And as these obligations require the study of the Ritual (पूर्वमीमांसा), it naturally follows that the study of the वेदान्त texts (leading to samnyāsa) is subsequent to the study of the पूर्वमीमांसा. The texts are :—

गृही भूत्वा वनी भवेत् वनी भूत्वा प्रव्रजेत् (जाबालोपनिषद् ४)-

अधीत्य विधिवद्वेदान्पुत्रांश्चोत्पाद्य धर्मतः ।

इष्ट्वा च शक्तितो यज्ञैर्मनो मोक्षे निवेशयेत् ॥ and

अनधीत्य द्विजो वेदाननुत्पाद्य तथात्मजान् ।

अनिष्ट्वा चैव यज्ञं च मोक्षमिच्छन्व्रजत्यद्य ॥ (मनु. ६३६-३७)-

We reply :— There is no rule of immediate succession of ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा to धर्मजिज्ञासा as we find in हृदयस्याग्रेस वदति अथ

जिह्वाया अथ वक्षसः—‘One should cut the heart *first*, *then* the tongue, *then* the sides.’ Here the order of sequence is shown by the words अथ (first) and अथ (then). But such a sequence is not meant here. Otherwise, why should the same श्रुति say in a later passage — यदि वैतरथा ब्रह्मचर्यादेव प्रव्रजेद्रहाद्वा वनाद्वा. All this shows that the most important thing is वैराग्य. The moment one gets वैराग्य, one is entitled to enter samnyāsa, as is shown by another श्रुति passage — यदहरेव विरजेत्तदहरेव प्रव्रजेत्. As regards the passage — अनधीत्य रद्विजो वेशान् etc., censuring the conduct of those people who enter samnyāsa without discharging the three obligations, it refers to people whose minds are not purified अविशुद्धसत्त्वो हि मोक्षमिच्छन्नालस्यात्तदुपायेऽप्रवर्तमानो गृहस्थधर्ममपि नित्यनैमित्तिकमनाचरन् प्रतिक्षणमुपचीयमानपाप्मा अधोगतिं गच्छतीत्यर्थः।—(भामती). A person of impure intellect desiring salvation, but not setting about the means there of because of laziness, will not observe the obligatory (नित्य) and occasioned (नैमित्तिक) rites of a गृहस्थ. He will thus go on the downward path with his load of sins increasing every moment.

Here it will be useful to know as to how the order of sequence is determined by the मीमांसकसु when several acts are enjoyed to be performed by a sacrificer.

Sequence or क्रम may be settled by direct *statement* (श्रुत sense (अर्थ), the order of *mention* in the texts (पाठ), the *position* of that whose sequence is to be settled (स्थान), the sequence adopted in the *principal* (मुख्य), or the sequence adopted in the first *procedure* (प्रवृत्ति).

(1) श्रुति—This is the clearest indication. Direct statement may be by the participial क्त्वा suffix, as in गृही भूत्वा चनी भवेत्. Such a sequence, of course, is sublated by the next passage of the श्रुति, यदि वैतरथा ब्रह्मचर्यादेव प्रव्रजेत्।



(2) अर्थ or sense or utility is the next determinant of sequence. The Sūtra of Jaimini is अर्थाच्च ( पूर्वमीमांसा ५.१.२. ) —‘Order of sequence is also determined on the basis of “efficiency” (use)’. For instance, the injunction अग्निहोत्रं जुहोति (one should offer *agnihotra*) comes first, and then comes the injunction ओदनं पचति or यवागूं पचति ( he should cook the rice or he should cook the barley gruel ); and on account of the impossibility of this order being adopted in practice (as until the rice or gruel has been cooked, no offerings can be made), the cooking of rice or gruel has to be done first.

(3) पाठक्रम—Order of sequence as laid down by ‘Verbal Text’, or *mention*. जैमिनी reads— क्रमेण वा नियम्येत क्रत्वेकत्वेः तद्गुणत्वात् (पूर्वमीमांसा ५.१.४.)—‘At any one sacrifice, the acts should be performed in a definite Order of Sequence: such being the nature of actions.’ The दर्शपूर्णमास consists of six rites, three to be performed at the full moon and three at the new moon. They are (1) आग्नेय, अग्निषोमीय and आनुबन्ध्य, and (2) आग्नेय, ऐन्द्रं दधि and ऐन्द्रं पयः. For either set of three, there is a set of subsidiaries called fore-sacrifices (प्रयाजः). They are mentioned in the following order. समिधो यजति, तनूनपातं यजति, इडो यजति, बहिर्यजति स्वाहाकारं यजति । (तैत्तिरीयसंहिता २.६.१.१.) [He should offer the समिध, —he should offer the तनूनपात् —he should offer the इड्, —he should offer the बहिष्, — he should offer with the syllable स्वाहा. ] In regard to this, there arises the question—Are these offerings to be made at random, without any definite Order of Sequence? Or is that Order of Sequence to be adopted in which the Verbal texts laying down the acts appear? The पूर्वपक्ष view is that— “As there are no rules restricting the Order of Sequence, on definite Order be adopted.”

Against this, we have the following सिद्धान्त—At any one sacrifice, the act should be performed in a definite Order of

Sequence; why;—because such is the very nature of actions; things are generally found to have the character of being done in a definite order; for instance, in the case of the sentence स्नायादनुलिप्तेत्, मुञ्जीत च, it is understood that the acts are to be performed in the order as they are mentioned. And as the names of these rites ( प्रयाजाः ) occur to the mind in the order of *mention*, they should be performed in that order. They are learnt in that order, in accordance with the injunction to study one's Veda, and the texts serve the purpose not only of making known the rites, but also of recalling them to mind for the sake of their observance. कुमारिल has also remarked — अतः स्वाध्यायेन पदार्थज्ञानं भावयेत्क्रमज्ञानं चेत्यर्थः ।

(4) स्थान—Position. साद्यस्क is a particular kind of Soma-sacrifice. ज्योतिष्टोम is the archetype ( प्रकृति ) of the साद्यस्क, which is Ectype ( विकृति ). At the ज्योतिष्टोम, three animals are sacrificed in the following order :— (1) the अग्निपोमीय animal is sacrificed on the 'Previous Day', the औषवसस्थ, (2) the सवनीय animal is sacrificed on the 'Extraction Day', at the Morning Extraction, after the offering of the cup dedicated to the अश्विन्s, (3) the अनुबन्ध्य animal is sacrificed after the Final Sacrificial Bath.—In accordance with the general law regarding Archetypes and Ectypes, the order at साद्यस्क would have been the same as at ज्योतिष्टोम, had it not been for the special injunction that at the साद्यस्क sacrifice, all the three animals should be sacrificed together सह पशूनालभेत. On which day, then, are they all to be offered ? The reply is :—On the second day—the day to which the सवनीय animal belongs in the प्रकृतियाग ( ज्योतिष्टोम )—, after collecting the Soma in the Cup dedicated to the अश्विन्s. For, in this way, each of the animals is moved out of its place by one day alone; whereas in any other way, there would be a



disturbance of two days for one or other of the animals. And on the second day, the सवनीय animal is to be approached first, because the offering of that animal belongs eminently to that day, and from the originative injunction in the archetype, it is understood to follow immediately on the filling up of the cup dedicated to the अश्विन्स. The other two animals may be approached either in the order belonging to them in the archetype, or without regard for any special sequence. Thus is sequence settled by *position* (स्थान). स्थानाच्चोत्पात्तिसंयोगात्—(पूर्वमीमांसा ५. १. १३)—The Order of Sequence can be determined on the basis of *position* also, as it is connected with the originative injunction.

(5) मुख्य—जैमिनी lays down—

(पूर्वमीमांसा ५. १. १४)—The Order of Sequence at the subsidiary should follow the order of the Principal because the accessories are meant to subserve the purpose of the Principal. Sequence among the subsidiaries may be settled in conformity with that in the *Principal* rite (मुख्य). When such an order is adopted, the intervals between the subsidiaries and their respective principals would be equal, otherwise, there would be a larger interval in some cases, and in others none at all. The offerings in the आग्नेय, etc., have to be sprinkled with the ghee left over from the fore-sacrifices (गयाजाः) The (आग्नेय) comes first and the ऐन्द्रं दधि comes next, the sprinkling of the respective materials should follow the same order. If the latter (materials for the ऐन्द्रं दधि), were sprinkled first then the former (materials for the आग्नेय), since the आग्नेय has to be offered up first, between the sprinkling of the materials and their offering there would be no interval at all, while there would be too long an interval in the case of ऐन्द्रं दधि.

(6) प्रवृत्ति—Procedure or Commencement. जैमिनी lays down:—प्रवृत्त्या तुल्यकालानां गुणानां तदुपक्रमात् (पूर्वमीमांसा ५. १. ८)—

'In a case where it is possible for several details to be performed at one time, their order of Sequence is to be determined at one time, their order of Sequence is to be determined by the Order of Commencement,' because {the performance began in that order. In connection with the वाजपेय sacrifice, we read सप्तदश प्राजापत्यान् पशूनालभते — He should sacrifice seventeen animals dedicated to Prajāpati. Over all these animals certain 'embellishments', like 'sprinkling of water' and the rest are to be performed. Now from among these embellishments, the first may be started with any one animal one may choose (there is no restriction as to that), but in regard to the second and succeeding embellishments, there arises the question — Should the second embellishment also be done to that same animal to which the first was done? Or is there no restriction regarding the second and other embellishments? The reply is — The second and succeeding embellishments also should commence with the same animal with which the first had started. — "Why so?" — *Because the performance began in that order.* As a rule the details of an action should not be very far removed in time from the Primary Act (to which they belong); because it is the Primary Act that is meant to be performed; and it is only when that is done that it affords the occasion for the other details. We have also a declaration speaking of their being done together — "The Primary Act should be performed *along with* all the details.' But in a case where many details have been prescribed, some sort of remoteness (from the Primary) is inevitable; but the intervention between the two should be only by such details as just saves that from immediate sequence; any thing more than that should not be allowed to intervene, Thus then, if the second embellishment began with an animal other than the one with which the first embellishment had been started,



then there would be an intervention of more than what is unavoidable.

All these determinants are stated here in the descending order; the preceding one is superior to the following one.

Keeping all these determinants of sequence in his mind, the भाष्यकार says— शेषशेषित्वे प्रमाणाभावात्—शेष means अङ्ग or subsidiary ; शेषिन् means अङ्गिन् or प्रधान or principal. The relation between धर्मजिज्ञासा and ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा is not that of principal and subsidiary, as it is between the आग्नेय and the समिध etc. (see पाठक्रम above). There the आग्नेय is शेषिन् and समिधे etc. are शेष. When such actions are prescribed for a man to be performed by him at one time, there the necessity of determining the Order of Sequence of several Acts arises; and this order is determined by such determinants as पाठ स्थान, etc. We have no proof that could convince us of the subsidiary nature of ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा to धर्मजिज्ञासा.

Nor is there any authority for the relationship of अधिकृताधिकार—of eligibility of the person already eligible, as we find in the statements दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यामिष्ट्वा सोमेन यजेत "Having performed the दर्शपूर्णमास sacrifice, one should perform the सोम sacrifice". Here the person eligible for सोम sacrifice is that who has already performed (अधिकृत) the दर्शपूर्णमास sacrifice. It has been shown that even where there is explicit use of क्त्वाप्रत्यय, indicative of sequence, no sequence is intended as shown in गृही भूत्वा वनी भवेत्. In the case of ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा (desire to know ब्रह्मन्) there is not even such a suffix to be explained away. Therefore, the existence of the sequence as between the सोम sacrifice and दर्शपूर्णमासेष्टि has no application here, that being a case of the explicit use of the principal suffix क्त्वा (दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यामिष्ट्वा सोमेन यजेत).

फलजिज्ञास्यभेदाच्च । अभ्युदयफलं धर्मज्ञानम् , तच्चानुष्ठानापेक्षम् ; निःश्रेयसफलं तु ब्रह्मज्ञानम् , न चानुष्ठानान्तरापेक्षम् । भव्यञ्च धर्मो जिज्ञास्यो न ज्ञानकालेऽस्ति, पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रत्वात् । इह तु भूतं ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यं नित्यवृत्तत्वान्न पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रम् । चोदनाप्रवृत्तिभेदाच्च । या हि चोदना धर्मस्य लक्षणम् , सा स्वविषये नियुञ्जाना एव पुरुषमवबोधयति । ब्रह्मचोदना तु पुरुषमवबोधयत्येव केवलम् ; अवबोधस्म चोदनाजन्यत्वान्न पुरुषोऽवबोधे नियुज्यते । यथा अक्षार्थसंनिकर्षेणार्थावबोधे, तद्वत् ।—( भाष्यम् )

There is also difference in the fruit and the object of the desire to know. The knowledge of the Religious Duty has for its fruit Prosperity, and it (viz., the knowledge of Religious Duty) depends on the performance of religious acts; the knowledge of Brahman, on the other hand, has beatitude for its fruit and it does not depend on the performance of any acts. Acts of religious duty, the object of the desire to know, have yet to come into existence; they do not exist at the time of knowing, for they depend on the activity of man. But, here, Brahman, the object of the desire to know, is already existent; and on account of eternal existence, that Brahman does not depend on human energy. There is also difference in the operation of the text. The text which defines Religious Duty, instructs a person only by engaging him in an activity. The text dealing with Brahman, on the other hand merely instructs the person; since the knowledge is to be produced from the text, the person is not directed (to activity) in respect of knowledge. As in the case of knowledge of an object produced from the contact of the sense-organ with the object, so is it here.



## NOTES

Another argument which goes against the Order of Sequence between the two मीमांसाs is—फलजिज्ञास्यमेदाच्च. Neither the fruit nor the object of जिज्ञासा is one in the case of the two मीमांसाs. The fruit of the knowledge of धर्म is धन्युदय or prosperity, which is of a transitory character; and धर्मज्ञान depends on the performance of religious acts. But ब्रह्मज्ञान has for its fruit निःश्रेयस, मोक्ष or beatitude and ब्रह्मज्ञान does not depend on the performance of any act whatsoever. Not only in फल do the धर्मज्ञान and ब्रह्मज्ञान differ, but also with regard to the way in which each is brought about. धर्मज्ञान can never be complete or of any use unless the religious acts taught are not actually performed. But in ब्रह्मज्ञान we require no performance of religious or other acts.

Moreover, the Religious Duty ( धर्म ) does not come into existence unless a man engages himself in performing it. But ब्रह्मन् is eternal and therefore, does not depend for its existence on human activity.

चोदनाप्रवृत्तिभेदाच्च—The word चोदना is a technical term of मीमांसा and it has been defined by कुमारिलमठ—

किमाद्यपेक्षितैः पूर्णः समर्थः प्रत्ययो विधौ ।

तेन प्रवर्तकं वाक्यं शास्त्रेऽस्मिंश्चोदनोच्यते ॥

(श्लोकवार्तिक १११.२।३)

किं केन कथमित्यपेक्षितैः साध्यसाधनेतिकर्तव्यतांशैः पूर्णः संबद्धार्यको लिङादिर्विधौ पुरुषप्रवर्तने समर्थो भवति । तत्पूरकं च वाक्यमिति 'प्रवर्तकं वाक्यम्' एव चोदनेत्युच्यत इत्यर्थः ।

(प्रभा on शाबरभाष्य Ānandāśrama edn. Vol., I. p. 12.)

चोदना means an '*injunctive text*', a sentence which urges a man to perform an act, fully showing the object, the instrument and the method of performing an action. For instance, यजेत स्वर्गकामः. So, in मीमांसा, चोदनेति क्रियायाः प्रवर्तकं वचनमाहुः ( शाबरभाष्य ), a man is taught to perform some act.

The भाष्यकार uses the word चोदना, not in its technical सीमांसा sense, but in the ordinary meaning of a Vedic text.

So, we see that there is a difference between धर्म and ब्रह्मन् even with regard to the scriptural texts which teach them. धर्मचोदना or an-injunctive text, while urging a person to perform some act, informs that person even about the nature of the act to be performed; for, otherwise a man cannot engage in the performance of that act. But the Scriptural texts dealing with ब्रह्मन् only inform about the nature of ब्रह्मन्; they cannot urge a person to activity. Information of knowledge entirely depends on the nature of the object and not on the will of a person ;as we see in the case of the knowledge of घट. घटज्ञान is produced from the contact of इन्द्रिय ( अक्ष ) with घट. As soon as there is a contact of the eye with a jar, we cognise the jar without any effort on our part. Similar is the case with ब्रह्मज्ञान. How is it? भासतीकार replies.

न तावद्ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारे पुरुषो नियोक्तव्यः, तस्य ब्रह्मस्वाभाव्येन नित्यत्वात् अकार्यत्वात्। नाप्युपासनायाम्, तस्या अपि ज्ञानप्रकर्षे हेतु-भावस्यान्वयव्यतिरेकसिद्धतया प्राप्तत्वेनाविधेयत्वात्। नापि शाब्दबोधे, तस्याप्यधीतवेदस्य पुरुषस्य विदितपदतदर्थस्य समधिगतशाब्दन्याय-तत्त्वस्याप्रत्यूहमूत्पत्तेः :—

A person is not to be directed (to activity) in respect of the intuition (साक्षात्कार) of ब्रह्मन्, for, that, being of the nature of ब्रह्मन् is eternal and not to be produced; nor in respect of contemplation (उपासना); for, by the method of Agreement and Difference, उपासना leads only to the excellence of knowledge and it, therefore, cannot be the object of an injunction; nor in respect of knowledge through verbal testimony; for that too arises unhindered in him who has studied the Vedas, knows the words and their meanings and understands the true principles governing knowledge gained through verbal testimony.



तस्मात् किमपि वक्तव्यं, यदनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा उपदिश्यते इति । उच्यते—नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः, इहामुत्रार्थभोगविरागः, शमदमादिसाधनसंपत्, मुमुक्षुत्वं चेति । तेषु हि सत्सु, प्रागपि धर्मजिज्ञासाया ऊर्ध्वं च शक्यते ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितुं ज्ञातुं च; न विपर्यये । तस्मात् अथ-शब्देन यथोक्तसाधनसंपत्त्यानन्तर्यमुपदिश्यते ॥—( भाष्यम् )

Therefore, something must be stated subsequent to which the desire to know Brahman is taught. The statement is—discrimination of things which are eternal or non-eternal; non-attachment to the enjoyment of fruit here or hereafter; possession in abundance of calmness, equanimity and other such means; and desire for release. If these conditions exist, even prior to a desire to know Religious Duty, and after that too, it is possible to desire to know Brahman and also to know not in their absence. Therefore, by the word अथ (then) is taught “immediate succession” to possession in abundance of the means stated above.

### NOTES

नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः—विवेक or discrimination stands in the sense of निश्चय or certitude. The certitude should be of the following nature:— Everything except the आत्मन्, is अनित्य or non-eternal, because it is an effect like a jar; the आत्मन् alone, which is not an effect is eternal.

इहामुत्रार्थभोगविराग means that firm attitude of the mind which is opposed to all the objects of desire, except those which are absolutely essential for the upkeep of the present body.

शमदमादिसाधनसम्पत्—the six साधनस or means viz., (1) शम, mental control; (2) दम, the control of external senses; (3) उपरति, giving up of even obligatory acts in order to obtain knowledge; (4) तितिक्षा, endurance of heat, cold etc.;

- (5) समाधान, attention and concentration of the mind; and  
 (6) श्रद्धा, faith.

**मुमुक्षुत्व**—desire for मोक्ष or release. मोक्ष is the release from बन्ध or bondage in the shape of relating the आत्मन् with Nescience and its effects.

तस्य च नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावब्रह्मज्ञानं मोक्षस्य कारणमित्युपश्रुत्य तज्जिज्ञासा भवति धर्मजिज्ञासायाः प्रागूर्ध्वं च; तस्मात्तेषामेवानन्तर्यं न धर्मजिज्ञासायाः ।—(भामती)

For a person who has heard that the knowledge of the eternally pure, intelligent and free ब्रह्मन् is the cause of मोक्ष, there comes the desire to know that even before and (sometimes) after the desire to know Religious duty; hence, the immediate succession is to them alone, not to the desire to know Religious Duty.

अतः शब्दो हेत्वर्थः । यस्माद्वेद एव अग्निहोत्रादीनां श्रेयः-साधनानामनित्यफलतां दर्शयति 'तद्यथेह कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयते, एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते' (छां. ८. १. ६) इत्यादिः, तथा ब्रह्मविज्ञानादपि परं पुरुषार्थं दर्शयति 'ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्' (तै. आ. १. १. १.) इत्यादिः, तस्मात् यथोक्तसाधनसंपत्त्यनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्या ।—(भाष्यम्)

The word 'therefore' signifies a reason. Because in the Veda itself, texts like "Therefore, as here the enjoyment acquired by an act perishes, even so, hereafter, the enjoyment acquired through Religious Duty perishes", show that अग्निहोत्र etc. which are means to prosperity, have an impermanent fruit; and because it is shown that the supreme goal of man results from the knowledge of ब्रह्मन् by texts like "One who knows ब्रह्मन् attains the Supreme", therefore, in immediate succession to the possession in abundance of the means stated above, there should be the desire to know ब्रह्मन्,



## NOTES

भामतीकार here states the objections to the desire to know ब्रह्मन् in the following words :—

सत्यं यथोक्तसाधनसंपत्त्यनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा भवति । सैव त्वनुपपन्ना, इहामुत्रफलभोगविरागस्यानुपपत्तेः । अनुकूलवेदनीयं हि फलम्, इष्टलक्षणत्वात्फलस्य । न चानुरागहेतावस्य वैराग्यं भवितुमर्हति । दुःखानुपपन्नदर्शनात्सुखेऽपि वैराग्यमिति चेत्, हन्त भोः सुखानुपपन्नाद् दुःखेऽप्यनुरागो न कस्मान्नवति? तस्मात्सुखे उपादीयमाने दुःखपरिहारे प्रयतितव्यम्; अवर्जनीयतया दुःखमागतमपि परिहृत्य सुखमात्रं भोक्ष्यते । तत्र या—तस्यार्थी सशक्तान्सकण्टकान्मत्स्यानुपादत्ते, स यावदादेयं तावदादाय निवर्तते; यथा वा धान्यार्थी सपलालानि धान्यान्याहरति, स यावदादेयं तावदादाय निवर्तते । तस्माद् दुःखभयात्तानुकूलवेदनीयमैहिकं वासुप्तिकं वा सुखं परित्यक्तमुचितम् । न हि मृगाः सन्तीति शालयो नोप्यन्ते, भिक्षुकाः सन्तीति स्थाल्यो नाधिश्रीयन्ते । अपि च इष्टं सुखं चन्दनवनितादिसङ्गजन्म क्षयिता; लक्षणेन दुःखेनात्रातत्त्वादातिभीरुणा त्यजेतापि, न त्वासुप्तिकं स्वर्गादि-तस्याविनाशित्वात् । श्रूयते हि—‘अपाम सोमममृता अमृम ।’ तथा च ‘अक्षयं ह वै चातुर्मास्ययाजिनः सुकृतं भवति’ इति । तस्माद्यथोक्तसाधनसंपत्त्याभावाच्च ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेति प्राप्तम् । एवं प्राप्ते आह भगवान्सूत्रकारः ‘अतः’ इति । तस्यार्थं व्याचष्टे भाष्यकारः—‘यस्माद्वेद एव’ इति ।

The passage means :—Granted, that there will be ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा if साधनसंपत्ति exists in a man. But that साधनसंपत्ति itself is unintelligible, for non-attachment to fruits in this world and hereafter is unintelligible. फल or fruit is something which is advantageous, because fruit is always desired. Hence, how can a man have non-attachment towards फल. Towards फल, indeed, he should have attachment. If it be said : A man has non-attachment towards सुख (pleasure) even because of its admixture with pain; we reply, that on the same analogy a person ought to have attachment even towards दुःख because of its admixture with सुख. Therefore,

a man should try to gain happiness and remedy pain. If pain is unavoidable, then it should be remedied and only pleasure ought to be enjoyed. For instance, a person desiring to get fishes, brings them covered with moss and full of bones. But he removes the moss and bones and takes the desired for portion. Or, a person desiring for wheat etc., brings it covered with straw, then throws away the straw and retains only the grains. Therefore, for fear of pain one should not give up the enjoyments of this world and the next. For fear of deer, nobody gives up sowing rice; or for fear of beggars, people do not cease from cooking. More over, it may be that the worldly objects like sandal, woman, etc. are full of misery because these objects are non-eternal. But what about the pleasures of the next world? स्वर्ग etc. are eternal. The Vedic texts also declare — "We drank Soma and became immortal," or "the merit of a चातुर्मास्य sacrificer cannot diminish." Hence it follows that as the acquisition of साधनसंपत्ति is unintelligible, ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा cannot take place. To this the सूत्रकार replies with the word अतः, which is explained by भाष्यकार in the following words — यस्माद्वेद एव etc.

अयमभिसंधिः—सत्यं मृगमित्तक्षुकादयः शक्याः परिहर्तुं पाचककृपीवलादिभिः; दुःखं त्वनेकविधानेककारणसपातजमशक्यपरिहारम् अन्ततः साधनपारतन्त्र्यक्षयितालक्षणयो दुःखयोः समस्तकृतकसुखाविनाभावनियमात्। न हि मधुविषसंपृक्तमश्वं विषं परित्यज्य मधुमिश्रं शक्यं क्षिप्तिवरेणापि भोक्तुम्। क्षयितानुमानोपोद्धूलितं च 'तद्यथेह कर्मचितः' इत्यादिवचनं क्षयिताप्रतिपादकम्. 'अपाम सोमम्' इत्यादिकं वचनं मुख्यासंभवे जघन्यवृत्तितामापादयति। यथाहुः पौराणिकाः—'आभूतसंश्लवं स्थानममृतत्वं हि भाष्यते' इति।—(भामती)

The sense is—Granted that deer, beggars etc. can be avoided by farmers, cooks, etc.; but misery or pain, which is due to various causes of different sorts, is impossible to



be avoided. For all happinesses which are produced (कृतक), are inseparable from the miseries of साधनपारतन्त्र्य (depending on external means) and क्षयिता (diminution). Howsoever clever a person might be, he cannot remove poison alone from the food mixed with honey and poison, and eat the food mixed with honey alone. The Vedic texts like—तद्यथैह कर्मचितः (just as the enjoyments acquired in this world by acts, etc.) bring about a secondary sense for texts like अपाम सोमम् etc. As the पौराणिकसः say—“Immortality is permanence till the dissolution of the living beings.”

ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा । ब्रह्म च वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणम्  
‘जन्माद्यस्य यतः’ इति । अत एव न ब्रह्मशब्दस्य जात्याद्यर्थान्तर-  
माशङ्कितव्यम् । ब्रह्मण इति कर्माणि षष्ठी, न शेषे; जिज्ञास्यापेक्षत्वा-  
ज्जिज्ञासायाः; जिज्ञास्यान्तरानिर्देशाच्च ।—( भाष्यम् )

ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा is the desire to know ब्रह्मन्. And ब्रह्मन् is that whose definition will be given in the next सूत्र — जन्माद्यस्य यतः. Therefore, the word ब्रह्मन् should not be mistaken to mean a caste, etc. The genitive case in ब्रह्मणः is in the sense of object and not in the residuary sense; because the desire of knowledge demands an object of desire and no other such object is stated.

### NOTES

The भाष्यकार expounds the समास in ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा as ब्रह्मणः जिज्ञासा, a षष्ठीतत्पुरुषः. This expounding is shown in order to exclude a चतुर्थीतत्पुरुषः (ब्रह्मणे जिज्ञासा) which is resorted to by शबरस्वामिन् in his भाष्य as धर्माय जिज्ञासा. This चतुर्थी is called तादर्थ्य (‘for the sake of that’) and is laid down by पाणिनी in his सूत्र—‘चतुर्थी तदर्थार्थबलिहितसुखरक्षितैः’ But according to कात्यायन, this चतुर्थीसमास is restricted to those cases only where one member denotes the basic object ( प्रकृति ) and the other

member denotes the modification of that very basic object (विकृति)—तादर्थ्यसमासे प्रकृतिविकृतिग्रहणं कर्तव्यम्—e.g., यूपाय दारु, = यूपदारु, a piece of wood meant for sacrificial post. Here the यूप or sacrificial post, is made out of, or is a modification of the other member of the compound namely, दारु. Hence we must resort to पठितत्पुरुष here, because, there is no प्रकृतिविकृति relation between ब्रह्मन् and जिज्ञासा.

The word ब्रह्मन् has several senses; cf. 'वेदस्तत्त्वं तपो ब्रह्म ब्रह्मा विप्रः प्रजापतिः' (अमरकोषः). It means Veda, God, penance, Brāhmaṇa and Prajāpati. Which of the senses is intended here? We reply—The sense which will be given in the following सूत्र—जन्माद्यस्य यतः।

The word जिज्ञासा is derived from the root ज्ञा to know. The desiderative form of the root will be जिज्ञास्. To this form the suffix अ is added by अप्रत्ययात् in the feminine gender. Finally it takes the आ of feminine gender and the word becomes जिज्ञासा. Here the affix अ is a कृत्. Hence the पठि in ब्रह्मणः is ordained by the सूत्र—कर्तृ-कर्मणोः कृति, which means—The sixth case affix is employed after the word, in denoting the agent and the object, when used along with a word ending with a कृत् affix. For example, कृष्णस्य कृतिः—the doing of कृष्ण—; here कृष्ण is the agent or कृती of 'the doing' expressed by the word कृति (which is derived with a कृत् affix; hence, there is पठि in कृष्णस्य; similarly, in जगत्: कर्ता कृष्णः—कृष्ण is the creator of the world,—जगत् is the object or कर्म of 'creation' and therefore, जगत् is used in पठिविभक्ति because of the word कर्ता (which is derived with a कृत् affix). In the same way, जिज्ञासा being a derivative with a कृत् affix, ब्रह्मन् the object of जिज्ञासा is put in पठि. Thus, ब्रह्मणः is कर्मणि पठि.

We should not construe it as शेषेपठि (the genitive case is employed to denote merely 'a relation'). If we take शेषपठि



the sense of ब्रह्मणा जिज्ञासा will be ब्रह्मसंबन्धिनी जिज्ञासा. An objector might argue that if you take शेषपट्टी then जिज्ञासा of ब्रह्मन् will include in itself all such things as the स्वरूप nature-प्रमाण (valid means of knowledge), युक्ति (reasoning), साधन (the means of attainment) and the प्रयोजन (fruit) about ब्रह्मन्. But if you take कर्मणि पट्टी then the word ब्रह्मन् will only signify 'the object' that is only the स्वरूप of ब्रह्मन्. In this case, प्रमाण, युक्ति, साधन, etc., will not be comprehended.

To this the भाष्यकार replies जिज्ञासापेक्षत्वाजिज्ञासाया. जिज्ञासा is really ज्ञानस्य इच्छा—the desire to know. ब्रह्मन् is the object of knowledge. Knowledge cannot be determined unless there is some object of it. Knowledge must always be of 'something'; we cannot have knowledge, pure and simple, unconnected with 'something'. Hence, जिज्ञासा primarily requires the object of the 'desire to know'. When we say 'the desire to know', the first question that arises is to know—'what? Hence, the first thing which is needed is the object of जिज्ञासा, which is ब्रह्मन्. So, it is कर्मणि पट्टी.

Moreover, if there were any other thing (except ब्रह्मन्) to be known primarily, then we could take that other thing as the कर्म and could allot the subsidiary position (of संबन्धसामान्य) to ब्रह्मन्. But, as there is no other thing desired to be known except ब्रह्मन्, we shall have to take कर्मणि पट्टी in ब्रह्मन् and not शेषे पट्टी.

ननु शेषपट्टीपरिग्रहेऽपि ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासाकर्मत्वं न विरुध्यते; संबन्धसामान्यस्य विशेषनिष्ठत्वात् । एवमपि प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मणः कर्मत्वं-मुत्सृज्य, सामान्यद्वारेण परोक्षं कर्मत्वं कल्पयतो व्यर्थः प्रयासः स्यात् ।  
—( भाष्यम् )

Now, even if we accept the genitive case in the subsidiary sense, ब्रह्मन् can still be the object of the desire to know; for, the general relation is based on the more particular one. To this the reply is—Even thus, by rejecting ब्रह्मन् as the direct object and then again by introducing it as the indirect object, the effort will be useless.

### NOTES

The objector here again raises the plea of शेषपट्टी. He says that शेष is संबन्धसामान्य or general relationship; it is a relationship which is not expressed by any कारकविभाक्त—a direct relationship of a word with the verb. But a general relationship is made up of particular relationships; a general notion is made up of several particular ones. In this way, there can be no clash, no contradiction with ब्रह्मन् being regarded as कर्म.<sup>९</sup>

Here the objector does not disclose his mind entirely. Hence, the reply given by the भाष्यकार also is to the point. The भाष्यकार says—Why should we give up the direct objectness of ब्रह्मन् and assume indirect objectness? This will be an absolutely needless procedure.

The objector makes his point clear in the next few lines—

ननु न व्यर्थः, ब्रह्माश्रिताशेषविचारप्रतिज्ञानार्थत्वादिति चेत्, न, प्रधानपरिग्रहे तदपेक्षितानामप्यर्थाक्षिप्तत्वात्। ब्रह्म हि ज्ञानेनाप्तुमिष्टतमत्वात्प्रधानम्। तस्मिन् प्रधाने जिज्ञासाकर्मणि परिगृह्यते, यैर्जिज्ञासितैर्विना ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितं न भवति, तान्यर्थाक्षिप्तान्येव इति न पृथक् सूत्रयितव्यानि। यथा 'राजासौ गच्छति' इत्युक्ते सपरिवारस्य राज्ञो गमनमुक्तं भवति, तद्वत्। श्रुत्यनुगमाच्च। 'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते' इत्याद्याः श्रुतयः 'तद्विजिज्ञासस्व तद्ब्रह्म' इति



प्रत्यक्षमेव ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासाकर्मत्वं दर्शयन्ति । तच्च कर्मणि षष्ठीपरिग्रहे सूत्रेणानुगतं भवति । तस्माद्ब्रह्मण इति कर्मणि षष्ठी ।—( भाष्यम् )

Not useless; since it would have the purpose of premissing inquiry into everything that is dependent on ब्रह्मन्; if this be said, we reply, no; because on the acceptance of the principal; whatever is dependent on it will be presumptively implied. ब्रह्मन्, indeed, being what is most desired to be attained by knowledge is the principal. When we accept that principal one which is the object of the desire to know, those things, without a desire to know which will not be the desire to know ब्रह्मन्, will certainly be presumptively implied hence they are not to be separately stated in the aphorism. Just as when it is said 'Here goes the king', what is stated is the going of the king along with his retinue, so is it here. And it is so, also, because of conformity with Scripture passages beginning with "That from whence these beings are born", in the passage, "Desire to know that; that is ब्रह्मन्", (Taitt. Up. III.1) quite explicitly show that ब्रह्मन् is the object of the desire to know. And all this will conform to the aphorism, if the genitive case is accepted in the sense of object. Hence, "of ब्रह्मन् ( ब्रह्मणः )" is in the genitive case in the sense of object.

## NOTES

The objector now discloses his entire view. He says that by resorting to शेषषष्ठी what we mean is that we promise to inquire into स्वरूप, प्रमाण, युक्ति, साधन and प्रयोजन of ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा. All these details cannot be comprehended if we take कर्मणि षष्ठी. In the latter, ब्रह्मन् as a कर्म can denote only the स्वरूप of ब्रह्मन्,

To this the भाष्यकार replies elaborately that by taking the principal thing, all its subsidiaries are comprehended. This

view is supported by such sentences as राजासौ गच्छति which we use every day. Moreover in the श्रुति passages also ( तद् विजिज्ञासस्व, तद् ब्रह्म ), we find the word ब्रह्मन्, used as an object. Hence we resort to कर्मणि पठौ.

ज्ञातुमिच्छा जिज्ञासा । अवगतिपर्यन्तं ज्ञानं सन्वाच्याया-  
इच्छायाः कर्म, फलविषयत्वादिच्छायाः । ज्ञानेन हि प्रमाणेनावगन्तु-  
मिष्टं ब्रह्म । ब्रह्मावगतिर्हि पुरुषार्थः, निःशेषसंसारबीजाविद्याद्यनर्थ-  
निवर्हणात् । तस्माद्ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यम् ॥—( भाष्यम् )

जिज्ञासा is the desire to know. The knowledge culminating in realisation is the object of desire denoted by the affix सन्; because fruit is the content of desire. Knowledge thus is the valid means by which the realisation of ब्रह्मन् is desired to be obtained. The realisation of ब्रह्मन् is the highest end of man because it destroys the root of all evil such as Nescience, the seed of the entire transmigration. Hence ब्रह्मन् is what is desired to be known.

### NOTES

Now, the भाष्यकार explains the word जिज्ञासा as ज्ञातुं इच्छा. But the विषय (content) of desire is not ज्ञान, that is, bare knowledge is not desired; what is desired is the knowledge which will culminate in the realisation of ब्रह्मन्. The विषय of the desire is the fruit. The idea is that the sphere or विषय of desire comprehends ज्ञान or knowledge culminating in the realisation of ब्रह्मन्. अवगतिरिति साक्षादनुभव उच्यते। ज्ञानं तु परोक्ष-  
ऽनुभवानारुढेऽपि संभवति । (पञ्चपादीका) If it be asked—When अवगति or realisation is the fruit of desire, then what part does ज्ञान or knowledge play?—The answer is—ज्ञान is the हेतु, is the valid means by which we can obtain realisation.



But why at all should we realise ब्रह्मन् ? The reply is, 'Because it is the supreme goal of humanity.

How so ?—Because, it destroys अविद्या or Nescience, which is the great अनर्थ or evil as it is the root cause of transmigration, जन्म, मरण etc., i.e. of संसार.

The author of भामती here enters into an interesting discussion —

स्यादेतत् । न ब्रह्मावगतिः । पुरुषार्थः । पुरुषव्यापारव्याप्यो हि पुरुषार्थो न चास्या ब्रह्मस्वभावभृताया उत्पत्तिविकारसंस्कारप्राप्तयः संभवन्ति, तथा सत्यनित्यत्वेन तत्स्वभाव्यानुपपत्तेः । न चोत्पत्त्याद्यभावे व्यापारव्याप्यता । तस्मान्न ब्रह्मावगतिः पुरुषार्थ इत्यत आह—निःशेषसंसारबीजाविद्याद्यनर्थनिवर्हणात् । सत्यम्, ब्रह्मावगतौ ब्रह्मस्वभावे नोपत्यादयः संभवन्ति; तथाप्यनिर्वचनीयानाद्यविद्यावशाद्ब्रह्मस्वभावोऽपराधीनप्रकाशोऽपि प्रतिभासमानोऽपि न प्रतिभातीव, पराधीनप्रकाश इव, देहेन्द्रियादिभ्यो भिन्नोऽप्यभिन्न इव भासते, इति संसारबीजाविद्याद्यनर्थनिवर्हणात् प्रागप्राप्त इव तस्मिन्सति प्राप्त इव भवतीति पुरुषेणार्थ्यमानत्वात् पुरुषार्थ इति युक्तम् ।

The gist of this is :— How can you regard the realisation of ब्रह्मन् as the goal of human being ? For, the human goal is that which is obtained by human activity. And the realisation of ब्रह्मन्, being of the nature of ब्रह्मन्, is eternal. It cannot be produced or modified. But if you regard it as पुरुषार्थ, it will have to be produced; for there can be no useful human activity which does not produce any result. Hence, ब्रह्मावगति cannot be a पुरुषार्थ.

To this, the answer is :— You are right; the realisation of ब्रह्मन् is of the nature of ब्रह्मन्, it is eternal and hence free from such modifications as उत्पत्ति, etc. Still, on account of this indeterminable (अनिर्वचनाय) and beginningless Nescience, the nature of ब्रह्मन् which is always shining and which is not dependent on another for illumination, appears as if it is not shining, is illumined by another and is not different from

body, sense, etc. Hence before the annihilation of अविद्या this ब्रह्मन् appears as if unattained; after the annihilation of अविद्या this ब्रह्मन् appears as if attained.

Therefore, being sought by human beings, this ब्रह्मावगति is a गुरुष्यार्थ.

Therefore, ब्रह्मन् should be inquired into.

तत्पुनर्ब्रह्म प्रसिद्धमप्रसिद्धं वा स्यात्; यदि प्रसिद्धं, न जिज्ञासितव्यम्; अथाप्रसिद्धं, नैव शक्यं जिज्ञासितुमिति । उच्यते—अस्ति तावद्ब्रह्म नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावं, सर्वज्ञं, सर्वशक्तिसमन्वितम् । ब्रह्मशब्दस्य हि व्युत्पाद्यमानस्य नित्यशुद्धवादयोऽर्थाः ० प्रतीयन्ते, बृहतेर्घातोर्र्थानुगमात् । सर्वस्यात्मवाच्च ब्रह्मास्तित्वप्रसिद्धिः । सर्वो ह्यात्मास्तित्वं प्रत्येति, न नाहमस्मीति । यदि हि नात्मास्तित्वप्रसिद्धिः स्यात्, सर्वो लोकः 'नाहमस्मि' इति प्रतीयात् । आत्मा च ब्रह्म ॥—( भाष्यम् )

That ब्रह्मन्, again, should be either known or unknown; if known, it is not to be desired to be known; if unknown, it cannot be desired to be known. To this we reply—There does exist ब्रह्मन्, who is by nature eternally pure, intelligent and free, omniscient and endowed with all powers. The senses of eternal purity, etc., are cognised when the word ब्रह्मन् is derived, because of conformity with the sense of the root बृह. And the existence of ब्रह्मन् is well-known, because ब्रह्मन् is the Self of all. Everyone cognises the existence of himself; not that he does not cognise "I do exist." If the existence of the Self were not known, the entire world would not cognise "I do exist." And that Self is ब्रह्मन्.



## NOTES

The arguments, nay even the language, in this and the next paragraphs are taken by our भाष्यकार from the शाबरभाष्य where we read—

धर्मः प्रसिद्धो वा स्यादप्रसिद्धो वा? स चेत्प्रसिद्धो न जिज्ञासितव्यः ।  
अथाप्रसिद्धो नतरास् । तदेतदनर्थकं धर्मजिज्ञासाप्रकरणम् । अथवा अर्थवत्?  
धर्मं प्रति हि विप्रतिपक्षा बहुविदः केचिदन्यं धर्ममाहुः । केचिदन्यम् ।  
सोऽयमविचार्य प्रवर्तमानः कंचिदेवोपाददानो विहन्येता अनर्थं च ऋच्छेत् ।  
तस्माद्धर्मो जिज्ञासितव्य इति । स हि निःश्रेयसेन पुरुषं संयुनक्तीति  
प्रतिजानीमहे ।

नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावं ब्रह्म—This is the अनौपाधिक (adjunct-  
less) nature of ब्रह्मन्. The word नित्य excludes the misery  
due to क्षयिता—diminution. शुद्ध excludes the misery due to  
adjuncts like the body etc. बुद्ध excludes the quality of  
being illumined by another (परार्थानुप्रकाशता). ब्रह्मन् is self-  
illumined and blissful (आनंदात्मन्). मुक्त excludes the  
dependence of ब्रह्मन् on the body and its qualities in the shape  
of old age, death, etc., even before salvation. That is, ब्रह्मन्  
by nature is ever free; it appears to be connected or identi-  
fied with the body on account of Nescience.

सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिसमन्वितम्—This is the अविद्योपाधिक (endowed  
with the qualities of Nescience) nature of ब्रह्मन्.

ब्रह्मन् is understood to be of this nature from its deriva-  
tion also. The root बृह्, meaning growth, signifies excellence  
(अतिशायन). तच्चेदमतिशायनमनवच्छिन्नं पदान्तरावगमितं नित्यशुद्धं.  
बुद्धत्वाद्यस्याभ्यनुजानातीत्यर्थः । ( सामती )—This undefined excell-  
ence permits of it (ब्रह्मन्) (the attribution of) eternality,  
purity, intelligence, etc., conveyed through other words.

सर्वस्यात्मत्वाच्च ब्रह्मास्तित्वप्रसिद्धिः । The existence of ब्रह्मन् is  
well-known because it is the Self of all. Even a पांसुलपाद

ब्र.च.—5

हालिक (a ploughman with his feet covered with dust) realises the existence of ब्रह्मन्. How so? Because that ब्रह्मन् in his आत्मन, his Self. And everyone is conscious of the existence of his own self. Everyone cognises "I exist". It is not that anybody does not cognise "I exist."

यदि तर्हि लोके ब्रह्म आत्मत्वेन प्रसिद्धमस्ति, ततो ज्ञातमेवेत्य-  
जिज्ञास्यत्वं पुनरापन्नम् । न, तद्विशेषं प्रति विप्रतिपत्तेः । देहमात्रं  
चैतन्यविंशेष्टमात्मेति प्राकृता जना लौकायतिकाश्च प्रतिपन्नाः । इन्द्रि-  
याण्येव चेतनान्यात्मेत्यपरे । मन इत्यन्ये । विज्ञानमात्रं क्षणिकमित्येके ।  
शून्यमित्यपरे । अस्ति देहादिन्यतिरिक्तः संसारी कर्ता भोक्ता इत्यपरे ।  
भोक्तैव केवलं न कर्तेत्येके । अस्ति तद्व्यतिरिक्त ईश्वरः सर्वज्ञः सर्व-  
शक्तिरिति केचित् । आत्मा स भोक्तुरित्यपरे । एवं बहवो विप्रतिपन्ना  
युक्तिवाक्यतदाभाससमाश्रयाः सन्तः । तत्राविचार्य यत्किञ्चित्प्रति-  
पद्यमानो निःश्रेयसात्प्रतिहन्येत, अनर्थं च इयात् । तस्माद्ब्रह्मजिज्ञासो-  
पन्यासमुखेन वेदान्तवाक्यमीमांसा तदविरोधितर्कोपकरणा निःश्रेयस-  
प्रयोजना प्रस्तूयते । — ( भाष्यम् )

If in this world ब्रह्मन् is well-known as the Self, then it being already known, there follows again that it is not to be desired to be known. We reply, No; for there are conflicting opinions as to its special nature. The ordinary men and the लौकायतiks are of opinion that the Self is merely the body endowed with intelligence. Others hold that the Self is only the intelligent sense-organs. Others say that it is the mind. Others maintain that it is mere momentary cognition. Others think it to be Void. Some say that there is a being different from the body, etc., who migrates and who is agent and enjoyer. Some hold that the Self is only an enjoyer but not an agent. There are others who maintain that there is, in



In addition to the individual souls, the Lord, who is omniscient and omnipotent. Others hold that he is the Self of the enjoyer. Thus many people hold different views, basing themselves upon reasoning and texts (both sound and fallacious). Of these he who without inquiry accepts any, will fall from beatitude and attain to evil. For this reason under the designation of an inquiry into ब्रह्मन्, there is begun a disquisition of the Vedānta texts, to be carried on with the help of conformable arguments and having for its aim the highest beatitude.

### NOTES

The पूर्वपक्षिन् argues that—आत्मत्वेन हेतुना ब्रह्म प्रसिद्धं यदि—If ब्रह्मन् is well-known, because it is the Self of all—, then what is the need of inquiry into it? The सिद्धान्तिन् replies—The need is, because there are conflicting opinions about its nature.

विप्रतिपत्ति is विरुद्धा प्रतिपत्तिः, conflicting views or opinions.

The भाष्यकार here gives such nine opinions. The first three belong to different materialistic schools. The next two belong to two sects of Buddhism. The following three belong to न्याय, सांख्य and योग respectively. The last opinion, of course, belongs to वेदान्तिन्. It will be seen here that there is a sort of gradual progress from things external to the innermost Self in the opinions given here.

(1) The first opinion is that of very ordinary people who are not learned. It is चैतन्यविशिष्टदेह—the body endowed with intelligence which is the Self.

तथाहि—‘मनुष्योऽहम्’ इत्यात्मनि मनुष्यत्वाभिमानो ‘गच्छामि - इति च गन्तृत्वाभिमानो देहविषयत्वं उपपद्यते । प्राकृता इति शास्त्रोपदेशा’

संस्कृतमयः (whose mind is not refined by learning) दृष्टमात्रा-  
विकल्पितव्यवहारिणः (and whose behaviour depends on things  
as they see them, without entering into their examination),  
लोकयतिका इति भूतचतुष्टयतत्त्ववादिनः—Those who regard only the  
four भूतs, viz., पृथिवी, जल, तेजस् and वायु as the basis of this  
creation.—पञ्चपादिका.

(2) The experience काणोऽहम्, सुकोऽहम्, etc., proves that  
the Self is but the intelligent sense-organs,

(3) In the dream, when all the sense organs are asleep,  
it is only the mind which is the sphere of the concept of  
'I'. Hence, the mind is the Self.

(4) According to the योगाचार school of the Buddhists the  
Self is an unbroken series of momentary consciousnesses.  
These Buddhists are called the क्षणिकविज्ञानवादिनs. ७

(5) According to the माध्यमिकs, the Self is but Void. In  
सुषुप्ति or deep sleep, there is not even consciousness; but when  
a man gets up, he suddenly, from nowhere gets the notion of  
अहम्. So, this अहम् is असन् or अभाव.

(6) This is the view of the नैयायिकs. अस्ति देहादिव्यतिरिक्तः,  
संसारि, कर्ता, भोक्ता.

(7) According to Sāṅkhya philosophy, the Self is only an  
enjoyer; the Self is not an agent.

(8) According to योग philosophy, ईश्वर is different not  
only from देह, इन्द्रियs, etc., but also from the जीवात्मन्s. He  
is the lord of the entire universe. He is सर्वज्ञ and सर्वशक्ति.

(9) The final view is that of the वेदान्तिन, according to  
whom that (स) ईश्वर is the Self of the enjoyer, that is of the  
जीवात्मन्. The Self of a जीव is not different from the Lord  
(ईश्वर). Both are, in reality, of one nature, as घटाकाश and  
परमाकाश are.

Thus, there are many views which take their stand  
(समाश्रयाः) on युक्ति (sound reasoning), युक्त्याभास fallacious



reasoning), वाक्य (Scriptural texts soundly interpreted) and वाक्याभास (unsoundly interpreted Scriptural texts). All the upholders of these views bring forth arguments and Scriptural texts in their support. It is for the intelligent inquirer to examine the soundness or otherwise of these arguments and the interpretations of the Vedic texts quoted. If a person accepts any of these views without minute examination, he will certainly fall from निःश्रेयस or मोक्ष. In addition, he will attain to evil.

In the end the भाष्यकार sums up the purport of the सूत्र. cf. also—

वेदान्तमीमांसा तावत् तर्क एव, तद्विरोधिनाश्च येऽन्येऽपि तर्का अध्वर-  
मीमांसायां न्याये च वेदप्रत्यक्षादिप्रामाण्यपरिक्षोधनादिषु उक्ताः ते उपकरणं  
यस्याः सा तीथोक्ता । तस्मात् परमनिःश्रेयससाधनब्रह्मज्ञानिप्रयोजना ब्रह्ममीमां-  
साकारव्यवर्त्येति सिद्धम् ॥) (भासर्तृ).—The inquiry into the Vedānta  
texts is but reasoning. Other reasonings which are not op-  
posed to these texts are the auxiliaries of this inquiry. These  
other reasonings are such as are found in the पूर्वमीमांसा or  
न्याय and are employed in discussing the authoritativeness of  
the Vedas. of perception, etc. Thus, it is established that an  
inquiry into the nature of ब्रह्मन् should be started; the aim or  
purport of this inquiry is the knowledge of ब्रह्मन् which is the  
means to Supreme Beatitude.

इति जिज्ञासाधिकरणम् ।

अथ द्वितीयं जन्माद्यधिकरणम् ॥

ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यमित्युक्तम् । किंलक्षणं पुनस्तद्ब्रह्म इत्यत आह

भगवान्सूत्रकारः—

जन्माद्यस्य यतः ॥१॥१॥२॥

—(सूत्रम्)

This has been said that ब्रह्मन् should be desired to be known. What is the definition of that ब्रह्मन्? In reply to this the venerable author of the Sūtras says—

That from which the Origin, etc. of this  
( World proceed ) 1. i. 2.

### NOTES

In the last topic it has been propounded that ब्रह्मन् is जिज्ञासितव्य i.e., inquiry about ब्रह्मन् is desirable. Now, the सूत्रकार proceeds to define ब्रह्मन्. That definition is really given in the तैत्तिरीयारण्यक in the two passages—

(1) "यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, येन जातानि जीवन्ति, यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति । तद्विजिज्ञासस्व तद्ब्रह्म ॥ ३. ४. १.

(२) आनन्दिनाद्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, आनन्देन जातानि जीवन्ति, आनन्दं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति ॥ ३. ६. १.

The present सूत्र also gives this very definition. A definition or लक्षण is generally of two kinds:—

(1) तटस्थ—where a property of a thing which is distinct from its nature, and yet is the property by which it is known. For example, शाखाग्रं चन्द्रः, where शाखाग्र is a property of चन्द्रः, but it is different from the nature of चन्द्रः. Still, however, शाखाग्र (the top of a branch) denotes the position of चन्द्रः.

(2) स्वरूपलक्षण—Where the property constituting the nature of a thing is given. For example, प्रकृष्टप्रकाशश्चन्द्रः, where प्रकृष्टप्रकाश is a property which constitutes the very nature of चन्द्रः.

Now, the rule is that an object is generally indicated by तटस्थलक्षण and then fully described by स्वरूपलक्षण. The two श्रुति passages quoted above give the तटस्थ and स्वरूप लक्षणसः of ब्रह्मन् respectively. The first passage defines ब्रह्मन् as that whence these beings originate; that by which, being originated, they live; and that to which they return; desire to know



that; that is ब्रह्मन्. That is, ब्रह्मन् is here indicated by the created beings, which do not constitute its nature. Hence, it is the तदस्थलक्षण.

The second passage of the श्रुति gives the real nature of ब्रह्मन्, namely, it is आनन्द. This is the स्वरूपलक्षण.

The words of the सूत्र are जन्मादि अस्य यतः. अस्य=जगतः; जन्मादि=उत्पत्त्यादि, यतः=यद्देतकम्, तद्ब्रह्म. This is the तदस्थलक्षण.

जन्म उत्पत्तिः आदि अस्य—इति तद्गुणसंविज्ञानो बहुव्रीहिः । जन्मस्थितिभङ्गं समासार्थः । जन्मनश्चादित्वं श्रुतिनिर्देशापेक्षं वस्तुवृत्तापेक्षं च । श्रुतिनिर्देशस्तावत्—‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते’ इति, अस्मिन् वाक्ये जन्मस्थितिप्रलयानां क्रमदर्शनात् । वस्तुवृत्तमपि जन्मना लब्धसत्ताकस्य धर्मिणः स्थितिप्रलयसंभवत् । अस्येति प्रत्यक्षादिसंनिधापितस्य धर्मिण इदमा निर्देशः ! षष्ठी जन्मादिधर्मसंबन्धार्था । यत इति कारणनिर्देशः ।—( भाष्यम् )

What begins with जन्म, origination, thus it is a बहुव्रीहि compound indicating its own attribute. The meaning of the compound is origination, sustentation and destruction. That the origination is mentioned in the beginning depends on the Scriptural statement and the nature of things. The statement of the Scripture is:—“That whence these beings originate.” In this sentence we see the order of succession of origination, sustentation and destruction. And the nature of things also is such that sustentation and destruction are possible in respect of only such a thing which has become existent through origination. In the expression अस्य, the word इदम् denotes the substrate presented to us by perception. etc. The genitive has the sense of relating it to origination, etc. The expression यतः (whence) denotes the cause.

## NOTES

The बहुव्रीहि compound is of two kinds—

(1) तद्गुणसंविज्ञान—Where the attribute or attributes of the compounded word are ever present along with that word. e.g.—लम्बकर्णमानय = लम्बौ कर्णौ यस्य तम्—आनय. The attributes of the compounded word लम्बकर्ण are the long ears; and when we bring that person, his long ears will also come with him.

(2) अतद्गुणसंविज्ञान—Where the attributes do not accompany the compounded word. e.g., चित्रगुमानय = चित्रा गावो यस्य तम्—आनय. The attributes of चित्रगु are that he has got cows of variegated colours. But when that person चित्रगु is brought, his cows are not brought along with him.

In the present सूत्र, जन्मादि is a तद्गुणसंविज्ञानबहुव्रीहि. It should be expounded as जन्म उत्पत्तिः आदिः यस्य तत् जन्मादि—That which has जन्म for its beginning. What is that?—जन्मस्थितिभङ्गम्—viz., Origination, Sustentation and Destruction. If we take अतद्गुणसंविज्ञान, then on the analogy of चिद्गु, जन्मादि will mean स्थितिभङ्ग alone; it will not include जन्म; for, that which has जन्म in its beginning is स्थितभङ्ग. Therefore, just as we include the long ears of लम्बकर्ण when we bring him, so we should include जन्म also in the compound जन्मादि. And this is possible in तद्गुणसंविज्ञान-बहुव्रीहि only. Therefore, the भाष्यकार expressly states—जन्मस्थितिभगं समासार्थं ।

अस्य जगतो नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्य अनेककर्तृभोक्तृसंयुक्तस्य प्रतिनियतदेशकालनिमित्तक्रियाफलाश्रयस्य मनसाप्यचिन्त्यरचनारूपस्य जन्मस्थितिभङ्गं यतः सर्वज्ञात्सर्वशक्तेः कारणान्द्वयवति, 'तद्ब्रह्म' इति वाक्यशेषः ।—( भाष्यम् )

Of this universe differentiated by name and form, which contains many agents and enjoyers, which is the



abode of those which are definitely regulated in respect of place, time, cause, action and fruit, and the nature of whose design cannot even be conceived by mind, that omniscient and omnipotent cause whence there is the origination, sustentation and destruction—"that is ब्रह्मन्" is the complement of the sentence (in the aphorism).

### NOTES

The भाष्यकार after explaining each term of the सूत्र, now gives the gist of the whole. The cause of this universe is ब्रह्मन्, and not प्रधान or any other unintelligent principle. Different people advocate different causes of this universe. cf.

कालः स्वभावो नियतियदृच्छा भूतानि योनिः पुरुष इति चिन्त्या ।  
संयोगिण्युपां न त्वात्मभावादात्माप्यनीशः सुखदुःखहेतोः । (श्वेताश्वतर-  
उप. १. २.)

That what is differentiated by name and form, like pot, has for its cause an intelligent being. This universe also, being differentiated by name and form, must have an intelligent Being as its cause. An intelligent being having considered the name and form of an object in his intellect creates that object. It is not possible for a non-intelligent cause like काल, स्वभाव, प्रधान, etc. to consider name and form in its intellect. It may be argued that intelligent Beings like ग्रह (planetary deities) or लोकपाल (the guardian deities) would create this universe. To this we reply—No. ग्रह, लोकपाल, etc., are of limited knowledge and capacity. They cannot create this universe which is अनेककर्तृभोक्तृसंयुक्त, प्रतिनियतदेशकालनिमित्त-क्रियाफलाश्रय and मनसाप्यचिन्त्यरचनारूप.

अनेककर्तृभोक्तृसंयुक्तस्य—On this भामती remarks:—केचित्कर्तारो भवन्ति यथा सूदस्विगादयः (like cooks or sacrificial priests), न भोक्तारः । केचित्तु भोक्तारः (enjoyers) यथा श्राद्धवेष्टानरेष्टयादिपु-  
पितापुत्रादयः, न कर्तारः । In the श्राद्ध ceremony the agent is the

son but the enjoyers are the manes (पितृs). The वैश्वानरेष्टि is offered in 12 potsherds (द्वादशकपाल) by the father for the welfare of his son. Here the agent is the father but the enjoyer is the son.

प्रतिनियतदेशकालनिमित्तक्रियाफलाश्रयस्य—प्रतिनियत means definite. आनन्दगिरी and the author of रत्नप्रभा explain the compound as—प्रतिनियतानि (व्यवस्थितानि) देशकालनिमित्तानि येषां क्रियाफलानां तदाश्रयस्य—which is the abode of the fruits of action, these fruits having their definite places, times and causes. But भामतीकार resorts to a different and better explanation of the compound as—देशः, कालः, निमित्तम्, क्रिया, फलं च—देशकालनिमित्तक्रियाफलानि इति इतरेतरद्वन्द्वः। देशादीनि च तानि प्रतिनियतानि चेति विग्रहः। तदाश्रयो जगत्, तस्य। the universe is the abode of definite place, definite time, definite cause, definite acts and definite fruits. Some things are born at definite places, as saffron in Kashmir; some are born at definite times, as the warbling of a cuckoo; some are created by definite causes, as the attainment of a village, money, etc., by the favour of the king, etc.; some acts are restricted to some people, as the performance of sacrifice for others belong to Brahmins alone; some enjoy definite fruit, as some are happy, some are miserable, likewise those who are happy at one time are miserable at another time.

मनसाप्यचिन्त्यरचनारूपस्य — On this the भामतीकार says — एकस्या अपि हि शरीररचनाया रूपं मनसा न शक्यं चिन्तयितुं कदाचित्, (it cannot even be conceived), प्रागेव जगद्रचनायाः (remote indeed is the possibility of conceiving the design of this universe), किमङ्ग पुनः कर्तुमिच्छार्थः (how remote then is the creation of the universe).

Therefore, the creation, sustentation and destruction can be caused by a Being who is सर्वज्ञ omniscient and सर्वशक्ति omnipotent. And that cause is ब्रह्मन्.



अन्येषामपि भावविकाराणां त्रिष्वेवान्तर्भाव इति जन्मस्थिति-  
नाशानामिह ग्रहणम् । यास्कपरिपठितानां तु 'जायतेऽस्ति'  
इत्यादीनां ग्रहणे तेषां जगतः स्थितिकाले संभाव्यमानत्वान्मूलकारणा-  
दुत्पत्तिस्थितिनाशा जगतो न गृहीताः स्युरित्याशङ्क्येत; तन्मा शङ्कि-  
इति या उत्पत्तिर्ब्रह्मणः कारणात्, तत्रैव स्थितिः प्रलयश्च, त एव  
गृह्यन्ते ।—(भाष्यम्)

As the other modifications of being are included in these three, origination, sustentation and destruction are mentioned here. If the modifications — 'originates', 'exists' — mentioned by Yāska, were to be mentioned here, since they occur in the period of the world's subsistence, the origination, sustentation and destruction of the world from its primal cause would not be apprehended : This doubt may arise, lest one should doubt so, that origination from ब्रह्म, the cause, and sustentation and dissolution even in that, these alone are apprehended.

### NOTES

It may be argued that there are other modifications of existing things besides जन्मस्थितिमङ्गम्; then why mention only the latter? To this the भाष्यकार replies that modifications like वृद्धि, परिणाम, अपक्षय, etc. are included in these जन्मस्थितिमङ्गम्. For, what is वृद्धि or growth? It is merely increase of parts, just as a big piece of cloth grows out of several threads joined together. Here, the increase of threads is the growth of cloth, this growth is nothing but origination. Similarly, the three परिणामs mentioned in the योगसूत्र III. 13 एतेन भूतेन्द्रियेषु धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामा व्याख्याता viz., धर्म, अवस्था and लक्षण are but origination. When gold ceases to be a lump and assumes the form of a bracelet, then it has undergone धर्मपरिणाम. This is in no way different from उत्पत्ति. When the bracelet ceases to be non-existent and assumes

the existent form, then it has undergone लक्षणपरिणाम. This also is उत्पत्ति. When that bracelet is attaining at each moment different states as new or old, it is undergoing the अवस्थापरिणाम. This also is उत्पत्ति. As regards अपक्षय it is the decrease of parts and, hence, tantamount to destruction.

Even if these modifications viz., वृद्धि, परिणाम, etc. are not included in जन्मस्थितिभङ्गम्, we should still mention only the latter. For, जन्मस्थितिभङ्गम्, at once remind us of the श्रुति text—यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते. etc., which (text) leads us to ब्रह्मन्, the primal cause of the universe. If we were to mention the modifications जायन्ते, अस्ति, etc. (according to निरुक्त I. 2, the six भावविकारः are—जायते, अस्ति, वर्धते, विपरिमते, अपक्षीयते, नश्यति) we shall at once be reminded of the निरुक्त text. But the निरुक्त text does not instruct us about the primal cause : for, these six modifications of existence mentioned therein are possible even in the period of subsistence of this world subsequent to its creation.

If it be asked—Why not indicate जन्म alone ? स्थिति and भङ्ग will be inevitably understood from जन्म.—We reply :—That जन्मस्थितिभङ्गम्, these three together, indicate that ब्रह्मन् is the material cause of this universe. Mere जन्म, being possible to be brought about by an efficient cause (निमित्तकारण) also, would not indicate material causality. ब्रह्मन् is that cause from which this world not only originates, but also subsists in it (ब्रह्मन्) and is dissolved into it (ब्रह्मन्).

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न यथोक्तविशेषणस्य जगतो यथोक्तविशेषणमीश्वरं मुक्त्वा, अन्यतः प्रधानादचेतनात् अणुभ्यो वा अभावाद्वा संसारिणो वा उत्पत्त्यादि संभावयितुं शक्यम् । न च स्वभावतः, विशिष्टदेशकाल-



निमित्तानामिहोपादानात् । एतदेवानुमानं ससारिभ्यतिरिक्तेश्वरास्ति-  
त्वादिसाधन मन्यन्ते ईश्वरकारणवादिनः ।—( भाष्यम् )

It is not possible to postulate origination, etc., of this universe possessing the above-mentioned qualities, from anything else except a Lord possessing the above-mentioned qualities; not either from non-intelligent Pradhāna, or from atoms, or from non-existence, or from a transmigrating being. Now, again, can it (origination) proceed from its nature; because here we have to accept that (for the<sup>o</sup> production of effects) there are particular places, times and causes. Those who maintain a Lord to be the cause of the world think that the existence of a Lord different from a transmigrating being, can be inferred by means of the argument stated just now (without recourse being had to the Scripture at all.)

### NOTES

Of the universe having the 4 qualities mentioned above, viz., नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्य, अनेककर्तृभोक्तृसंयुक्तस्य, प्रति-  
नियतदेशकालनिमित्तक्रियाफलाश्रयस्य and मनसाप्यचिन्त्यरचनारूपस्य,  
the origination, etc. cannot proceed from any other cause except ईश्वर who is सर्वज्ञ and सर्वशक्ति. The non-intelligent प्रधान, or atoms, or non-existence or any other transmigrating being cannot be its cause. Even स्वभाव or Spontaneity cannot be its cause. For, what is स्वभाव ? Is it स्वयमेव स्वस्य हेतुः—itself causing itself ? Or, is it production without a cause ? The former is impossible, for the same-thing cannot be cause and effect both. The latter also is impossible. Because—विशिष्टदेशकालनिमित्तानामिहोपादानात्, agents require particular time, place or causes to bring about an effect. An effect, therefore, cannot be produced without a cause. If it were not so, then why should a farmer desirous of producing corn, require particular kind of soil, seed, rains, etc.

Therefore, an effect cannot be produced without an agent. Thus we get at the syllogism:—

क्षित्यकुरादिकं कर्तृजन्यम्, कार्यत्वात्, घटवत्। (The earth, sprout, etc., are produced by an agent because, they are effects like a pot).

From this syllogism we get an agent of this world. And on account of its 4 qualifications mentioned above, this universe must have such an agent who should be सर्वज्ञ and सर्वशक्ति. And that agent is ईश्वर, different from the mere transmigrating beings.

Those who maintain a Lord to be the cause of this world viz., the वैशेषिकस rely upon these inferences to prove the existence of a Lord.

नन्विहापि तदेवोपन्यस्तं जन्मादिसूत्रे; न, वेदान्तवाक्यकुसुम-  
प्रथनार्थत्वात्सूत्राणाम् । वेदान्तवाक्यानि हि सूत्रैरुदाहृत्य विचार्यन्ते ।  
वाक्यार्थविचारणाध्यवसाननिर्वृत्ता हि ब्रह्मावगतिः, नानुमानादि-  
प्रमाणान्तरनिर्वृत्ता । सत्सु तु वेदान्तवाक्येषु जगतो जन्मादिकारण-  
वादिषु, तदर्थग्रहणदाढर्याय अनुमानमपि वेदान्तवाक्याविरोधि प्रमाणं  
भवत् न निवार्यते, श्रत्यैव च सहायत्वेन तर्कस्याप्यभ्युपेतत्वान् । तथा  
हि—‘श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः’ (बृह० २. ४. ५) इति श्रुतिः, ‘पण्डितो  
मेधावी गान्धारानेवोपसंपद्येतैवमेवेहाचार्यवान् पुरुषो वेद’ (छान्दोग्य  
६. १४. २) इति च पुरुषबुद्धिसाहाय्यमात्मनो दर्शयति ।  
—(भाष्यम्)

Now, here too that same thing (i.e. the argument alone) has been premised in the aphorism ‘That from which the Origin, etc.’ We reply, No; because the aphorisms have the purpose of stringing together the flowers of the Vedānta texts. In reality, it is the Vedānta texts that are cited and considered by the aphorisms. For the realisation of ब्रह्मन्



is accomplished at the end of inquiry into the meaning of the texts, and is not accomplished by other means of valid knowledge like inference. While, however, the Vedānta texts primarily declare the cause of the origination, etc., of the world, inference also, being an instrument of valid knowledge in so far as it does not contradict the Vedānta texts, is not to be excluded as a means of confirming the meanings ascertained; because argumentation is accepted as an auxiliary even by Scripture. For the passages, "It is to be heard, to be reflected on" and "As the man, having been informed and being able to judge for himself, would arrive at Gāndhāra, in the same way a man obtains knowledge when he has a teacher declare that the human understanding assists the Scripture.

### NOTES

In this passage the भाष्यकार states the difference between the views of the वैशेषिक and the वेदान्तिन्. While the former is satisfied with argumentation alone, the latter accepts argumentation merely as an auxiliary to the Vedānta texts. The primary function of the सूत्रs is to discuss the meanings of the Vedānta texts. Argumentation, however, if it does not contradict the sense of the Vedānta texts is acceptable only as an auxiliary. For the realisation of ब्रह्मन् is accomplished by the अभ्यवसान (ascertainment) of the वाक्यार्थ विचारणा (discussion of the meanings of the Vedānta texts). We are not totally against inference, etc. if they help us. For inference, etc., as auxiliaries are admitted even by श्रुति. This is indicated by the words मन्तव्यः and मेधावी.

न धर्मजिज्ञासायामिव श्रुत्यादय एव प्रमाणं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाम् ;  
किन्तु श्रुत्यादयोऽनुभवादयश्च यथासंभवमिह प्रमाणम् , अनुभवावसा-

नत्वाद्वस्तुविषयत्वाच्च ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य । कर्तव्ये हि विषये नानुभवापेक्षा-  
स्तीति श्रुत्यादीनामेव प्रामाण्यं स्यात्, पुरुषाधीनात्मलाभत्वाच्च  
कर्तव्यस्य । कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्यं लौकिकं वैदिकं च कर्म;  
यथा अश्वेन गच्छति, पद्भ्याम्, अन्यथा वा, न वा गच्छतीति तथा  
'अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति' 'नातिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति', 'उदिते  
जुहोति', 'अनुदिते जुहोति' इति । विधिप्रतिषेधाच्च अत्र अर्थवन्तः  
स्युः, विकल्पोत्सर्गापवादाश्च । न तु वस्तु 'एवम्', 'नैवम्',  
'अस्ति', 'नास्ति' इति वा विकल्प्यते । विकल्पनास्तु पुरुषबुद्ध्य-  
पेक्षाः । नवस्तुयाथात्म्यज्ञानं पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षम् । किं तर्हि ? वस्तुतन्त्रमेव  
तत् । न हि स्थाणावेकस्मिन् 'स्थाणुर्वा, पुरुषोऽन्यो वा' इति तत्त्वज्ञानं  
भवति । तत्र 'पुरुषोऽन्यो वा' इति मिथ्याज्ञानम्, 'स्थानुरेव' इति  
तत्त्वज्ञानम् ; वस्तुतन्त्रत्वात् । एवं भूतवस्तुविषयाणां प्रामाण्यं वस्तु-  
तन्त्रम् ।—( भाष्यम् )

Moreover, the Scripture, etc., are not the only autho-  
rity in the inquiry into ब्रह्मन्, as they are in the enquiry into  
Religious duty; but here, the Scripture, etc., and experience  
etc., are means of valid knowledge. as the occasion arises,  
because the knowledge of ब्रह्मन् culminates in experience  
and has an existent object for its content. In an object  
which is to be accomplished, as there is no need of experi-  
ence, there is a possibility for only the Scripture, etc., to be  
an authority, for an object to be accomplished derives its  
existence in dependence on a person. An action, worldly or  
scriptural, may be done, or not done, or done in a different  
way; for instance a man may go on horseback, or on foot,  
or otherwise, or may not go at all. Similarly 'in the अतिरात्र  
one should use the sixteenth cup', 'in the अतिरात्र, one should  
not use the sixteenth cup'; 'one is to offer oblation after



sun-rise', 'one is to offer oblation before sun-rise.' In these cases injunctions and prohibitions would be purportful as options or general rules and exceptions. But an (accomplished) thing cannot admit of options like, 'thus and not thus', 'exists, does not exist'. Options, however, depend on human intellect. The knowledge of the real nature of a thing does not depend on human intellect. What then? It depends on the thing itself. In the case of a post, the true cognition will not be of this nature: 'It is a post or something else, a man'. Here, 'something else', a man' is a false cognition. 'It is certainly a post' is the true cognition, because it depends on the thing (itself). Thus, the authoritativeness of existing things depends on the things themselves.

## NOTES

What differentiates the ब्रह्मज्ञिज्ञासा from धर्मज्ञिज्ञासा is that in the latter the authoritativeness depends on scriptural texts alone. But in the former, experience also is authoritative. Not only Scriptures, but also experience in the shape of the realisation of Brahman should be connected as authoritative in ब्रह्मज्ञिज्ञासा. Why so? Because—the inquiry into ब्रह्मन् culminates in the experience of ब्रह्मन्, and also because ब्रह्मन् is an already existent entity.

अतिरात्रे पोडशिन् गृह्णाति — "The Soma juice is collected and kept in cups called 'grahas'. In a particular sacrifice called the 'atirātra', the use of sixteen cups is prescribed; but elsewhere in Scripture, there is also the prohibition of the use of the sixteenth cup in the 'atirātra' sacrifice. In the face of such contradiction, it is understood that there is option for the sacrificer to use or not to use the sixteenth cup." For further details : see मीमांसासूत्र — X. 8. 6 and 9.

ब्र.च.—6

विधिप्रतिषेधाश्चात्र अर्थवन्तः स्युः विकल्पोत्सर्गापवादश्च । Here the last च after विकल्पोत्सर्गापवाद stands for इव. Hence, the clause means that विधि and प्रतिषेध are purportful as विकल्प or उत्सर्ग or अपवाद.

A विधि is an injunction which must be followed, e.g. यजेत.

A प्रतिषेध or निषेध is a prohibition, e.g. न सुरां पिबेत्.

A विकल्प is an option, e.g. ब्रीहिभिर्यवैर्वा यजेत.

An उत्सर्ग is a general rule, e.g. न हिंस्यात्.

An अपवाद is an exception, e.g. अग्निपोमीयं पशुमालभेत.

So, when we find contradiction between विधि and प्रतिषेध, then it ought to be removed by interpreting them as विकल्प or उत्सर्ग or अपवाद. But all such contrivances are possible with regard to those things only which are to be accomplished, whose existence is to be brought into being. As regards ब्रह्मन् which is already existent, we cannot have a resort to विधि, निषेध or विकल्पापवाद. For instance, with regard to an already existing thing like a post, can we have true cognition in the shape of स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वा? No.

स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषोऽन्यो वा—should be explained as स्थाणुर्वा-अन्यः (i.e. पुरुषः) वा. पुरुषः is an explanation of अन्यः.

तत्रैवं सति ब्रह्मज्ञानमपि वस्तुतन्त्रमेव, भूतवस्तुविषयत्वात् । ननु भूतवस्तुविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः प्रमाणान्तरविषयत्वमेवेति वेदान्तवाक्य-विचारणा अनर्थिकैव प्राप्ता । न, इन्द्रियविषयत्वेन संबन्धग्रहणात् । स्वभावतो विषयविषयाणीन्द्रियाणि, न ब्रह्मविषयाणि । सति हि इन्द्रिय-विषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः, इदं ब्रह्मणा संबद्धं कार्यमिति गृह्येत । कार्यमात्रमेव तु गृह्यमाणं किं ब्रह्मणा संबद्धम्, किमन्येन केनचिद्वा संबद्धम्, इति न शक्यं निश्चेतुम् । तस्माज्जन्मादिसूत्रं नानुमानोपन्यासार्थम् । किं तर्हि ? वेदान्तवाक्यप्रदर्शनार्थम् । किं पुनस्तद्वेदान्तवाक्यं यत् पूत्रेणेह



लिलक्षयिषितम् ? 'भृगुर्वै वारुणिः वरुणं पितरमुपससार, अघीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति' इत्युपक्रम्याह—'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते; येन जातानि जीवन्ति; यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति; तद्विजिज्ञासस्व; तद्ब्रह्म' इति । तस्य च निर्णयवाक्यम्—'आनन्दाद्धयेव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते; आनन्देन जातानि जीवन्ति; आनन्दं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति' इति । अन्यान्यप्येवंजातीयकानि वाक्यानि नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभाव-सर्वज्ञस्वरूपकारणविषयाणि उदाहर्तव्यानि ।—(भाष्यम् )

Then, this being so, the knowledge of Brahman also depends on the thing itself, because its content is an already existent thing. Now, as Brahman is a thing whose content is an already existent thing, so Brahman becomes an object of other means of valid knowledge; and, therefore, the discussion of the Vedānta texts becomes useless. (To this, we reply) No, because, Brahman is not an object of senses, the relation cannot be apprehended. The senses naturally have objects as their content, not Brahman. If Brahman were the content of senses, then we should have the apprehension that this effect is related to Brahman. But, as this effect alone is apprehended, it is not possible to decide whether this effect is related to Brahman or to something else. Therefore, the Sūtra 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' is not for the purpose of suggesting inference. What then ? It is for the purpose of showing the Vedānta texts. What then is the Vedānta text which is desired to be indicated by the Sūtra here ? 'भृगु, the son of वरुण, went to his father वरुण and said — Venerable Sir, teach me Brahman', beginning thus, it is said "That from which these beings originate, that by which, being originated, they live, and that to which they return : desire to know that; that is Brahman". And the sentence finally determining the sense (of these passages) is — 'From

Bliss these beings originate, by Bliss, being originated, they live, and they return to Bliss.' Other texts also are to be adduced which declare the cause to be the omniscient Being, whose essential nature is eternal purity, intelligence and freedom.

### NOTES

Thus, when it is proved that कर्मानुष्ठान is पुरुषतन्त्र (dependent on the will of a human being) and भूतवस्तुज्ञान is वस्तुतन्त्र (dependent on the thing itself), ब्रह्मज्ञान is also dependent on ब्रह्मन् itself because ब्रह्मन् is भूतवस्तु (an already existent entity).

On this the opponent asks :—Whatever is भूतवस्तु (an already existent thing) is proved by other means of valid knowledge. For, a sentence, which refers to an already existent thing, is proved by other प्रमाणs. That sentence simply restates the knowledge of an existent thing. For example, the sentence नद्यास्तीरे फलानि सन्ति, merely restates a fact which has already been proved by प्रत्यक्ष. Similarly, the वेदान्त texts merely express ब्रह्मन् whose existence has been proved by such प्रमाणs as अनुमान. And it had already been pointed out before सत्सु तु वेदान्तवाक्येषु जगतो जन्मादिकारणवादिषु, तदर्थग्रहणदाढ्याय अनुमानमपि वेदान्तवाक्याविरोधि प्रमाणं भवत् न निवार्यते, श्रुत्यैव च सहायत्वेन तर्कस्याभ्युपेतत्वात्. Thus you recognise अनुमान (inference) also as a proof of ब्रह्मन्. Then why not let us examine the inference? Why should we consider the meanings of the वेदान्त texts? This consideration will serve no useful purpose.

To this we reply, No. We cannot make ब्रह्मन् the object of any other प्रमाण. For although ब्रह्मन् is a भूतवस्तु still ब्रह्मन् cannot be comprehended by any इन्द्रिय. Only that भूतवस्तु which can be apprehended by any इन्द्रिय can become the object of another प्रमाण. And as प्रत्यक्ष cannot operate without इन्द्रियसंबन्ध, the अनुज्ञान also (which rests on प्रत्यक्ष) cannot



operate without ultimate. इन्द्रियसंबन्ध. Hence ब्रह्मन् being beyond the pale of senses it cannot be comprehended by inference alone. The only प्रमाण, therefore is in the shape of वेदान्तवाक्यस. Again we have learnt that this जगत् is an effect (कार्य) of ब्रह्मन्. If ब्रह्मन् were इन्द्रियविषय (graspable by senses) then we could ordinarily (without being taught by the वेदान्तवाक्यस) comprehend the जगत् as related to ब्रह्मन्. But our experience is different. We comprehend only this much that जगत् is an effect. We are unable to decide whether it is an effect of ब्रह्मन् or something else. That this जगत् is an effect of ब्रह्मन् we learn from the वेदान्तवाक्यस. Hence the सूत्र—जन्माद्यस्य यतः does not suggest inference, but shows the वेदान्तवाक्यस. And those वेदान्त passages are ऋगुर्वेदं बार्हणः etc. up to the concluding sentence आनन्दादयैव खल्विदमानि भूतानि जायन्ते etc. referred to by us in the beginning of the Notes on the second सूत्रः. Similar other passages should also be adduced.

इति जन्माद्यधिकरणम् ।

### अथ तृतीयं शास्त्रयोनित्वाधिकरणम्

जगत्कारणत्वप्रदर्शनेन सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्मेत्युपक्षिप्तम् ; तदेव द्रढयन्नाह—

शास्त्रयोनित्वात् ॥ १ ॥ १ ॥ ३ ॥

महत् ऋग्वेदादेः शास्त्रस्य अनेकविद्यास्थानोपबृंहितस्य प्रदीप-  
वत्सर्वार्थावद्योतिनः सर्वज्ञकलस्य योनिः कारणं ब्रह्म । न हीदृशस्य  
शास्त्रस्य ऋग्वेदादिरूपस्य सर्वज्ञगुणान्वितस्य सर्वज्ञादन्यतः संभ-  
वोऽस्ति । यद्यद्विस्तरार्थं शास्त्रं यस्मात्पुरुषविशेषात्संभवति, यथा  
व्याकरणादि पाणिन्यादेः, ज्ञेयैरुद्देशार्थमपि, स ततोऽत्यधिकतरविज्ञान  
इति प्रसिद्धं लोके । किमु वक्तव्यम्—अनेकशास्त्रामेदमिन्नस्य देवतिथिद-

मनुष्यवर्णाश्रमादिप्रविभागहेतोः ऋग्वेदाद्याख्यस्य सर्वज्ञानाकरस्य अप्रयत्नेनैव लीलान्यायेन पुरुषनिःश्वासवत् यस्मान्महतो भूतात् योनेः संभवः—‘अस्य महतो भूतस्य निःश्वासितमेतद्यद्यवेदः ।’ (बृह० २.४. १०) इत्यादिश्रुतेः—तस्य महतो भूतस्य निरतिशयत्वं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्व-शक्तिमत्त्वं चेति ।—( भाष्यम् )

It has been pointed out that ब्रह्मन् is omniscient by showing that it is the cause of the universe; to strengthen this very conclusion, (the Sūtrakāra says—

**From its being the source of the Scripture—I. i.3.**

ब्रह्मन् is the source, i.e. the cause of the great body of the Scripture comprising the Ṛgveda, etc., supplemented by innumerable disciplines, illuminating all things like a lamp and which is itself omniscient as it were. Such a body of the Scripture comprising the Ṛgveda, etc. and endowed with the quality of omniscience, cannot originate from others except the Omniscient Being. When a science with an extensive theme originates from a particular person, for example, the Science of Grammar etc. from Pīṇi etc., although its content be only a part of what is to be known, he possesses more extensive knowledge than that (i.e. his work)—this is well known in experience. What idea, then shall we have to form of the unsurpassed omniscience and omnipotence of that great Being, from which great Being originates, even without an effort, in sport as it were, like human breath, the vast mass of holy texts known as the Ṛgveda, etc., which is divided into various branches, which is the mine of entire knowledge and which is the cause of such distinctions as gods, lower animals, man, castes and stages of life ! As it is said in the Scripture: “Of that great Being this is the breath, which is the Ṛgveda.”



## NOTES

In the previous सूत्र—जन्माद्यस्य यतः— it has been pointed out that ब्रह्मन् is सर्वज्ञ or omniscient because it is the cause of the origination, etc. of this universe. In this सूत्र, the सूत्रकार adduces an additional argument to support the सर्वज्ञत्व of ब्रह्मन्. The additional argument is that ब्रह्मन् is the source of Scripture and hence it is सर्वज्ञ.

The ऋग्वेद, etc. are called शास्त्र (or Sacred teaching) because they teach about the four āśramas, four castes, their duties from birth till death, the truth about ब्रह्मन्, etc. Therefore, the scope of the शास्त्र is called महत् or great. And the शास्त्र is not only great on account of its wide scope but also because it is समुपवृंहित or supplemented by so many विद्यास्थानs or disciplines. According to याज्ञवल्क्य there are 14 विद्यास्थानs viz.—

पुराणन्यायवीमांसाधर्मशास्त्राङ्गमिश्रिताः ।

वेदाः स्थानानि विद्यानां धर्मस्य च चतुर्दश ॥

Again that शास्त्र is प्रदीपवत्सर्वार्थावद्योतिनः— it illuminates all things like a lamp. Therefore, it is सर्वज्ञकल्प. The knowledge of सर्वज्ञ or omniscient embraces everything and the subject-matter of Scriptures also extends to everything. Hence there is similarity between the two. The construction of the phrase—यद्यद्विस्तरार्थ, etc. is यत् यत् विस्तरार्थं शास्त्रं यस्मात्पुरुषविशेषात्संभवति स पुरुषविशेषः ततोऽपि शास्त्रत् अधिकतरविज्ञानः । विस्तरार्थ means अधिकार्थ. The idea is that words can never express the complete sense. Sense is always more extensive than the words. अस्माकं वक्तव्यं वाक्याद् ज्ञानमधिकविषयम् । न हि ते तेऽसाधारणधर्मा अनुभूयमाना अपि शक्या वक्तुम्—The distinctive qualities of various things although experienced by us cannot be expressed in words. The भासतीकार adds न खल्विष्टुक्षीरगुडादीनां मधुररसमेदाः शक्याः सरस्वत्याप्याख्यातुम् ।

The various types of sweetness in sugarcane, milk and molasses cannot be expressed even by सरस्वती. Therefore, the word विस्तर indicates that howsoever wide the scope of the sense of a sentence be, the knowledge of the speaker will always be more extensive than that sense. As for example, पाणिनि must have known more of Grammar than he has put in his अष्टाध्यायी. Hence, his व्याकरण incorporates only a part of the sense which ought to have been known (ज्ञेयैकदेशार्थम्). Cf.—प्रदीप—पाणिनिना ज्ञातुं योग्येषु बहुषु केचनैव पाणिनिना स्वीये व्याकरणे सूत्रिताः, न तु सर्वं तदीयं ज्ञातमिति भावः ॥

If such is the case in mundane matters like Grammar, etc., how much more should it be with regard to शास्त्रs like ऋग्वेद ! The author of the latter must be immensely superior in knowledge. And, moreover, he did not put in any effort in originating the ऋग्वेद, etc. They came out of him लीलया, अग्रयत्नेन, निःश्रसितवत्. Hence, it follows that the सर्वज्ञत्व of ब्रह्मन्, as well as his सर्वशक्तिमत्त्व is of unsurpassed nature. What even the देवर्षिs etc. with great efforts cannot accomplish; that is accomplished by ब्रह्मन्, hence it is सर्वशक्तिमत्.

It may be argued that while defining ब्रह्मन्, as the originator etc. of this universe ( जन्माद्यस्य यतः ) and as the source of the Scriptures ( शास्त्रयोनित्वात् ) you have merely stressed the point of inference. That is, on the analogy of inferring a cause from the product, you have inferred ब्रह्मन् from its product in the shape of this जगत् and शास्त्र. Thus, inference becomes the main प्रमाण in proving the existence of ब्रह्मन्. Where is your contention that वाक्यार्थविचारणाध्यवसाननिवृत्ता हि ब्रह्मावगतिः, नानुमानादिप्रमाणान्तरनिवृत्ता—?

To avoid this kind of objection, the भाष्यकार gives another explanation of the सूत्र—



अथ वा यथोक्तमृगवेदादिशास्त्रं योनिः कारणं प्रमाणमस्य ब्रह्मणो यथावत्स्वरूपाधिगमे । शास्त्रादेव प्रमाणात् जगतो जन्मादिकारणं ब्रह्माधिगम्यत इत्यभिप्रायः । शास्त्रमुदाहृतं पूर्वसूत्रे—‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते’ इत्यादि । किमर्थं तर्हीदं सूत्रम्, यावता पूर्वसूत्रेणैव एवंजातीयकं शास्त्रमुदाहरता शास्त्रयोनित्वं ब्रह्मणो दर्शितम् ? उच्यते—तत्र सूत्राक्षरेण स्पष्टं शास्त्रस्यानुपादानाज्जन्मादिसूत्रेण केवलमनुमानमुपन्यस्तमित्याशङ्क्येत; तामाशङ्कां निवर्तयितुमिदं सूत्रं प्रवृत्ते ‘शास्त्रयोनित्वात्’ इति ।—( भाष्यम् )

Or else the above-mentioned Scripture, viz., the R̥gveda etc., is the source or cause: that is the proof for ascertaining the true nature of ब्रह्मन्. The purport is that it is only from the authority of the Scriptures that we understand ब्रह्मन् as the cause of the origination etc. of this universe. And that (passage of) Scripture is quoted in the previous सूत्र, beginning with—“That from which originate these beings”, etc. Then what is the purpose of this सूत्र, because the previous सूत्र itself while quoting a text of this nature has shown that Scripture is the source of ब्रह्मन्? To this it is replied—There, the word शास्त्र was not explicitly stated in the text of the सूत्र, and hence there is room for doubting that the aphorism जन्माद्यस्य यतः suggests merely inference. To obviate this doubt, the present सूत्र—शास्त्रयोनित्वात्—has been produced.

इति शास्त्रयोनित्वाधिकरणम् ।

अथ चतुर्थं समन्वयाधिकरणम् ।

कथं पुनर्ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वमुच्यते, यावता ‘आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्शानाम्’ (जै० सु० ३।२।१) इति क्रियापरत्वं शास्त्रस्य प्रदर्शितम् । अतो वेदान्तानामानर्थक्यम्, अक्रियार्थ-

त्वात् ; कर्तृदेवतादिप्रकाशनार्थत्वेन वा क्रियाविधिशेषत्वम् , उपासनाविदिक्रियान्तरविधानार्थत्वं वा । न हि परिनिष्ठितवस्तुस्वरूपप्रतिपादनं संभवति, प्रत्यक्षादिविषयत्वात्परिनिष्ठितवस्तुनः, तत्प्रतिपादने च हेयोपादेयरहिते पुरुषार्थाभावात् । अत एव 'सोऽरोदीत्' इत्येवमादीनामानर्थक्यं मा भूदिति 'विधिना त्वेकवाक्यत्वात्स्तुत्यर्थेन विधीनां स्युः' (जै० सू० १।२।७) इति स्तावकत्वेनार्थवत्त्वमुक्तम् । मन्त्राणां च 'इष्टे त्वा' (यजुर्वेदे १।१।१) इत्यादीनां क्रियातत्साधनाभिधायकत्वेन कर्मसमवायित्वमुक्तम् । न क्वचिदपि वेदवाक्यानां विधिसंस्पर्शमन्तरेणार्थवत्ता दृष्टा उपपन्ना वा । न च परिनिष्ठिते वस्तुस्वरूपे विधिः संभवति, क्रियाविषयत्वाद्विधेः । तस्मात्कर्मापेक्षितकर्तृदेवतादिस्वरूपप्रकाशनेन क्रियाविधिशेषत्वं वेदान्तानाम् । अथ प्रकरणान्तरभयाच्चैतदभ्युपगम्यते, तथापि स्ववाक्यगतोपासनादिकर्मपरत्वम् । तस्मान्न ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रयोनित्वमिति प्राप्ते, उच्यते—( भाष्यम् ;

How is it said that Scripture is the means of knowing ब्रह्मन्, when by (the following aphorism of Jaimini) "The purpose of the Veda lying in the enjoining of Actions, those parts of the Veda which do not serve that purpose are useless," it has been shown that Scripture aims at action ? Therefore, the Vedānta texts are useless, because they do not aim at action; or they may be subsidiaries to injunctions enjoining actions, for the purpose of laying down the agent, the deity, etc.; or they may be enjoining new class of actions in the shape of contemplation, etc. (Their sense) cannot be the teaching the nature of an already existent thing, for an already existent thing is the object of perception, etc., and in the teaching thereof, there is no human goal, as there is nothing to be rejected or accepted. For this very reason, lest the Vedic passages like 'He howled', etc. appear pur-



poseless, they are stated to be purposeful as being praises, in the aphorism — “Being construed along with Injunction, they would serve the purpose of commending those Injunctions.” In the same way, *mantras* like “Thee for food (I cut)” are said to be related to ritual, in so far as they indicate the actions and their means. The Vedic texts are nowhere seen or proved to be purposeful unless they are associated with injunctions. And there can be no injunction with regard to an already existent thing, for injunctions have actions for their objects. Therefore, the Vedānta texts are subsidiaries to injunctions enjoining actions, notifying the nature of the agent, the deity, etc., required by ritual. If, for fear of the different context it is not admitted, still they have for their purport the contemplation (of the deity, etc.) present in their own sentences. Therefore, Scripture is not the means of knowing ब्रह्मन्. To this the reply is :—

### NOTES

In the last सूत्र it has been stated that ब्रह्मन् is शास्त्रयोनि (Scripture is the means of valid knowledge of ब्रह्मन्). In this सूत्र, it will be taught as to how ब्रह्मन् is शास्त्रयोनि. This portion of the भाष्य starts with an objection that this शास्त्र cannot lead to मुमुक्षु-प्रवृत्ति (activity on the part of one desirous of obtaining salvation). For, our वेदान्तशास्त्र simply lays down or defines ब्रह्मन् which is an already existent thing. The वेदान्तशास्त्र does not enjoin any activity.

According to the सूत्र of जैमिनि. viz., आन्नाद्यस्य क्रियार्थ-त्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्शनाम्, the entire Veda has action or religious activity as its purpose. The Upaniṣad portion of the Veda, as it does not enjoin any activity, is, therefore, useless.

If it be argued that even in the कर्मकाण्ड portion of the Veda we find such sentences as वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवता (Wind is a swift god), which do not enjoin any action, then we reply that even such sentences become purportful when they enter into the relationship of uniformity of sense with the विधिवाक्य (injunctions). In the present case वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवता means वायुर्वै क्षिप्रतमगामिनी देवता, तद्देवताकं कर्म क्षिप्रमेव फलं दास्यति and hence it enters into the relationship of एकवाक्यता (or uniformity of sense) with the विधिवाक्य—वायव्यं श्वेतमालभेत (a white animal should be sacrificed to the god Wind).

Hence, these वेदान्तवाक्य should be regarded as either (1) the शेष (= अङ्ग, i.e. portion) of क्रियाविधि— injunction sen-joining religious activity—, because they make known the agent and the deity; or (2) they are for enjoining another activity in the shape of contemplation etc.

(1) In this alternative, we shall thus explain the कर्तृ-देवतादिप्रकाशन. In the various sacrifices we require the agent of the sacrifice. In the वेदान्तवाक्य, the real nature of that agent is disclosed. He is अभिन्न from ब्रह्मन्, he is different from the body, senses, etc.—This is told in the वेदान्तवाक्य. And also, the nature of the देवता or the god is made known in such sentences as सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म; यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविद्. Thus, these वेदान्तवाक्य can become the subsidiaries of the क्रियाविधि or injunctions found in कर्मकाण्ड portion of the Veda.

(2) If however, you say that how can the वेदान्तवाक्य, found in the ज्ञानकाण्ड of the वेद, become subsidiaries of the विधिवाक्य found in the कर्मकाण्ड portion of the वेद, then, we reply that let us take them as उपासनादिक्रियान्तरविधानार्थ. As सुमुञ्चु should contemplate अहं ब्रह्मास्मि or आत्मा ब्रह्मेत्युपासीन Here, we have the विधि or injunction of उपासना.

If we do not accept either of these two alternatives, we cannot prove the सार्थकता of the वेदान्तवाक्य. For, no



portion of the वेद can be सार्थक unless it is a विधिवाक्य or somehow becomes a part of विधिवाक्य.

[Leaving this discussion here, it is very important for us to enter into a digression about विधि. What is विधि? —It is an injunction or order to perform an action. This विधि is expressed generally by लिङ् which is therefore called विधिलिङ्. This विधिलिङ् gives rise to Efficient Force or Productive Energy which is called भावना (a technical term of the पूर्वमीमांसा). This भावना is twofold —(1) आर्थी (belonging to sense) and (2) शाब्दी (belonging to words). On the basis of these two भावनाs, a विधि is of two kinds— viz. (1) अज्ञात-ज्ञापक and (2) अप्रवृत्तप्रवर्तक. The first variety of विधि (viz., अज्ञातज्ञापक) teaches threefold अज्ञात (unknown) आर्थी भावना to a man in this way—your action has (1) this fruit (साध्य), (2) these instruments or means (साधन) and (3) this method (इतिकर्तव्यता). This is called अज्ञातज्ञापकत्व. When knowledge about an unknown thing has been thus imparted, the अप्रवृत्तप्रवर्तक विधि enjoins a person to perform an action which he had not as yet performed. This अप्रवृत्तप्रवर्तन teaches threefold प्रवर्तन (performance) of अप्रवृत्त (not already performed) actions. This is done by शाब्दी भावना having three parts, viz., (1) किम् (what), (2) केन (by what means), and (3) कथम् (in what way). The first part is known by understanding the sense (अर्थभावना); the second part by means of the knowledge that Veda orders me to do such and such action; the third part by means of knowing the excellence arising out of the action. Hence, the अर्थवादs—which praise an action, become parts of विधि. In simple words, the above-named two भावनाs are only two ways of looking at the Vedic injunctions. One way is to examine them from the point of view of *sense* and the other way is to examine them from the point of view of *words*. The first is called आर्थी भावना and the second is called the शाब्दी भावना.

Now from another point of division विधि is of 4 kinds. (1) उत्पत्तिविधि, (2) विनियोगविधि, (3) अधिकारविधि, and (4) प्रयोग-विधि.

(1) That which teaches us only the स्वरूप (nature) of an action is उत्पत्तिविधि.

(2) That which teaches us the relation of the whole action and its parts, is called विनियोग.

(3) That which teaches the fruit of the action and thus urges us to perform that action, is called अधिकारविधि.

(4) That which teaches us the entire order of the various parts of the action from beginning to end and then urges us to perform that action, is called प्रयोगविधि.

Now उत्पत्तिविधि and विनियोगविधि belong to आर्थभावन, and अधिकारविधि and प्रयोगविधि belong to शास्त्रीभावन. Let us illustrate the latter two विधिस.

(1) प्रयोगविधि. अनुतिष्ठेत्—(1) किम्? क्रमान्तं साङ्गं कर्म—The entire action with its various parts in order from beginning to end. (2) केन? पदार्थानां स्मरणेन—by remembering the पदार्थस.

(3) कथम्? मन्त्रैः—by means of mantras.

(1) अधिकारविधि. भावयेत्—किम्? स्वर्गम्. (2) केन? यागेन.

(3) कथम्! ज्योतिष्टोमेन by means of ज्योतिष्टोम.

Because, a वेदवाक्य cannot lay down an injunction about an already accomplished thing. There can be अप्रवृत्तप्रवर्तन or अकृतकरण in the विधिवाक्य, but not परिनिष्ठितवस्तुस्वरूपप्रतिपादन—teaching of the nature of an already existent thing. Because, such a thing is already known by प्रत्यक्ष or अनुमान. And a शास्त्र is always अज्ञातज्ञापक, not ज्ञातज्ञापक. If a शास्त्र tells us something which is already known to us then that शास्त्र becomes useless.

Again, शास्त्र leads us to our goal by telling us to perform an action or avoid an action, to accept a thing or reject a thing. If शास्त्र merely defines a thing as such and such, and does not tell us whether we should accept or reject that thing, then that शास्त्र becomes useless; it does not lead to human activity towards a goal.

If it be said that on your line of argument such sentences like सौरोदित्—he howled—would become useless, for



they do not enjoin any action, then we reply—In the sentence *देवैर्निर्द्धः सोऽग्निररोदीत्* (that fire, being confined by gods, howled), refers to creation of silver from tears. It thus censures silver. And thus, this sentence by means of censuring silver, becomes a part of the *निषेधवाक्य*—*अहिंषि न देयम्* (silver ought not to be offered in a sacrifice). This very fact is stressed in the सूत्र of जैमिनि,—‘*विधिना त्वेकवाक्यत्वास्तु-त्यर्थेन विधीनां स्युः*’—Being construed along with Injunction, they would serve the purpose of commending those Injunctions.

If it be said that the वेदान्त texts are independently authoritative as the मन्त्रs of the वेद, they should not be like मन्त्रs, relegated to the subordinate position of अर्थवाद and thus brought into *एकवाक्यता* with *विधिवाक्य*, then we reply—That even मन्त्रs have to form part of some *विधिवाक्य*. They have to enter into some relation or the other with क्रिया, either by stating the nature of the action, or the means employed in that action. For example, the मन्त्र—‘*इधे त्वा*’ (वाजसनेयसंहिता १११), is used in the chopping of the tree-branch, and thus serves the purpose of the action of cutting (*छिदिक्रिया*). Cf.—*प्रयोगसमवेतार्थस्मारकत्वेनैव मन्त्राणां प्रामाण्याद् मन्त्राणामपि क्रियासम्बन्धं विना न प्रामाण्यमिति भावः—प्रदीप*.

Thus, it is clear that no portion of वेद is useful unless it is somehow or other related to *विधिवाक्यs* (Injunctions).

If it be argued—Even in your *विधि* there is a variety called *उत्पत्तिविधि* which merely *states* the nature of an action (*कर्मस्वरूप*) and does not enjoin any action. Similarly, the वेदान्त texts might be construed as stating the nature of ब्रह्मन् (*ब्रह्मस्वरूप*) and although they do not enjoin any action yet they will be *विधिवाक्यs*. Because, a *विधि* is not only *अप्रवृत्तप्रवर्तक*—urging towards an action which has not been accomplished—, but also *अज्ञातज्ञापक*—teaching that which was not known before. And the Vedānta texts teach us about ब्रह्मन् which was not known before, hence they will be *उत्पत्तिविधिस*.

Then we reply—न च परिनिष्ठिते वस्तुस्वरूपे विधिः संभवति, क्रिया-विषयत्वाद् विधेः । *And there can be no injunction with regard to an already existing thing, for injunctions have action for their object.* The general definition of a विधि is that it has for its विषय only a becoming which is not yet existent and is to be originated (अनागतोत्पाद्यभावविषय एव हि सर्वो विधिरूपेयः । —भामती ). This qualification is present in all the 4 kinds of विधिस— उत्पत्ति, विनियोग, अधिकार and प्रयोग. In fact these 4 forms are inseparable from one another, and these विधि varieties can never refer to a thing which is already existent. If you ask then what is the difference between these varieties, then we reply that they differ with regard to the तात्पर्य of their respective वाक्यस. For example, the sentence अग्निहोत्रं जुहोति is merely an उत्पत्तिवाक्य in significance, because by the sentence अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्स्वर्गकामः, the विनियोग, अधिकार and प्रयोग can be obtained. It is not that in अग्निहोत्रं जुहोति, the विनियोग, अधिकार and प्रयोग are not present; they are present, but as they are obtained from another sentence, they are not intended to be expressed by the sentence अग्निहोत्रं जुहोति. Therefore, a विधि which has भावना (productive force) for its विषय, cannot result in the case of an existent object.

Therefore, the Vedānta texts teach only the agent, the deity, etc., required by a ritual. They are thus subsidiary to injunctions of rituals.

If it be argued—The Veda has two parts. viz., कर्मकाण्ड and ज्ञानकाण्ड, both of them cannot have one and the same purport. Therefore, if you make the वेदान्त texts (which form part of ज्ञानकाण्ड) subsidiary to injunctions of rituals (belonging to कर्मकाण्ड portion of वेद) then you will be violating the context—incorporating a thing in a context different from its own.



Then we reply—that the वेदान्त texts have for their purport the contemplation of the deity, etc., present in their sentences. The idea is that that portion of the वेदान्त which lays down उपासना of ब्रह्मन् will become the मुख्य or the principal part and the other texts will become subsidiary to it. उपासना is a क्रिया and that becomes the principal aim of the वेदान्त texts. ब्रह्मन् or ब्रह्मज्ञान is not the principal subject-matter.

Therefore, ब्रह्मन् is not शास्त्रयोनि —Scripture is not the means of knowing ब्रह्मन्.

When this results, then the सूत्रकार replies :—

तत्तु समन्वयात् ॥१॥१॥४॥

तुशब्दः पूर्वपक्षव्यावृत्त्यर्थः । तद्ब्रह्म सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिं जगदुत्पत्ति-स्थितिलयकारणं वेदान्तशास्त्रादवगम्यते । कथम् ? समन्वयात् । सर्वेषु हि वेदान्तेषु वाक्यानि तात्पर्येणैतत्स्यार्थस्य प्रतिपादकत्वेन समनुगतानि “सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्” (छान्दोग्य ६।२।१), “एकमेवाद्वितीयम्” (बृह० २।५।१९), “आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्” (ऐत० २।४।१।१), “तदेतद्ब्रह्मा पूर्वमनपरमनन्तरमबाह्यम्”, “अयमात्मा ब्रह्म सर्वानुभूः” (बृह० २।९।१४), “ब्रह्मैवेदममृतं पुरस्तात्” (मुण्ड० २।२।११) इत्यादीनि । न च तद्गतानां पदानां ब्रह्मस्वरूपविषये निश्चिते समन्वयेऽवगम्यमाने अर्थान्तरकल्पना युक्ता, श्रुतहान्यश्रुतकल्पनाप्रसङ्गात् । न च तेषां कर्तृदेवतादिस्वरूपप्रतिपादनपरता अवसीयते, ‘तत्केन कं पश्येत्’ (बृह० २।४।१३) इत्यादिक्रियाकरकफलनिराकरणश्रुतेः ।—( भाष्यम् )

But that, because of Harmony—L. i. 4.

The word ‘but’ is to rebut the *prima facie* view. That ब्रह्मन्, Omniscient and Omnipotent, the cause of the origi-

ब्र.च...7

nation, subsistence and destruction of this universe, is known from the Scripture, the Vedānta (alone). How? Because of harmony. In all the Vedāntas, the sentences run together as having for their purport the teaching of this sense: "Dear one, existence alone was in the beginning", "One alone without a second", "The Self, indeed, as one alone, was there in the beginning", "This is ब्रह्मन् without cause, without effect, without an inside or outside", "This Self is ब्रह्मन्, the experience of all", "The immortal ब्रह्मन् alone is in front", and so on. And when for the words occurring in these sentences the ascertained harmony is understood to refer to the nature of ब्रह्मन्, it is not proper to assume another sense, for that would result in rejecting that which is directly stated; and assuming that which is not directly stated. Nor can we conclude that their purport is to teach the nature of the agent, the deity, etc., because there are scriptural passages like "Then by what and whom could one see?" which refute action, causal condition and result.

### NOTES

समन्वय is सम्यगन्वय—full or right relation, harmony. That is, there is harmony in the तात्पर्य or purport of all the वेदान्त texts. Now how do you determine the तात्पर्य?—Thus :—

उपक्रमोपसंहारावम्यासोऽपूर्वता फलम् ।

अर्थवादोपपत्ती च किञ्च तात्पर्यनिर्णये ॥

According to मीमांसा writers, there are seven things necessary to determine the तात्पर्य of any work. They are (1) उपक्रम beginning, (2) उपसंहार conclusion, (3) अवम्यास repetition, (4) अपूर्वता newness, (5) फल result, (6) अर्थवाद praise or censure and (7) उपपत्ति logic.



Now according to these 7 items, it can be shown that the entire वेदान्त points out to ब्रह्मन्. In the छान्दोग्य we see the उपक्रम. उद्दालक teaches his son—सदेव सोम्यदमग्र आसीत् (६.२.१). Starting the teaching of ब्रह्मन्, the father concludes (उपसंहरति)—ऐतदात्म्यामिदं सर्वम् (छा. १.८.७-१६). तत्त्वमसि is repeated 9 times there. This is अभ्यास. The अपूर्वता lies in this that ब्रह्मन् who is devoid of form etc., is to be known only by means of the वेदान्त and not by any well-established means of knowledge like प्रत्यक्ष, etc. The फल or result of ब्रह्मज्ञान is laid down in तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्न विमोक्षये अथ संपत्स्ये—The only delay in his becoming ब्रह्मन् is due to his body. As soon as the body is destroyed, he will become ब्रह्मन्. The अर्थवाद or praise is illustrated in येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवति etc.—that by means of which even unheard-of thing is heard, is ब्रह्मन्. उपपत्ति or reasoning is illustrated in यथैकेन मृतत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृण्मयं विज्ञातं भवति, etc. This उपपत्ति proves that ब्रह्मन् is changeless and it is only the प्रकृति which is changing (स विकारा). When by these लिङ्गs we determine that the तात्पर्य of all the वेदान्त texts is ब्रह्मन्, then if you try to assume another sense, then there would arise the faults of श्रुतहानि and अश्रुतकल्पना.

Now, the objector had said that the वेदान्त texts are like अर्थवाद sentences. They, in reality, reveal the nature of the agent, the deity, etc. and hence, these वेदान्त texts are subsidiary to क्रियाविधि or the कर्मकाण्ड portion of the वेद.

This is now refuted by the श्रुति passage तत्केन कं पश्येत्. Here action, causal condition and result are refuted.

न च परिनिष्ठितवस्तुस्वरूपत्वेऽपि प्रत्यक्षादिविषयत्वं ब्रह्मणः, 'तत्त्वमसि' इति ब्रह्मात्मभावस्य शास्त्रमन्तरेणानवगम्यमानत्वात् । अतु हेयोपादेयरहितत्वादुपदेशानर्थक्यमिति, नैष दोषः; हेयोपादेयशून्यब्रह्मात्मतावगमादेव सर्वल्लेशप्रहरणात्पुरुषार्थसिद्धेः । देवतादि-

प्रतिपादनस्य तु स्ववाक्यगतोपासनार्थत्वेऽपि न कश्चिद्विरोधः । न तु तथा ब्रह्मण उपासनविधिशेषत्वं संभवति, एकत्वे हेयोपादेयशून्यतया क्रियाकारकादिद्वैतविज्ञानोपमर्दोपपत्तेः । न हि ब्रह्मैकत्वविज्ञानेनोन्मथितस्य द्वैतविज्ञानस्य पुनः संभवोऽस्ति, येनोपासनविधिशेषत्वं ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपाद्येत । यद्यप्यन्यत्र वेदवाक्यानां विधिसंस्पर्शमन्तरेण प्रमाणत्वं न दृष्टम्, तथाप्यात्मविज्ञानस्य फलपर्यन्तत्वान्न तद्विषयस्य शास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्यं शक्यं प्रत्याख्यातुम् । न चानुमानगम्यं शास्त्रप्रामाण्यम्, येनान्यत्र दृष्टं निर्दर्शनमपेक्षेत । तस्मात्सिद्धं ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वम् ।  
—( भाष्यम् )

Nor again can ब्रह्मन्, though it is of the nature of an already existent thing, become an object of perception, etc., because, that ब्रह्मन् is Self, as stated in "That thou art", cannot be grasped except by the Scripture. As for what has been said that the teaching of ब्रह्मन् is futile as it is devoid of what is to be rejected or accepted, it is not a defect; because the attainment of a human goal results even from the realisation of the Self as ब्रह्मन् which is devoid of what is to be rejected or accepted, as it (this knowledge) leads to the destruction of all hindrances. As regards the passages teaching the deity, etc. there is no opposition even to their standing in subordinate relation to contemplation mentioned in their own texts. But it is not possible in the case of ब्रह्मन् that it is subsidiary to the injunction of contemplation; because, ब्रह्मन् being one and devoid of what is to be rejected or accepted, it is intelligible that all conception of duality in the shape of action, causal condition, etc. is quashed. Conception of duality once quashed by the knowledge of the oneness of ब्रह्मन्, cannot rise again, and so no longer be the cause of ब्रह्मन् being looked upon as subsidiary object to the injunction of.



contemplation. Although in other places the Vedic texts are not seen to be authoritative unless they are connected with injunctions, yet, since the knowledge of the Self culminates in the fruit, the authoritativeness of the Scripture conveying the knowledge of the Self cannot be denied. And, moreover, the authoritativeness of the Scripture is not understood through inference, in which case it would be dependent on instances observed elsewhere. Therefore, it is established that the authority for ब्रह्मन् is the Scripture. ॐ

### NOTES

In the पूर्वपक्ष it was said that ब्रह्मन्, being an already existent thing is knowable through such means of knowledge as अत्यक्ष or अनुमान. ब्रह्मन् is not taught by शान्त्र alone. To this the भाष्यकार replies that it is impossible to realise the identity of ब्रह्मन् and आत्मन् by any such प्रमाण as प्रत्यक्ष or अनुमान. The realisation is possible only through शास्त्र-तत्त्वमसि.

Now the second argument of the पूर्वपक्षिन् was that as the वेदान्त texts teach ब्रह्मन् which is devoid of what is to be rejected or accepted, so these texts do not lead to human goal. To this the भाष्यकार replies that there is पुरुषार्थसिद्धि, because the knowledge of ब्रह्मन् leads to सर्वज्ञानाश. And what is पुरुषार्थ if not दुःखनिवृत्ति and सुखासि? In विधिवाक्य the attainment of पुरुषार्थ is very indirect. You have first to understand the sense of the injunctions, then act according to them and then only you reach your goal. But in the वेदान्तवाक्य like तत्त्वमसि, the moment you have realised their truth, you reach your goal. You have not to perform the intricate actions, as you have to do in Sacrifices. Cf. the भामति—

एतदुक्तं भवति—द्विविधं ह्रीप्सितं पुरुषस्य; किञ्चिदप्राप्तम्, यथा ग्रामादि; किञ्चित्पुनः प्राप्तमपि भ्रमवशादप्राप्तमित्यवगतम्, यथा स्व-  
ःप्रीवावनद्धं प्रवेयकम्। एवं जिहासितमपि द्विविधम्; किञ्चिदहीनं जिहासति,

यथा वलयितचरणं फणिनम् ; किञ्चित्पुनर्हीनमेव जिहासति, यथा चरणाभरणे नूपुरे फणिनमारोपितम् । तत्राप्राप्तप्राप्तौ चात्यक्तत्यागे च बाह्योपायानुष्ठान-साध्यत्वात् तदुपायतत्त्वज्ञानादस्ति पराचीना (subsequent) अनुष्ठानापेक्षा न जातु ज्ञानमात्रं वस्त्वपनयति । न हि सहस्रमपि रज्जुप्रत्यया वस्तुसन्तं फणिनमन्यथयितुमीक्षते । समारोपिते तु प्रेक्षितजिहासिते तत्त्वसाक्षात्कार-मात्रेण बाह्यानुष्ठानानपेक्षेणैव शक्येते प्राप्तुमिव हातुमिव । समारोपितमात्र-जीविते हि ते, समारोपितं च तत्त्वसाक्षात्कारः समूलघातमुपहन्तीति । तथेहीन्यविद्यासमारोपितजीवभावे ब्रह्मण्यनन्दे वस्तुतः शोकदुःखादिरहिते समारोपितनिबन्धनस्तद्भावः 'तत्त्वमसि' इति वाक्यार्थतत्त्वज्ञानात् अवगतिपर्यन्तात् (culminating in realisation) निवर्तते । तन्निवृत्तौ प्राप्तमप्यानन्दरूपं अप्राप्तमिव प्राप्तं भवति, त्यक्तमपि शोकदुःखादि अत्यक्तमिव त्यक्तं भवति । तदिदमुक्तम्—ब्रह्मात्मावगमादेव जीवस्य सर्वक्लेशस्य, सवासनस्य विपर्यासस्य (of error together with its impressions)—स हि क्लिप्नाति जन्तूनतः क्लेशः—तस्य प्रकपेण हानात् पुरुषार्थस्य दुःखनिवृत्तिमुखप्राप्तिलक्षणस्य सिद्धेरिति ।

As regards the argument of the पूर्वपक्षिन् that वेदान्त texts teach deity and hence they are subordinate to the क्रिया of उपासना (contemplation), we ask : Are all the वेदान्त texts उपासनागतदेवतादिप्रतिपादक (teaching the deity, etc. required in contemplation) or some ? If you say only some, then we agree. We have no objection to वेदान्त texts being subordinate to उपासनाविधि in such cases as 'आत्मेत्येवोपासीत', 'आत्मानमेव लोकमुपासीत', because, here the deity taught is आत्मन् alone and not ब्रह्मन्. In such cases there is उपासनागत-देवतादिप्रतिपादकत्व. But if you say, that all वेदान्त texts are उपासनागतदेवतादिप्रतिपादक, then we say, No. For the वेदान्त texts like सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्मन् which lay down no injunctions, which do not tell us to reject or accept something, but teach of the oneness of ब्रह्मन् without a second, cannot lead to उपासना. उपासना really depends on the establishment of dif-



difference in the shape of उपास्य, उपासक, उपासना, etc. This उपासना is not possible in ब्रह्मन् which is devoid of all differences and is to be known only through the वेदान्त. Hence the वेदान्त-texts cannot be subsidiary to the injunctions of उपासना.

If you say that whenever द्वैतज्ञान or knowledge of duality will reappear, then the वेदान्त will become subordinate to उपासनाविधि, then we reply that once the knowledge of duality is destroyed by the एकत्वविज्ञान, it can never reappear. Hence; the वेदान्तवाक्यस cannot be subordinate to उपासनाविधि.

Objection:—If the वेदान्त texts can become authoritative without being of the nature of injunctions, then why should not the Vedic sentences like सोऽरोदीत्, which do not refer to any विधि and which refer to things towards which one should be indifferent, be authoritative? The fruit of authoritativeness is not only the desire to reject or accept something; even the desire to remain indifferent can be its fruit. Therefore, we should not try to connect सोऽरोदीत् with the prohibitory injunction बहिषि न देयम्.

Reply :—The real position is this that the entire Veda, being dependent on the injunction स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः (one should study one's own Veda), is a means to पुरुषार्थ (human goal). There is not even a single letter which should be अपुरुषार्थ; how can, then so many words—सोऽरोदीत्—be अपुरुषार्थ? In these sentences, the human goal is not apprehended by mere understanding of their sense, as is the case in the वेदान्त texts. Therefore, सोऽरोदीत्, desiring to generate human goal, stands in expectancy of something else to complete its sense. Again, the prohibitory injunction बहिषि रजतं न देयम् is also expectant of censure of that which it prohibits; otherwise an intelligent person cannot turn away

from it. Therefore, a mutual syntactical relation (समन्वय) is brought about between the two sentences, through the channel of censure implied secondarily. But in the वेदान्त texts there is no such dependence on human goal. Because, from the very comprehension of their sense, without dependence on anything else, the supreme पुरुषार्थ is attained.

If it be further asked—Well, no other part of the Veda is considered to be authoritative unless it is connected with the injuctions. Why should then वेदान्त alone, without being connected with injuctions, be regarded as authoritative? —We reply—न चानुमानगम्यं etc. The प्रमाणs (means of valid knowledge like प्रत्यक्ष, etc.) are authoritative in so far as they generate a piece of knowledge which is अबाधित (not sublated subsequently), अनधिगत (not already acquired) and असंदिग्ध (free from doubts). This authoritativeness of the प्रमाणs is intrinsic; it is not dependent on any प्रमाण like अनुमान, etc. It is known to us from the result. That is, seeing the result as a piece of अबाधितानाधिगतासंदिग्ध knowledge we presume (by अर्थापत्ति) that the generating cause of this knowledge must be valid means (प्रमाण). These प्रमाणs do not depend on any other प्रमाणs, not even the above-mentioned अर्थापत्ति, otherwise there will be अन्योऽन्याश्रय (reciprocal dependence). The authoritativeness of the प्रमाणs will depend on अर्थापत्ति, and the authoritativeness of अर्थापत्ति, (being a प्रमाण) will depend on the authoritativeness of प्रमाणs. Hence, we have to admit the स्वतःप्रामाण्य (intrinsic authoritativeness) of the प्रमाणs. Similar is the case of the वेदान्त texts in respect of ब्रह्मन्. Hence their authoritativeness in respect of ब्रह्मन् results without the need of an example. Otherwise, since we do not find any other इन्द्रिय manifesting colour, it would follow that चक्षुस् also could not manifest colour. Therefore, the वेदान्त texts are स्वतःप्रमाण.

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अत्रापरे प्रत्यवतिष्ठन्ते—यद्यपि शास्त्रप्रमाणकं ब्रह्म, तथापि प्रति-  
पत्तिविधिविषयतयैव शास्त्रेण ब्रह्म समर्प्यते; यथा यूपाहवनीयादीन्य-  
लौकिकान्यपि विधिशेषतया शास्त्रेण समर्प्यन्ते, तद्वत् । कुत एतत् ?  
प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिप्रयोजनपरत्वाच्छास्त्रस्य । तथा हि शास्त्रतात्पर्यविदामनु-  
क्रमणम्—‘दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनम्’ (शावरभाष्य—१।१।१)  
इति । ‘चोदनेति क्रियायाः प्रवर्तकं वचनम्’ (शावरभाष्य—१।१।२),  
‘तस्य ज्ञानमुपदेशः’ (जै० सू० १।१।५), ‘तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थेन  
समाम्नायः’ (जै० सु० १।१।२५), ‘आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थ-  
क्यमतदर्शानाम्’ (जै० २० १।२।१) इति च । अतः पुरुषं  
क्वचिद्विषयविशेषे प्रवर्तयत्कुतश्चिद्विषयविशेषान्निवर्तयच्चार्थवच्छास्त्रम् ।  
तच्छेषतया चान्यदुपयुक्तम् । तत्सामान्याद्वेदान्तानामपि तथैवार्थवत्त्वं  
स्यात् । सति च विधिपरत्वे, यथा स्वर्गादिकामस्याग्निहोत्रादिसाधनं  
विधीयते, एवममृतत्ववत्तत्त्वकामस्य ब्रह्मज्ञानं विधीयत इति युक्तम् ।

नन्विह जिज्ञास्यवैलक्षण्यमुक्तम्—कर्मकाण्डे भव्यो धर्मो जिज्ञास्यः;  
इह तु भूतं नित्यनिर्वृतं ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यमिति । तत्र धर्मज्ञानफलादनुष्ठान-  
सापेक्षाद्विलक्षणं ब्रह्मज्ञानफलं भवितुमर्हति ।

नार्हत्येवं भवितुम्, कार्यविधिप्रयुक्तस्यैव ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपाद्यमान-  
त्वात् । ‘आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः’ (बृह० ४।४।६); ‘य आत्मा-  
पहतपाप्मः.....सोन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः’ (छा० ८।७।१),  
‘आत्मेत्येवोपासीत’ (बृह० १।४।७); ‘आत्मानमेव लोकमुपासीतः’  
(बृह० १।४।१५), ‘ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति’ (मुण्ड० ३।२।९)  
इत्यादिषु विधानेषु सत्सु, ‘कोऽसावात्मा?’ ‘किं तद् ब्रह्म?’  
इत्याकाङ्क्षायां तत्स्वरूपसमर्पणेन सर्वे वेदान्ता उपयुक्ताः—‘नित्यः  
सर्वज्ञः सर्वगतो नित्यवृत्तो नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावो विज्ञानमानन्दं  
ब्रह्म’ इत्येवमादयः । तदुपासनाच्च शास्त्रदृष्टोऽदृष्टो मोक्षः फलं

भविष्यति । कर्तव्यविध्यननुप्रवेशे तु वस्तुमात्रकथने हानोपादाना-  
संभवात् 'सप्तद्वीपा वसुमती', 'राजासौ गच्छति' इत्यादिवाक्यवद्वे-  
दान्तवाक्यानामानर्थक्यमेव स्यात् ।

ननु वस्तुमात्रकथनेऽपि 'रज्जुरियं नायं सर्पः' इत्यादौ भ्रान्ति-  
जनितभीतिनिवर्तनेनार्थवत्त्वं दृष्टम् । तथेहाप्यसंसार्यात्मवस्तुकथनेन  
संसाहिवभ्रान्तिनिवर्तनेनार्थवत्त्वं स्यात् ।

स्यादेतदेवम्, यदि रज्जुस्वरूपश्रवणमात्रेणैव सर्पभ्रान्तिः, संसा-  
रित्वभ्रान्तिर्ब्रह्मस्वरूपश्रवणमात्रेण निवर्तेत । न तु निवर्तते; श्रुत-  
ब्रह्मणोऽपि यथापूर्वं सुखदुःखादिसंसारिधर्मदर्शनात्, 'श्रोतव्यो  
मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः' इति च श्रवणोत्तरकालयोर्मनननिदिध्या-  
सनयोर्विधिदर्शनात् । तस्मात्प्रतिपत्तिविधिविषयतयैव शास्त्रप्रमाणकं  
ब्रह्माभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति ।—( भाष्यम् )

Here others raise the following objection:—Although the authority for ब्रह्मन् is Scripture, yet the latter intimates ब्रह्मन् only as the object of the injunction of realisation; just as the sacrificial post, the आहवनीय fire, etc., even though they are supramundane, are intimated by the Scripture as subsidiary to an injunction. Whence is this? Because, the Scripture has the purport of either instigating to action or restraining from it. So indeed is the quotation from those who know the purport of the Scripture:—'The purport of the Veda is seen to be what is called the teaching of ritual', 'An injunction is a statement which prompts to action', 'Of this (viz., the ritual) the knowledge comes from an injunction', 'Of (words) denoting those (existent things), there is relation with that whose purport is ritual', 'Since the Scripture is for the purpose of ritual, there is futility for whatever has not that



purpose'. Therefore, the Scripture can be purposeful only: if it prompts a man towards a particular object and restrains him from a particular object. Other passages are useful (only) as subsidiary thereto. And because of similarity (viz. the वेदान्त texts also belong to the वेद), the वेदान्त texts also can be purposeful only in the same way. And if their (i.e. of the वेदान्त texts) aim is injunction, then just as अग्निहोत्र, etc. are enjoined as the means for him who is desirous of the heavenly world, so the knowledge of ब्रह्मन् is enjoined as means for him who is desirous of immortality: this stands to reason.

(Somebody might object)—Here the distinctness of what is desired to be known has been stated : The object of inquiry in the कर्मकाण्ड (the ritual section) is the Religious Duty which is to come into being; but here (in the वेदान्त) the object of enquiry is ब्रह्मन् which is already existent, which is eternally fulfilled. Of these, the fruit of the knowledge of ब्रह्मन् should be distinct from the fruit of the knowledge of Religious Duty which requires an observance.

(Then we reply)—It cannot be so, for ब्रह्मन् is taught only as connected with injunctions of actions. 'Verily, the Self is to be seen'; 'The Self which is free from sin.....that should be searched, that should be desired to be known'; 'Contemplate as the Self alone'; 'Let a man contemplate the Self only as his true state'; 'He who knows ब्रह्मन् becomes ब्रह्मन्'—there being such injunctions, when there is a desire to know, 'who is this Self?' 'what is that ब्रह्मन्?', the entire वेदान्त is useful in setting forth ब्रह्मन्'s nature :—that ब्रह्मन् is eternal, omniscient, all-pervading, eternally contented, eternally pure, intelligent and free by nature, knowledge, bliss and so on. From contemplation of that (ब्रह्मन्) will result the invisible fruit, final release as seen from the Scripture..

If they were not to form part of injunctions of something to be done and if they be mere statements of fact, since there can be neither rejection nor acceptance, there would only be futility for the वेदान्त texts, as for the statements, 'The earth has seven islands', 'Here goes the king'.

(If it be said), well, even in the case of a mere statement of fact like 'This is a rope and not a snake' etc., purposefulness is seen through the removal of fear caused by delusion. Similarly, here also, by the statement of the fact of the Self not being a transmigrator, there may be purposefulness through the removal of the delusion of his being a transmigrator.

(Then we reply): It would have been so, if the delusion of his being a transmigrator could be removed by merely hearing about the nature of ब्रह्मन्, like the delusion of snake by merely hearing about the nature of the rope. But it is not removed; for we observe that even those men who had heard of ब्रह्मन् are found to be possessed of the attributes of a transmigrator, as happiness and misery as before; and because we find an injunction of reflection and contemplation subsequent to hearing in the passage. 'He is to be heard, to be reflected on and to be contemplated'. Therefore ब्रह्मन् should be admitted to have Scripture as authority only as the content of an injunction of realisation.

### NOTES

Here some मीमांसकs raise the objection :—We grant that ब्रह्मन् is शास्त्रप्रमाणक, but शास्त्र teaches ब्रह्मन् as the object of अतिपत्तिविधि (the injunction of contemplation or realisation). The वेदान्तशास्त्र does not teach us independent ब्रह्मन् but as dependent on उपासनाविधि, just as the वेद teaches us of यूप and आहवनीय as connected with some क्रियाविधि. A यूप (or



sacrificial post) and the आहवनीय fire are not commonly used by people; they are अलौकिक (supra-mundane). Without reading the शास्त्र (here वेद) their nature cannot be understood. But the वेद teaches about them as parts of some क्रियाविधि. Had they not been connected with some कर्म, the वेद could not have taught about them. Therefore, even already existing things, things which can be comprehended by perception or inference, are taught as connected with some कर्म or क्रियाविधि. In the वेद we learn यूपे पशुं विनाति. Here arises the question—What is यूप? Then the वेद itself tells us—यूपं तक्षति, यूपं अष्टास्त्रीकरोति—a यूप is a piece of wood which is cut so as to have eight sides. Similarly, there is another विधिवाक्य—आहवनीये जुहोति. And the वेद teaches us the nature of आहवनीय as the fire taken out of गार्हपत्य for sacrificial purposes (गार्हपत्यादाहवनीयं ज्वलन्तमुद्धरेत्). Similarly the वेदान्त texts declare that ब्रह्मन् ought to be contemplated. Here arises the question—What is ब्रह्मन्? Then the वेदान्त texts define him as सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म. Therefore, the वेदान्त texts teach ब्रह्मन् as connected with उपासनाविधि.

If it be asked—How do you say that? Then we reply:—The purpose of शास्त्र is to teach प्रवृत्ति or निवृत्ति—prompting towards an action or restraining from an action. As it is said—

प्रवृत्तिर्वा निवृत्तिर्वा नित्येन कृतकेन वा ।

पुंसां येनोपदिश्येत तच्छास्त्रमभिधीयते ॥

(Engaging in or cessation from activity in respect of the obligatory or the occasioned actions, that by which these are taught to men is called a शास्त्र.) Mere statement of fact is not the purpose of शास्त्र. And this प्रवृत्ति or निवृत्ति is known from a कार्य or क्रिया, i.e., an action. Hence, शास्त्र teaches क्रिया or कर्म, and ब्रह्मन् is also a part of कार्य or action. This view is supported by the sayings of the मीमांसक इष्टो हि

तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनम् (i.e. शास्त्र teaches us only क्रिया and not mere facts); चोदनेति क्रियायाः प्रवर्तकं वचनम् (in the सूत्र—चोदना-लक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः, the word चोदना means a statement which prompts a person to action); तस्य ज्ञानमुपदेशः (that, which imparts knowledge about धर्म which is क्रियात्मक, is उपदेश or विधियाक्य); तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थेन समान्नायः (the words which denote already existent things, सिद्ध or भूतवस्तुs, they are all connected with some action); आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमत-दर्शनात् (as the purpose of the वेद is action, the words which do not denote an action are futile). Therefore, शास्त्र is purposeful only when it teaches प्रवृत्ति or निवृत्ति. Those portions of शास्त्र which do not teach प्रवृत्ति or निवृत्ति can be purposeful if they enter into some relation with प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ति-परक or विधिनिषेधात्मक शास्त्र. The वेदान्त texts also form part of the वेद. Hence, on the similarity of the other वेदवाक्यs, the वेदान्त texts also will be purposeful if they are क्रियात्मक. And when the वेदान्तशास्त्र also has its aim the injunctions, then यथा स्वर्गादिकामस्याग्निहोत्रादिसाधनं विधीयते, एवममृततत्त्वकामस्य ब्रह्मज्ञानं विधीयते.

Here the objector says :—There is a difference between धर्मजिज्ञासा and ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा. Had they been one, then what was the necessity of composing two different शास्त्रs? Therefore, the जिज्ञास्य of कर्मकाण्ड is different from the जिज्ञास्य of ज्ञानकाण्ड and their fruits are also different. Hence, for मुक्ति, the फल of ज्ञानकाण्ड, ज्ञान cannot be regarded as a क्रियात्मक means. If मुक्ति were also brought about by a क्रिया, then how will it differ from यज्ञकर्मफल which is brought about by a क्रिया? And if कर्मफल were not different from ज्ञानफल, then कर्म also will not be different from ज्ञान.

To this the reply is—It is not so. It cannot be proved that like कर्मफल, the ज्ञानफल is not क्रियाजन्य (brought about by



an action). The वेदान्त texts themselves teach ब्रह्मन् as occasioned by an injunction about something to be done. Cf.—आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः etc. These are विधिवाक्यs or injunctions. Therefore, when the questions arise—Who is that आत्मन्? What is that ब्रह्मन्? Then the वेदान्त texts tell us about the nature of आत्मन् and ब्रह्मन्. And herein lies their purposefulness. The वेदान्त texts like नित्यः सर्वज्ञः, etc., by teaching us the nature of ब्रह्मन् answer the two questions stated above. As a result of ब्रह्मोपासना, a person gets मोक्ष, a fruit which is taught in the शास्त्र and not known otherwise. If the वेदान्त texts do not form part of an injunction of something to be done, then they will be mere statements of facts like सप्तद्वीपा वसुमति, राजासौ गच्छति, and hence purposeless.

An objector further remarks :—Even though the वेदान्त texts merely state an already existing thing (i.e. ब्रह्मन्) and do not teach anything which can form part of an injunction to do something, yet they can be purposeful inasmuch as they remove the संसारित्वभ्रान्ति from the असंसार्यात्मन्; just as the statement रज्जुरियम्, नायं सर्पः removes the fear due to भ्रान्ति.

To this the reply is :—We could grant this, if just after hearing about ब्रह्मन्, the संसारित्वभ्रान्ति from असंसार्यात्मन् could be removed, as just after hearing रज्जुरियम्, नायं सर्पः, the भीति (fear) due to सर्पभ्रान्ति is removed. But our experience is different. Even after studying the वेदान्त texts people are seen to suffer from सुख, दुःख, etc., the attributes of संसारित्व, as they used to suffer before. Moreover, if श्रवण alone were to lead to मुक्ति, then the श्रुति passage will not lay down मनन and निदिध्यासन as subsequent to श्रवण. Therefore, ब्रह्मन् should be admitted to have the Scripture as authority only as connected with an injunction of realisation or contemplation.

To this lengthy पूर्वपक्ष, the भाष्यकार replies in the next passages.

अत्राभिधीयते-न, कर्मब्रह्मविद्याफलयोर्वैलक्षण्यात् । शरीरं वाचिकं मानसं च कर्म श्रुतिस्मृतिसिद्धं धर्माख्यम्, यद्विषया जिज्ञासा 'अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा' इति सूत्रिता । अधर्मोऽपि हिंसादिः प्रतिषेध-चोदनालक्षणत्वाज्जिज्ञास्यः परिहाराय । तयोश्चोदनालक्षणयोरर्थानर्थ-योर्धर्मत्रर्मयोः फले प्रत्यक्षे सुखदुःखे शरीरवाङ्मनोभिरेवोपभुज्यमाने विषयेन्द्रियसंयोगजन्ये ब्रह्मादिषु देहवत्सु स्थावरान्तेषु प्रसिद्धे । मनुष्यत्वादारभ्य ब्रह्मान्तेषु देहवत्सु सुखतारतम्यमनुश्रूयते । ततश्च तद्धेतोर्धर्मस्यापि तारतम्यं गम्यते । धर्मतारतम्यादधिकारितारतम्यम् । प्रसिद्धं चार्थत्वसामर्थ्यविद्वत्तादिकृतमधिकारितारतम्यम् । तथा च यागाद्यनुष्ठायिनामेव विद्यासमाधिविशेषादुत्तरेण पथा गमनम्, केवलैरिष्टापूर्तदत्तसाधनैर्धूमादिक्रमेण दक्षिणेन पथा गमनम्, तत्रापि सुखतारतम्यम्, तत्साधनतारतम्यं च शास्त्रात् 'यावत्संपातमुषित्वा' इत्यस्माद्गम्यते । तथा मनुष्यादिषु स्थावरान्तेषु सुखलवश्चोदनालक्षण-धर्मसाध्य एवेति गम्यते तारतम्येन वर्तमानः । तयोर्ध्वगतेष्वधोगतेषु च देहवत्सु दुःखतारतम्यदर्शनात्तद्धेतोरधर्मस्य प्रतिषेधचोदनालक्षणस्य तदनुष्ठायिनां च तारतम्यं गम्यते । एवमविद्यादिदोषवतां धर्माधर्म-तारतम्यनिमित्तं शरीरोपादानपूर्वकं सुखदुःखतारतम्यमनित्यं संसाररूप-श्रुतिस्मृतिन्यायप्रसिद्धम् । तथा च श्रुतिः 'न ह वै सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति' इति यथावर्णितं संसाररूपमनुवदति । 'अशरीरं वाव सन्तं प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः' (छा० ८।१२।१) इति प्रियाप्रियस्पर्शनप्रतिषेधाच्चोदनालक्षणधर्मकार्यत्वं मोक्षाख्यस्याशरीरत्वस्य प्रतिषिध्यते इति गम्यते । धर्मकार्यत्वे हि प्रियाप्रियस्पर्शनप्रतिषेधो नोप-पद्येत । अशरीरत्वमेव धर्मकार्यमिति चेत्, न; तस्य स्वाभाविकत्वात्



—‘अशरीरं शरीरेषु अनवस्थेष्ववस्थितम् । महान्तं विभुमात्मानं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति’ (कठ० २।२२), ‘अप्राणो ह्यमनाः शुभ्रः’ (मुण्ड० २।१।२), ‘असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः’ (बृह० ४।३।१५) इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः । अत एवानुष्ठेयकर्मफलविलक्षणं मोक्षाख्यमशरीरत्वं नित्यमिति सिद्धम् ।—(भाष्यम् )

To all this we reply : No, because of the different nature of the knowledge and fruit of ritual and ब्रह्मन्. Ritual performed by body, speech and mind is what is called the Religious Duty, as established in the वेद and स्मृतिस, and the enquiry about which is declared in the aphorism ‘Then therefore, the enquiry into Religious Duty’. Vices (अधर्म) also like killing, etc., are objects of enquiry for rejections, being defined by prohibitory injunctions. The fruits of the Religious Duty and Vices (अधर्म), which are defined by injunctions and which are good and evil respectively, are perceptible happiness and misery which are experienced through the body, speech and the mind, generated by the contact of sense-organs with objects and are well known ( to affect all ) from ब्रह्मा down to the immovable objects. The Scripture declares the gradation of happiness in all corporeal beings from men upward to ब्रह्मा. And therefrom, is understood the gradation of its cause viz., merit. From the gradation of merit follows the gradation of the persons qualified ( to perform acts of Religious Duty). And the gradation of the persons qualified brought about by desire for fruit, capacity, learning, etc., is well-known. Thus only those who perform sacrifices, etc., can go by the northern path (of the Sun) on account of the excellence of their knowledge and meditation; while minor offerings, works of public utility and alms, only lead through smoke and the other stages to the southern path. Here also the gradation of happiness and the gradation of

its means are known from this text of the Scripture—'And having lived there till their works are consumed.' Similarly it is understood that the smallest happiness which is enjoyed by beings starting from man down to inanimate beings, is generated by Religious Duty as defined by injunctions, and that it (i.e. happiness) exists in gradations. In the same way, seeing gradations of misery in higher and lower embodied creatures, we understand the gradation of its cause, viz., vice,<sup>5</sup> as defined by prohibitory injunctions. Thus, in the case of those who have the defect of Nescience, etc., the gradations of happiness and misery, which have for their antecedent embodied existence, which are generated by the gradations of merit and demerit, which are non-eternal and of the nature of transmigration, are well-known from श्रुति, स्मृति and reasoning. And thus the Scripture,—'As long as he is in the body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain', restates the nature of transmigration as described above. From 'when he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him', which denies the touch of pleasure or pain, we learn that the unembodied state called 'final release' (मोक्ष) is declared not to be the fruit of Religious Duty as defined by Vedic injunctions. For, if it were the fruit of Religious Duty,<sup>1</sup> the denial of the touch of pleasure and pain would be unintelligible. If you say that the unembodied state itself is the fruit of Religious Duty, then we reply, No; because it is natural, as understood from the श्रुति texts :— 'The wise who knows the Self as bodiless within the bodies, as unchanging among changing things, as great and omnipresent, does never grieve'; 'He is without breath, without mind, pure'; 'This Self is indeed non-attached'. Hence it is



that the unembodied state called final release, which is different from the fruit of the ritual to be observed, is established to be eternal.

### NOTES

The author of प्रदीप says :—Well, Mr. Objector, all what you have said about the वेदान्त texts being subsidiary to उपासनाविधि will lead to the अनित्यत्व (non-eternality) of मोक्ष (which is absurd). Now, tell me, is the fruit of Vedic actions नित्य or अनित्य ? If you say नित्य, then the happiness arising out of ज्योतिष्टोम (enjoined by धर्म) and the hell arising out of हिंसा (actuated by अधर्म), both of these things will become eternal. Not only this but the fruits of different sorts of actions (for instance, being born as an animal or becoming a god in heaven) will become similar, because all of them are caused by actions. This will lead to your denial of gradation or तारतम्य between the fruits. You must, therefore, tell the cause of different gradations in being born as an animal or a god after death. If you say that these gradations are based upon the gradations of धर्म and अधर्म then you will contradict yourself. For, धर्म or अधर्म both being taught by Veda, have 'taught by Veda' in common. Then how can there be any difference in the degree or gradation between them ? If you say again that this gradation is due to the difference of grades among the अधिकारिन्s (eligible persons), then it will mean—that as the performances of धर्म and अधर्म by different अधिकारिन्s are caused through the body, speech and the mind, their fruits also are enjoyed by them through the body, speech and the mind. That is, the cause of gradation, or excellence or अनित्यत्व is dependent on the enjoyment of fruits by means of the body, speech and the mind. Therefore, if your मोक्ष arising from उपासना is to be enjoyed by means of the body, speech and the mind, then that मोक्ष will also be अनित्य; otherwise, you will have to tell as to why the

fruit of उपासना alone is not अनित्य, when the fruits of all religious actions (उपासना being one of them) are अनित्य? If you say that श्रुति declares मोक्ष to be eternal, then, on the basis of the श्रुति passages 'अपाम सोमममृता अभूम', 'अक्षयं ह वै चातुर्मास्य-याजिनः सुकृतं भवति' which declare स्वर्ग to be नित्य, स्वर्ग will become a variety of मोक्ष. If you say again that on the basis of the श्रुति passages—'तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्न विमोक्षयेऽथ संपत्स्ये', 'ब्रह्मवेद ब्रह्मैव भवति' मोक्ष is the unembodied state (अशरीरत्व) which is brought about by उपासना, then we ask you to ponder over this question—How does उपासना bring about अशरीरत्व? Is it through some perceptible means or through अदृष्ट (invisible means, acquired as a result of performing some ritual)? If you say through अदृष्ट, then why not call स्वर्ग also (which is obtained through अदृष्ट) as अशरीरत्व? Because in स्वर्ग, this body of elements does not exist, it is destroyed, therefore, there is a sort of अशरीरत्व which is obtained through अदृष्ट. If you again say that residents of स्वर्ग cannot be said to have reached the unembodied state (अशरीरत्व), because they suffer from अविद्या, then we ask you—How is the अविद्या (Nescience) of the उपासक destroyed?

You will have to admit that the destruction of अविद्या depends on विद्या and not on धर्म; otherwise, why should अविद्या not disappear even in स्वर्ग? Therefore, lest मोक्ष become अनित्य, the वेदान्त texts cannot form part of उपासना-विधि. This is what the भाष्यकार begins to explain with the words—अत्राभिधीयते.

कर्मब्रह्मविद्याफलयोर्वैलक्षण्यात्—कर्म and ब्रह्मविद्या as well as their fruits are distinct. The भाष्यकार first describes कर्म with the words—शरीरं वाक्त्रिकं मानसञ्च etc. Having shown that कर्मफल is to be enjoyed by शरीर, वाक् and मनस्, the भाष्यकार proceeds to impress another point about कर्मफल, viz., there is gradation or तारतम्य in them, with these words तयोश्चोदनालक्षणयोः



etc. This leads us to the तारतम्य of the cause of कर्मन्s, viz. धर्म. This again leads us to the तारतम्य of qualified persons. There are different sorts of rituals like राजसूय, वैश्यस्तोम, वसन्तकालिकाधान (a sacrifice performed in the autumn). Everyone is not qualified to perform them. राजसूय can be performed by a क्षत्रिय alone, वैश्यस्तोम by a वैश्य alone, and वसन्तकालिक आधान (वसन्ते ब्राह्मण अग्निनादधीत) by a ब्राह्मण alone. Thus, कर्मस्वरूप, कर्मफल and the अधिकारिन्s—all of them have gradations. But it is not so in ब्रह्मविद्या. Here anybody who is साधनचतुष्टयसम्पन्न and अधीतवेदान्त is an अधिकारिन्. Nor is there any तारतम्य in ब्रह्मस्वरूप or ब्रह्मज्ञानफल.

If it be said, well there is तारतम्य in rituals as they depend on the body, speech and the mind; but we do not admit any तारतम्य in उपासना, then the भाष्यकार replies—तथा च यागाद्यनुष्ठायिनामेव etc. Here यागाद्यनुष्ठान is ज्ञानपूर्वकयागाद्यनुष्ठान and hence it stands for उपासना. Those who perform sacrifices with knowledge, they go by northern path on account of the excellence of knowledge and meditation. The words विद्या and समाधि indicate that here याग is उपासना and not a sacrifice-ritual like अग्निहोत्र etc. That is, याग is a समुच्चय of ज्ञान and र्मे, viz., उपासना. Those who obtain fixity of mind in उपासना go to ब्रह्मलोक by the northern path, otherwise called देवयान or अर्चिरादिमार्ग. That is, they go to the region of the Sun and thence to the region of ब्रह्मन् and afterwards get salvation. This is also called क्रममुक्ति. But those who engage themselves in इष्टापूर्वदत्त, they go by the southern path (पितृयान or धूमादिमार्ग) to the region of the moon. इष्ट, पूर्त and दत्त are:—

अग्निहोत्रं तपः सत्यं वेदानां चानुपालनम् ।

आतिथ्यं वैश्वदेवं च इष्टमित्यभिधीयते ॥

चापीक्षुषतटाकादिदेवतायतनानि च ।

अन्नप्रदानमारामः पूर्तमित्यभिधीयते ॥

शरणागतसन्त्राणं भूतानां चाप्यर्हिसनम् ।

बहिर्वेदि च यद्दानं दत्तमित्यभिधीयते ॥

Thus we see that the फल of उपासना also is obtained through उत्तरमार्ग. And if मोक्ष is the फल of ब्रह्मोपासना, then it will also be obtained through उत्तरमार्ग as स्वर्ग is obtained through दक्षिणमार्ग, and it (मोक्ष), will also become अनित्य like स्वर्ग. If you say that even though मोक्ष is obtained through उत्तरमार्ग yet it is not अनित्य, as the Scripture says that there is no पुनरावृत्ति (returning again to this world) and a man obtains eternal godhood, then we reply—तत्रापि सुखतारतम्यम्—even in godhood there is gradation of happiness, and तत्साधनतारतम्यम्, the gradation of means thereto. This is what the श्रुति says—यावत्संपातमुपित्वा—Having lived there till the संपात (=कर्म) lasts, a man returns again. Thus, everywhere there is तारतम्य of सुख, and तारतम्य in the actions which are the means to that सुख. The conclusion is that the fruits of धर्म and अधर्म are सुख and दुःख in different degrees; and in order to enjoy these fruits, a man has to get a शरीर and come to this world. There is no अशरीरत्व as the result of धर्म or अधर्म. Without the removal of अविद्या, अशरीरत्व cannot be obtained. Therefore, उपासना which is a kind of क्रिया (ritual) cannot lead to अशरीरत्व. And as long as there is शरीर, सुख and दुःख cannot vanish. But in मोक्ष there is no शरीरबन्ध (bondage in the shape of body) and, hence, no सुखदुःखप्राप्ति, as is stated by श्रुति—अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः ।

If you say that अशरीरत्व also is the result of धर्म, then we say, no. The unembodied state of आत्मन् is स्वभावसिद्ध, natural. It is not brought about by rituals. This is proved by the श्रुति passages अशरीरं शरीरेषु, etc. That is, even when there is an embodied state, the Self is bodiless. The unembodied state is the natural state of the Self.



Thus it is proved that the unembodied state called मोक्ष, which is different from the fruit of the ritual to be observed, is eternal (नित्य).

तत्र किञ्चित्परिणामिनित्यं स्यात्, यस्मिन्विक्रियमाणेऽपि तदे-  
वेदमिति बुद्धिर्न विहन्यते; यथा पृथिव्यादि जगन्नित्यत्ववादिनाम्,  
यथा वा सांख्यानां गुणाः । इदं तु पारमार्थिकं कूटस्थनित्यं व्योम-  
वत्सर्वव्यापि सर्वविक्रियारहितं नित्यवृत्तं निरवयवं स्वयंज्योतिःस्वभावम्,  
यत्र धर्माधर्मौ सह कार्येण कालत्रयं च नोपावर्तते । तदेतदशरीरत्वं  
मोक्षाख्यम् 'अन्यत्र धर्मादन्यत्राधर्मादन्यत्रास्मात्कृताकृतात् । अन्यत्र  
भूताच्च अव्याक्तच' (कठ० १।२।१४) इत्यादिभूतिभ्यः । अतस्तद्ब्रह्म,  
यस्येयं जिज्ञासा प्रस्तुता । तद्यदि कर्तव्यशेषत्वेनोपदिश्येत, तेन च  
कर्तव्येन साध्यश्चेन्मोक्षोऽभ्युपगम्येत, अनित्य एव स्यात् । तत्रैवं सति  
यथोक्तकर्मफलेष्वेव तारतम्यावस्थितेष्वनित्येषु कश्चिदतिशयो मोक्ष  
इति प्रसज्येत । नित्यश्च मोक्षः सर्वैर्मोक्षवादिभिरुपगम्यते । अतो न  
कर्तव्यशेषत्वेन ब्रह्मोपदेशो युक्तः ।—(आख्यम् )

Among these (eternal things), some may be eternal in evolution, in which though subject to transformation, the cognition 'it is the same thing' is not destroyed; for example, earth, etc., for those who uphold the universe to be eternal, or, for instance, the (three) गुण for the Sāṅkhyas. This, however, is eternal in the real sense (absolute), immutably eternal, all-pervading like the ether, devoid of all modifications, eternally contented, without parts, self-luminous by nature, which merit and demerit together with their fruits do not approach, nor the three times. This is the unembodied state called the 'final release', because the Scriptures like, "Different from merit and demerit, different from what is done and not done, different from past and future". Therefore, that (i. e. मोक्ष) is (the same as) ब्रह्मन्,

in the enquiry into which we are at present engaged. If that be taught as subsidiary to actions, and if the final release be acknowledged as something to be accomplished by those actions, then it would be certainly non-eternal. Under these circumstances the result will be that the final release will have to be considered as merely an excellent stage among the graded non-eternal fruits of ritual described above. But the final release is acknowledged to be eternal by all who uphold the doctrine of the final release. Therefore, the teaching of ब्रह्मन् as subsidiary to actions does not stand to reason.

### NOTES

Even if मोक्ष is admitted to be नित्य, yet it can become the effect of धर्म (ritual), if it is परिणामिनित्य—eternal in evolution. The eternality is of two kinds—(1) परिणामिनित्यत्व and (2) कूटस्थनित्यत्व. परिणाम has been defined as—पूर्वरूपपरित्यागे सति नानाकारप्रतिभासः परिणामः—When a thing gives up its original form and appears to assume different forms, it is said to be undergoing परिणाम. For instance, this earth sometimes assumes the shape of grass, trees, etc., and after the destruction of grass, trees, etc., the earth is modified into सृष्टिका. In all these conditions, the earth is present. Under all these modifications, we can recognise the earth as 'it is the same earth'. Similarly the three गुणः—सत्त्व, रजस and तमस—of the सांख्य assume the form of प्रकृति when they are in equilibrium (सान्यावस्था), and are modified into various objects at the time of creation. But, under all these circumstances they can be recognised as 'they are the same गुणः.'

कूटस्थनित्यत्व is that which undergoes no modifications whatsoever. This मोक्ष is not परिणामिनित्य, and hence not an effect of धर्म or ritual. It is कूटस्थनित्य, and hence cannot be achieved by ritual. It is सर्वव्यापि, therefore not some-



thing which is to be attained. It is everywhere. It is सर्व-विक्रियारहित, devoid of all modifications. It is निश्चयव, without parts. It is निश्चयवृत्त, eternally contented, therefore happy. That is, it, being a state of eternal happiness, is the human goal. And as happiness, if not cognised cannot be a human goal, it is said to be स्वयंज्योति, self-luminous.

If मोक्ष were taught as subsidiary to ritual, and to be obtained by ritual, then that मोक्ष will not only become अनित्य, but will be reduced to the state of the fruits of other rituals. But मोक्ष is acknowledged as नित्य by all who uphold the doctrine of मोक्ष. Hence मोक्ष cannot be regarded as something subsidiary to ritualistic actions.

अपि च 'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति' (मुण्ड० ३।२।९), 'क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन्दृष्टे परावरे' (मुण्ड० २।२।८); 'आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान्न विभेति कुतश्चन' (तैत्ति० २।९)। 'अभयं वै जनक प्राप्तोऽसि' (बृह० ४।२।४), 'तदात्मानमेवावेदहं ब्रह्मास्मीति तस्मात्तत्सर्वमभवत्' (वाजसनेयिब्राह्मणोपनिषत् १।४।१०), 'तत्र को मोहः कः शोक एकत्वमनुपश्यतः' (ईश० ७) इत्येवमाद्याः श्रुतयो ब्रह्मविद्यानन्तरमेव मोक्षं दर्शयन्त्यो मध्ये कार्यान्तरं वारयन्ति। तथा 'तद्वैततपश्यन् नृषिर्वाग्भवेवः प्रतिपेदेऽहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्च' (बृह० १।४।१०) इति ब्रह्मदर्शनसर्वात्मभावयोर्मध्ये कर्तव्यान्तरवारणायोदाहार्यम्, यथा 'तिष्ठन् गायति' इति तिष्ठतिगायत्योर्मध्ये तत्कर्तृकं कार्यान्तरं नास्तीति गम्यते। 'त्वं हि नः पिता योऽस्माकमविद्यायाः परं पारं तारयसि' (प्रश्न० ६।८) : श्रुतं ह्येव मे भगवद्दृशेभ्यस्तरति शोकमात्मविदिति; सोऽहं भगवः शोचामि; तं मा भगवान्छोकस्य पारं तारयतु' (छा० ७।१।२), 'तस्मै मृदितकषायाय तमसः पारं दर्शयति भगवान्सनत्कुमारः' (छा० ७।२।२) इति चैवमाद्याः

श्रुतयो मोक्षप्रतिबन्धनिवृत्तिमात्रमेवात्मज्ञानस्य फलं दर्शयन्ति । तथा च आचार्यप्रणीतं न्यायोपवृंहितं सूत्रम्—‘दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः’ (न्यायसूत्र १।१।२) इति । मिथ्याज्ञानापायश्च ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानाद्भवति ।—(भाष्यम्)

There are, moreover, a number of Scriptural texts which declare final release to follow immediately on the cognition of ब्रह्मन्, and which preclude the possibility of an action intervening between the two : ‘He who knows ब्रह्मन् becomes ब्रह्मन्’; ‘All his actions perish when He has been beheld, who is the higher and the lower’; ‘He who knows the bliss of ब्रह्मन् has no fear from anywhere’; ‘O Janaka, you have verily reached fearlessness’; ‘That (जीव) recognised his Self only in the form, I am ब्रह्मन्, from that, he became All (i. e. Perfect in His glory)’; ‘What sorrow, what delusion can there be to him who beholds this unity?’ etc. Similarly, the following may be cited in order to exclude the idea of any action taking place between the sight of ब्रह्मन् and becoming one with the universal Self : ‘Seeing this the sage वामदेव realised : I was सत्तु, I was the sun’; just as in ‘standing he sings’, no other act of the agent intervenes between his standing and singing. Other Scriptural texts show that the removal of the obstacles to final release is the only fruit of the knowledge of ब्रह्मन्; so, for instance, ‘You indeed are our father, you who carry us from our ignorance to the other shore’; ‘I have heard from men like you that he who knows the Self overcomes grief; I am in grief; do, Sir, help me over this grief of mine’; ‘To him after his faults had been rubbed out, the revered Sanatkumāra shows the other side of darkness’. The same is the purport of the Sūtra,



supported by reasoning, of (Gautama) Ācārya, 'Final release results from the successive removal of illusory knowledge, faults, activity, birth, pain, the removal of each later member of the series depending on the removal of the preceding member'. And the removal of illusory knowledge results from the realisation of the oneness of ब्रह्मन् and the Self.

### NOTES

If the objector were to say—Well, you also admit that मोक्ष is attained through the acquisition of विद्या. Hence, it becomes an effect of विद्या and therefore अनित्य—, then we reply that विद्या only serves the purpose of removing अविद्या. विद्या does not produce मोक्ष; either directly or through creating अपूर्व. There are a number of श्रुति texts which oppose the view that मोक्ष, as caused by अपूर्व (unseen potentiality) born of ज्ञान (knowledge) is dependent on some विधिवाक्य. For instance—ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति etc. In these passages it is shown that the knowledge of ब्रह्मन् and becoming one with ब्रह्मन् are simultaneous. A man who knows ब्रह्मन् is not enjoined to perform some action. This simultaneity of the knowledge of ब्रह्मन् and becoming one with ब्रह्मन् is the purport of the श्रुति—तद्धेतुत्पद्यन्नुपिर्वाप्तदेवः प्रतिषेदे 'अहं जगत्सर्वं सूर्यश्च'. Here पश्यन् प्रतिषेदे show that there was no interval, nothing else done between दर्शन of ब्रह्मन् and (सर्वात्मभाव—) प्रतिपत्ति; just as we see in तिष्ठन् गायति, that between standing and singing there is nothing else for him to do (Cf. Also अत्र न स्थितिक्रियासामर्थ्यादेव गीतिक्रियानिर्वृत्तिः, अपि तु प्रयत्नान्तरात् । क्वदतो न तयोर्मध्ये क्रियान्तरप्रतीतिरित्येतावतोदाहरणम् । इह पुनर्न सर्वात्मभावस्य ब्रह्मदर्शनातिरेकेण प्रयत्नान्तरापेक्षा विद्यते—पञ्चपादिका.)

In support of his view that विद्या is a means to मोक्ष, only in so far as it removes the obstacle of अविद्या, and not directly or through producing अपूर्व (unseen potentiality), the भाष्यकार cites the श्रुति texts, त्वं हि नः पिता etc. Not only is

our view based on श्रुति, but also there is the सूत्र of गौतम—  
दुःखजन्म etc. In this सूत्र order of the things enumerated is  
effect, cause. On the destruction of birth, pain is destroyed;  
on the destruction of activity birth is destroyed; on the destruc-  
tion of faults, activity is destroyed; on the destruc-  
tion of illusory knowledge, faults are destroyed. The illusory  
knowledge (मिथ्याज्ञान) is अविद्या which is the ultimate cause  
of the transmigration. That अविद्या is removed by the realisa-  
tion of तत्त्वज्ञान; and hence, मोक्ष is the manifestation of ब्रह्म-  
स्वरूप, through the removal of अविद्या. मोक्ष is not the effect  
of विद्या or the effect of अपूर्व generated by विद्या.

न चेदं ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानं संपद्रूपम्—यथा 'अनन्तं वै मनोऽनन्ता  
विश्वे देवा अनन्तमेव स तेन लोकं जयति' (बृह० ३।१।९) इति ।  
न चाध्यासरूपम्, यथा 'मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत' (छा० ३।१८।१),  
'आदित्यो ब्रह्मेत्यादेशः' (छा० ३।१९।१) इति च मनआदित्यादिषु  
ब्रह्मदृष्ट्यध्यासः। नापि विशिष्टक्रियायोगनिमित्तम् 'वायुर्वाव संवर्गः',  
'प्राणो वाव संवर्गः' (छा० ४।३।१, ३) इतिवत् । नाप्याज्यावेक्षणादि-  
कर्मवत्कर्माङ्गसंस्काररूपम् ।—( भाष्यम् )

Nor is this cognition of the oneness of ब्रह्मन् and the  
Self an imagined identification, as in the case of 'Mind is  
indeed endless (infinite), and the विश्वेदेव are endless;  
therefore, he gains the endless world'. Nor is it of the  
nature of superimposition, as in the case of, 'One should  
contemplate the mind as ब्रह्मन्', 'आदित्य is ब्रह्मन्, this is the  
teaching', where the contemplation as ब्रह्मन् is superimposed  
on the mind, the Sun etc. Nor is it caused by association  
with a distinct mode of activity, as in the case of 'The air is  
the devourer, the Vital air is the devourer'. It is not also  
of the nature of purification subsidiary to a ritual like the  
glance at ghee.



## NOTES

In this passage there are 4 views about ब्रह्मन्, which are stated to be refuted in the next passage. They are :

(1) ब्रह्मन् is संपद्वरूप. संपद्वरूप is an imagined identification between two things which are really different but have similar attributes. For example, the mind has innumerable modifications, and the विश्वेदेवस (All-gods) also are innumerable. Now, on the basis of similarity of innumerableness, the विश्वेदेवस are imagined in the mind. The mind which is the support (आलम्बन) is ignored and only the विश्वेदेवस are principally contemplated. The result of this संपद्वरूपसना is that the उपासक attains infinite worlds. In the same way, जीव and ब्रह्मन् have the similarity of चैतन्य (intelligence) between them. Now on the basis of this similarity, ब्रह्मन् is imagined in the जीव. The आलम्बन जीव is ignored and only ब्रह्मन् is principally contemplated. The result of this संपद्वरूपसना will be अमृतत्वप्राप्ति (attainment of immortality). Thus, this संपद्वरूपसना, being non-established before being ordained by an injunction, becomes the object of injunction (विधिवाक्य).

(2) ब्रह्मदृष्टि is an अध्यास. In the first instance it is the आलम्बन which is ignored, but in अध्यास it is the आलम्बन which is principal. It is the contemplation of आलम्बन as having the स्वरूप (nature) of the superimposed. In the stock-example of शुक्तिरजताध्यास, the आलम्बन or the support of अध्यास is शुक्ति on which रजत is superimposed. That is, when we mistake शुक्ति for रजत, we are contemplating शुक्ति as having the form (स्वरूप) of रजत. Hence, as in मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत or आदित्यो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत, the mind and the Sun, having the idea of ब्रह्मन् superimposed on them, are contemplated as ब्रह्मन्, so the जीव, having the idea of ब्रह्मन् superimposed on it, is contemplated as ब्रह्मन्.

(3) ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञान is caused by क्रियाविशेषयोग (or विशिष्टक्रियायोग), association with a distinctive mode of activity. For instance, वायु is called संवर्ग, because it is associated with the distinct mode of activity of संवरण, that is संहरण (devouring or absorbing). In the छान्दोग्य उपनिषद्, we read :—

वायुर्वाव संवर्गो यदा वा अग्निरुद्धायति वायुमेवाप्येति, यदा सूर्योऽस्तमेति वायुमेवाप्येति, यदा चन्द्रोऽस्तमेति वायुमेवाप्येति ॥१॥ पदाऽऽप उच्छुष्यन्ति वायुमेवापियन्ति. वायुर्ह्येवैतान् सर्वान् संवृङ्क्त इत्यधिदैवतम् ॥२॥ अथाध्यात्मम्, प्राणो वाव संवर्गः। स यदा स्वपिति प्राणमेव वागप्येति। प्राणं चक्षुः, प्राणं श्रोत्रम्, प्राणं मनः, प्राणो ह्येवैतान् सर्वान् संवृङ्क्त इति ॥३॥ Because of his संवरणक्रिया, वायु is called संवर्ग; the fire, the sun, the moon, the waters, all of them are devoured or absorbed by वायु. He is, therefore, the devourer. In human body also, the प्राण or the vital air is the absorber or devourer of all. When a man sleeps, the speech, the eyes, the ears, the mind, all these are devoured by the प्राण. In sleep, all these senses cease to function; it is only the प्राण which functions. Therefore, प्राण is संवर्ग.

So, just as प्राण and वायु are called devourers, because of their association with the act of devouring, similarly, the जीव, because of its association with वृंहणक्रिया (the act of causing to grow), is called ब्रह्मन्. Such a contemplation of जीव as ब्रह्मन् leads to immortality.

(4) ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञान is कर्माङ्गसंस्काररूप, of the nature of purification subsidiary to ritual. In उपांशु sacrifice, it is ordained 'पत्न्यैवेक्षितमाज्यं भवति' 'ghee ought to be seen (i. e. examined as pure) by the sacrificer's wife'. Here seeing of ghee, that is, its purification, is an action subsidiary (अङ्ग) to प्रधानकर्म (viz., उपांशु sacrifice). Similarly, the ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञान as enjoined in 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः' etc., is a subsidiary



rite to all sacrifices. For, in all sacrifices, we need a कर्ता, an agent, who is enjoined to perform them. Now, the श्रुति texts like 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः', prescribe that the nature of that कर्ता should be ascertained. The nature of that कर्ता is ascertained by ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञान. Hence, ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञान is an action subsidiary to the action of purifying the Self of the agent of a sacrifice.

That all these views are faulty is shown in the following :—

संपदादिरूपे हि ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने 'तत्त्वमसि' (छा० ६।८।७), 'अहं ब्रह्मास्मि' बृह० १।४।१०), 'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म' (बृह० २।५।१९) इत्येवमादीनां वाक्यानां ब्रह्मात्मैकत्ववस्तु-प्रतिपादनपरः पदसमन्वयः पीडयेत; 'भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिश्छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः' (मुण्ड० २।२।८) इति चैवमादीन्यविद्यानिवृत्तिफल-श्रवणान्युपरुध्येरन्; 'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति' (मुण्ड० ३।२।९) इति चैवमादीनि तद्भावापत्तिवचनानि संपदादिरूपत्वे न सामञ्जस्ये-नोपपद्येरन् । तस्मान्न संपदादिरूपं ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानम् ।—(भाष्यम् )

If the knowledge of oneness of ब्रह्मन् and the Self were admitted to be of the nature of 'an imagined identification, etc., then in the case of the texts, 'that thou art', 'I am ब्रह्मन्', 'this Self is ब्रह्मन्', violence would be done to the syntactical relation of words whose purport is to declare the fact of the oneness of ब्रह्मन् and the Self; and other texts like, 'the knot of the heart is cut and all doubts are removed', which declare the fruit (of the knowledge of the oneness of ब्रह्मन् and the Self) to be the cessation of Nescience, would be contradicted thereby; in admitting it to be of the nature of

imagined identification, the texts like 'he who knows ब्रह्मन् becomes ब्रह्मन्', which speak of (the individual Self) becoming ब्रह्मन्, would not be satisfactorily intelligible. Therefore, the knowledge of the oneness of ब्रह्मन् and the Self is not of the nature of an imagined identification.

### NOTES

The श्रुति texts like तत्त्वमसि. अहं ब्रह्मास्मि, अयमात्मा ब्रह्म declare the fact that the Self and ब्रह्मन् are really one. If this oneness were admitted as संपदरूप (imagined) or, for the sake of उपासना, as आरोपित or अध्यस्त (superimposed), then the clear declaration of the श्रुति texts quoted above would be contradicted. Again the अविद्यानिवृत्ति is attained by विद्या and not by अध्यासः otherwise, how would you explain such texts भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिच्छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः ?

Again, if ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञान is संपदरूप or अध्यस्त or आरोपित (that is, not real but imaginary), then the really distinct आत्मन् cannot really become one with ब्रह्मन्. And in that case it would be impossible to explain satisfactorily ब्रह्म चेद् ब्रह्मैव भवति ।

Therefore, न संपदादिरूपं ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानम्.

अतो न पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रा ब्रह्मविद्या । किं तर्हि ? प्रत्यक्षादि-प्रमाणविषयवस्तुज्ञानवद्वस्तुतन्त्रैव । एवंभूतस्य ब्रह्मणस्तज्ज्ञानस्य च न कश्चाचिद्युक्त्या शक्यः कार्यानुप्रवेशः कल्पयितुम् । न च विदिक्रिया-कर्मत्वेन कार्यानुप्रवेशो ब्रह्मणः, 'अन्यदेव तद्विदितादथो अविदितादधि' (केन० १।३) इति विदिक्रियाकर्मत्वप्रतिषेधात्, 'येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति तं केन विजानीयात्' (बृह० २।४।१४) इति च । तथोपास्तिक्रियाकर्मत्वप्रतिषेधोऽपि भवति, 'यद्वाचानभ्युदितं येन वागभ्युद्यते' इत्यविषयत्वं ब्रह्मण उपन्यस्य, 'तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि, नेदं यदिदमुपासते' (केन० १।४) इति । अविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रयोनि-



त्वानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्, न; अविद्याकल्पितभेदनिवृत्तिपरत्वाच्छास्त्रस्य । न हि शास्त्रमिदंतया विषयभूतं ब्रह्म प्रतिपिपादयिषति । किं तर्हि ? प्रत्यगात्मत्वेनाविषयतया प्रतिपादयत् अविद्याकल्पितं वेद्यवेदितृवेदनादिभेदमपनयति । तथा च शास्त्रम्—‘यस्यामतं तस्य मतं मतं यस्य न वेद सः । अविज्ञातं विजानतां विज्ञातमविजानताम् ’ (केन० २।३), ‘न दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारं पश्येर्न श्रुतेः श्रोतारं शृणुया न मतेर्मन्तारं मन्वीथा न विज्ञातेर्विज्ञातारं विजानीयाः ’ (बृह० ३।४।२) इति चैवमादि । अतोऽविद्याकल्पितसंसारित्वनिवर्तनेन नित्यमुक्तात्मस्वरूपसमर्पणान्न मोक्षस्यानित्यत्वदोषः ।—( भाष्यम् )

Hence the knowledge of ब्रह्म does not depend on human activity. What then is it ? It is dependent on the thing alone, like the knowledge of things which are the objects of such valid cognitions as perception, etc. Of such a ब्रह्म or its knowledge, it is impossible to establish by reasoning any connection with actions. Nor can ब्रह्म become connected with actions by representing it as an object of the action of knowing, because the texts, :‘It is different from the known as well as from the unknown’and ‘By whom one knows all this, how can one know him ?’ declare the denial of ब्रह्म’s becoming an object of the action of knowing. Similarly, there is also the denial of its being an object of the action of contemplation : after premising the non-objectness of ब्रह्म, in ‘That which is not expressed by speech, by which speech is expressed,’ the Scripture says, ‘know then that alone to be ब्रह्म, not this which is contemplated.’ If it be said that if ब्रह्म be not an object, the Scripture cannot possibly be its source, then we refute this objection by saying that the purport of the शास्त्र is to remove the difference fictitiously created by Nescience. The purport of the

शास्त्र is not to represent ब्रह्मन् definitely as this. What is it then? The शास्त्र declares ब्रह्मन् to be a non-object, as being the inner Self, and removes differences like the known, knower and knowledge fictitiously created by Nescience. Accordingly the शास्त्र says—'By whom it is not conceived of, by him it is conceived. By whom it is conceived he does not know it. It is not known to them who (say they) know; known to them who (say they) do not know'; 'Thou canst not see the seer of sight, canst not hear the hearer of hearing, canst not think the thinker of the thought, canst not know the knower of knowledge, and so on. Therefore through the creation of migratoriness posited by Nescience, there is the restoration of the nature of the Self eternally free; so, the fault of transitoriness does not reside in the final release.

### NOTES

पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रा—depending on human activity. As ब्रह्म-विद्या is not of the nature of imagination (संपद् रूप), so it is not dependent on human activity.

If it be said that ब्रह्मन् is to be known, and hence ब्रह्मन् becomes an object (कर्म) of the action of knowing (विदिक्रिया); thus it will become a कार्य, something to be done—then we reply, no. श्रुति denies it. Cf. अन्यदेव तद्विदितादथो etc.

Similarly, ब्रह्मन् cannot become the object of the action of contemplation (उपासिक्रिया), because the श्रुति says—यद्वाचानम्युदितम् etc.

An objector on this remarks—well, how can ब्रह्मन् be शास्त्रयोनि (having Scriptures as its source), if ब्रह्मन् is अविषय (non-object)? To this the भाष्यकार replies—शास्त्र does not hand over ब्रह्मन् as if it were an iron ball; it does not represent ब्रह्मन् definitely as this.

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अस्य तूत्पाद्यो मोक्षः, तस्य मानसं वाचिकं कायिकं वा कार्यमपेक्षत इति युक्तम् । तथा विकार्यत्वे च । तयोः पक्षयोर्मोक्षस्य ध्रुवमनित्यत्वम् । न हि दध्यादि विकार्यम्, उत्पाद्यं वा घटादि नित्यं दृष्टं लोके ।— (भाष्यम्)

But for him who regards the final release as something to be produced, it stands to reason, there is the necessity of (admitting its) dependence on the acts of mind, speech or body. And the same is the case, if it be a modification. In both these views, the non-eternality of the final release is a certainty. Modifications like curd, etc., and products like the jar, etc., are not found to be eternal in this world.

## NOTES

If we regard मोक्ष as an *effect* brought about by the अपूर्व of sacrifice, etc., or a *modification* of संसारावस्था (state of transmigration) as कैवल्यावस्था (state of isolation), then मोक्ष becomes अनित्य.

न च आप्यत्वेनापि कार्यपेक्षा; स्वात्मस्वरूपत्वे सत्यनाप्यत्वात्; स्वरूपव्यतिरिक्तत्वेऽपि ब्रह्मणो नाप्यत्वम्; सर्वगतत्वेन नित्याप्तस्वरूपत्वात्सर्वेण ब्रह्मण आकाशस्येव ।—(भाष्यम्)

Nor, again, can it be said that there is a dependence on action in consequence of (ब्रह्मन् or मोक्ष) being something which is to be attained; for, if it be of the nature of one's own Self, it is not what is to be attained; even if it be different from the nature of one's own Self, ब्रह्मन् cannot be what is to be attained; for as ब्रह्मन् is omnipresent, it is by nature eternally attained by all, like the ether.

## NOTES

Well, in order to obviate the non-eternality of ब्रह्मन्, let us admit that it is neither उत्पाद्य, nor विकार्य, but स्थिर (unchanging). But still it can be an object of our efforts to attain it, as a village can be an object of our efforts to attain or reach it. Thus, the attainment of ब्रह्मन् will be brought about by उपासनाविधि and ब्रह्मन् will become an object of attainment.

To this the भाष्यकार says, No. Is ब्रह्मन् identical, or different from जीव ? In neither case can ब्रह्मन् be established as something to be attained. If जीव is identical with ब्रह्मन्, then the former cannot attain the latter. Even if जीव is different from ब्रह्मन्, the latter being all-pervasive like आकाश is नित्याप्त, eternally attained. Hence, no effort is needed.

नापि संस्कार्यो मोक्षः, येन व्यापारमपेक्षेत । संस्कारो हि नाम संस्कार्यस्य गुणाधानेन वा स्यात्, दोषापनयनेन वा । न तावद् गुणाधानेन संभवति, अनाधेयातिशयब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वान्मोक्षस्य; नापि दोषापनयनेन, नित्यशुद्धब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वान्मोक्षस्य । स्वात्मधर्म एव सन् तिरोभूतो मोक्षः क्रियायात्मनि संस्क्रियमाणेऽभिव्यज्यते, यथा आदर्शे निघर्षणक्रियायां संस्क्रियमाणे भास्वरत्वं धर्म इति चेत्, न; क्रियाश्रयत्वानुपपत्तेरात्मनः । यदाश्रया क्रिया तमविकुर्वती नैवात्मानं लभते । यद्यात्मा स्वाश्रयाक्रियया विक्रियेत, अनित्यत्वमात्मनः प्रसज्येत । 'अविकार्योऽयमुच्यते' इति चैवमादीनि वाक्यानि बाध्येरन् । तच्चानिष्टम् । तस्मान्न स्वाश्रया क्रिया आत्मनः संभवति । अन्याश्रयायास्तु क्रियाया अविषयत्वान्न तयात्मा संस्क्रियते ।—(भाष्यम्)

Nor is the final release something to be purified, and as such depends on activity. For, purification results either from the addition of some excellence to what is to be purified, or



the removal of some blemish. (Here) it is not possible by addition of some excellence, because the final release is of the nature of ब्रह्मन् to which no excellence can be added; nor is it possible by the removal of blemish, because the final release is of the nature of ब्रह्मन् which is eternally pure. But, it might be said, the final release is of the nature of the Self, yet having been obscured, it becomes manifest on the purification of the Self through acts; just as the quality of lustre becomes manifest in a mirror when it is purified through the act of rubbing.—This objection is invalid, we reply, because the Self cannot be the abode of any action. For an action cannot exist without modifying that in which it abides. If the Self were to be modified by the action abiding in it, then the Self would have to be admitted as non-eternal, and the texts like 'He is called non-modifiable' would be sublated. This, of course, is unacceptable. Therefore, no action can abide in the Self. As regards the action abiding in something else, the Self is not its object and hence by that (action) the Self cannot be purified.

## NOTES

मोक्ष cannot be regarded as an object of संस्कार or purification. संस्कार is of two kinds : (1) Either by the addition of merits, as the flower of citron if besprinkled with the juice of lac produces fruit which has the colour of lac; (2) or by removing blemish, as the impure surface of mirror is made bright by rubbing it with powdered brick. Both kinds of संस्कारs are impossible in the case of मोक्ष. मोक्ष is of the nature of ब्रह्मन् to which no excellence can be added; and ब्रह्मन् being eternally pure, there can be no removal of defects from it.

If you say—मोक्ष is the धर्म or the nature of ब्रह्मन्; but this nature is obscured by the impurity of अविद्या. By means

of उपासना, this impurity is removed, and the real nature of ब्रह्मन् is then manifested; for example, the lustrous surface of a mirror is manifested by removing the impurities. That is, the eternal purity of जीवात्मन् is not established, because it is obscured by अविद्या. We reply—No. Because, अविद्या resides in जीवात्मन् and not ब्रह्मन्. ब्रह्मन् is eternally pure. Hence ब्रह्मन् cannot be purified by any action. How can an action purify ब्रह्मन् ? Can action (क्रिया) purify ब्रह्मन् by abiding in it or in something else ? This is an established rule that क्रिया must modify that in which it abides. If it were to abide in ब्रह्मन्, then ब्रह्मन् will have to become an object of modification and, therefore, अनित्य. If on the other hand, क्रिया abides in something else, then how can it purify ब्रह्मन् ? Otherwise, by rubbing the mirror we shall be able to purify the gem. And this is certainly absurd.

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ननु देहाश्रयया स्नानाचमनयज्ञोपवीतधारणादिक्रिया क्रियया देही संस्क्रियमाणो दृष्टः । न; देहादिसंहतस्यैवाविद्यागृहीतस्यात्मनः संस्क्रियमाणत्वात् । प्रत्यक्षं हि स्नानाचमनादेर्देहसमवायित्वम् । तथा देहाश्रयया तत्संहत एव कश्चिदविद्ययात्मत्वेन परिगृहीतः संस्क्रियत इति युक्तम् । यथा देहाश्रयचिकित्सानिमित्तेन धातुसाम्येन तत्संहतस्य तदभिमानिन आरोग्यफलम्, 'अहमरोगः' इति यत्र बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते, एवं स्नानाचमनयज्ञोपवीतधारणादिक्रिया 'अहं शुद्धः संस्कृतः' इति यत्र बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते, स संस्क्रियते । स च देहेन संहत एव । तेनैव अहंकर्ता अहंप्रत्ययविषयेन प्रत्ययिना सर्वाः क्रिया निर्वर्त्यन्ते । तत्फलं च स एवाभाति, 'तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्ति अनश्नन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति' (मुण्ड० ३।१।१) इति मन्त्रवर्णात्; 'आत्मेन्द्रियमनोयुक्तं भोक्तेत्याहुर्मनीषिणः' (कठ० १।३।४) । तथा 'एको देवः



सर्वभूतेषु गूढः सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा । कर्मोध्यक्षः सर्वभूताधि-  
वासः साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्च' (श्वेता० ६।११) इति, 'स  
पर्यगाच्छुक्रमकायमव्रणमस्नाविरं शुद्धमपापविद्धम्' (ईश० ८) इति च,  
एतौ मन्त्रावनाधेयातिशयतां नित्यशुद्धतां च ब्रह्मणो दर्शयतः ।  
ब्रह्मभावश्च मोक्षः । तस्मान्न संस्कार्योऽपि मोक्षः । अतोऽन्यन्मोक्षं प्रति  
क्रियानुप्रवेशद्वारं न शक्यं केनचिद्दर्शयितुम् । तस्मात् ज्ञानमेकं मुक्त्वा  
क्रियाया गन्धमात्रस्याप्यनुप्रवेश इह नोपपद्यते ।—(भाष्यम्) ॐ

Well, by bathing, sipping, wearing of sacred thread, etc., the acts, abiding in the body, the embodied Self is seen to be purified. (To this we say) No. It is only the Self, which is associated with the body, etc., which is caught hold of by Nescience, that is purified. For, it is a matter of perception that bathing, sipping, etc., inhere in the body. Therefore, it is proper to conclude that by such actions which inhere in the body only that something is purified which is associated with the body and which is apprehended as the Self through Nescience. Just as through the equilibrium of humours brought about by the treatment of the body, there results health for that which is associated with that body, and which has the conceit in itself of that body, where, there arises the cognition 'I am free from disease,' similarly, that wherein, through bathing, sipping, wearing of the sacred thread, etc., there arises the cognition 'I am clean, purified,' that alone is purified. And that is certainly associated with the body. It is only by him who has the conceit 'I', who is the object of the concept 'I', who is the knower, that all actions are fulfilled. And their fruits also are enjoyed by him alone, because there is the *mantra* passage—'One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating,' also, 'When he is

in union with the body, the senses, and the mind, the wise people call him the enjoyer'. Similarly 'He is the one God, hidden in all beings, pervading all, the Self within all beings, watching over all works, dwelling in all beings, the witness, the intelligent, alone and free from attributes,' and 'He pervaded all, he who is effulgent, non-embodied, free from misery, indestructible, pure and non-afflicted by sin,' these two *mantras* show that ब्रह्मन् cannot have any excellence added to it and that it is eternally pure. And the final release is becoming ब्रह्मन्. Therefore, the final release is not also something to be purified. Other than these, no one can point out any other way in which the final release could be connected with action. Therefore, apart from the one means) knowledge, it is impossible that it (i. e. the final release) should stand in any, even the slightest, relation to, any action.

### NOTES

In the previous passage it has been proved that an action abiding in one thing cannot purify another thing; rubbing of mirror does not brighten a gem. On this the objector says that even अन्याश्रया क्रिया is seen to purify a different object. For instance, bathing, sipping, etc., although they abide in the body, yet they are seen to purify the embodied Self.

To this the मात्स्यकार replies :—No, it is not the Self but the body which is purified. Through अविद्या the Self is associated with the body, and hence people consider that it is the Self which is purified. If bathing etc., were to abide in the Self, then the Self would become अनित्य like देह. Therefore, अन्याश्रया क्रिया can never purify a different object. That bathing, etc. abide in the body alone, is proved by प्रत्यक्ष. The स्वानादिक्रिया is ascribed to आत्मन् through ignorance; and that आत्मन् is always देहादिसंयुत (associated with the body), and not



असंहत (unassociated). Similarly health (आरोग्य) is also abiding in that Self which is देहादिसंहत. The Self on account of its association with the body, is identified with the body; and it is in this identified condition that the Self is cognised as अहम् in अहमरोगः, etc. In the same way, when we cognise अहं शुद्धः संस्कृतः, it is really the संस्कार or purification of the body which has been erroneously identified with the Self. Therefore, it is the देहादिसंहत Self, which is cognised as अहम् and which performs all actions. The pure Self has neither action abiding in it, nor is it purified. This is proved by the श्रुति passages also—तयोरन्यः etc. तयोः of ब्रह्मन् and जीव, अन्यः=जीव, पिण्डल=कर्मफल, भुक्ति=enjoys, अनश्वन्नन्यः=परमात्मा, अभि-चाकशीति=merely looks on; is free from all कर्तृत्व and भोक्तृत्व. And—आत्मेन्द्रियमनोयुक्तं भोक्तेत्याहुर्मनीषिणः.

The unassociated ब्रह्मन् is of pure nature. For this the आप्यकार cites—(1) एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु etc., and (2) स पर्यगाच्छुक्रम्, etc.

Therefore मोक्ष is not also संस्कार्य.

Thus, it has been shown and proved that मोक्ष cannot be regarded as : (1) उत्पाद्य, or (2) विकार्य, or (3) आप्य, or (4) संस्कार्य. Apart from these 4 forms, there is no other form by means of which मोक्ष could be made to associate with action. तस्मात् ज्ञानमेकं मुक्त्वा क्रियाया गन्धमात्रस्याप्यनुप्रवेश इह नोपपद्यते ।

ननु ज्ञानं नाम मानसी क्रिया । न; वैलक्षण्यात् । क्रिया हि नाम सा, यत्र वस्तुस्वरूपनिरपेक्षैव चोद्यते, पुरुषचित्तव्यापाराधीना च । यथा 'यस्यै देवतायै हविर्गृहीतं स्यात्तां मनसा ध्यायेद्वषट्कारिष्यन्', इति, 'संख्यां मनसा ध्यायेत्' (ऐ. ब्रा. ३।८।१) इति चैवमादिषु । ध्यानं चिन्तनं यद्यपि मानसम्, तथापि पुरुषेण कर्तुमर्कतुमन्यथा वा

कर्तुं शक्यम्, पुरुषतन्त्रत्वात् । ज्ञानं तु प्रमाणजन्यम् । प्रमाणं च यथाभूतवस्तुविषयम् । अतो ज्ञानं कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुं न शक्यम् ; केवलं वस्तुतन्त्रमेव तत् ; न चोदनातन्त्रम्, नापि पुरुषतन्त्रम् । तस्मान्मानसत्वेऽपि ज्ञानस्य महद्वैलक्षण्यम् । यथा च 'पुरुषो वाव गौतमाग्निः', 'योषा वाव गौतमाग्निः' (छां० ५।७, ८।१) इत्यत्र योषिपुरुषयोरग्निबुद्धिर्मानसी भवति । केवलचोदनाजन्यत्वान्तु क्रियैव सा पुरुषतन्त्रा च । या तु प्रसिद्धेऽग्नावग्निशुद्धिः, न सा चोदनातन्त्रा; नापि पुरुषतन्त्रा । किं तर्हि ? प्रत्यक्षविषयवस्तुतन्त्रैवेति ज्ञानमेवेतत् ; न क्रिया । एवं सर्वप्रमाणविषयवस्तुषु वेदितव्यम् ।—(भाष्यम्)

But, it may be said that knowledge itself is a mental activity. By no means, we reply. Because, there is difference (between knowledge and activity). An action is indeed that wherein there is an injunction even without regard to the nature of the thing and in dependence on the mental activity of a person. For instance, in the following passages, 'To whichever deity the offering is made on that one let him meditate when about to say वषट्,' and 'Let him meditate in his mind on the संध्या' and such others, meditation, that is, contemplation, although it is mental, still, since it is dependent on a person, it may be done, not done or done in a different way. Knowledge, on the other hand, is generated by valid means of knowledge. And a valid means of knowledge has for its object the thing as it exists. Therefore, knowledge cannot be effected or not effected or effected in a different way ; it is dependent purely on the thing; it is neither dependent on a person nor on injunction. Hence, although mental knowledge widely differs (from meditation, etc.). In a case like, 'The fire is man, O Gautama; the fire is



woman, O Gautama', the cognition of fire in man and woman is mental. Being generated by injunction alone, this (cognition) is only an act and dependent on a person. As regards the cognition of fire referring to the well-known (real) fire, it is neither dependent on a person nor an injunction. What is it then? As it is dependent on a thing which is an object of perception, it (viz. cognition) is only knowledge and not an act. The same remark applies to all things which are the objects of different means of valid knowledge.

### NOTES

On this the objector asks : Is not ज्ञान, knowledge, a mental activity (क्रिया)? To this the भाष्यकार replies—Well, ज्ञान may be a मानसी क्रिया, still it cannot generate fruit in the nature of ब्रह्मन्. For, we have already established that ब्रह्मन् is स्वयंप्रकाश and hence ब्रह्मन् cannot become an object to an act of cognition (विदि क्रिया). There is also another difference. क्रिया is that which is dependent on human will and wherein there is an injunction even without regard to the nature of the thing. For instance, in यस्यै देवतायै हविर्दत्तं स्यात् etc., meditation on संध्या is enjoined. This meditation is a क्रिया because it is dependent on the will of the man to meditate or not meditate on संध्या. In पुरुषो वाव गौतमाग्निः, योषा वाव गौतमाग्निः, a person is enjoined to meditate on man and woman as अग्नि. Here, no regard is paid to the nature of man and woman but a person is enjoined to meditate upon them as fire. Hence, ध्यान is चोदनाजन्य, पुरुषतन्त्र and वस्तुस्वरूपनिरपेक्ष. But ज्ञान is प्रमाणजन्य, not पुरुषतन्त्र and वस्तुस्वरूपपेक्ष. Cognition of fire (the real one) is by such प्रमाणs as ग्रन्थक्ष, etc.; this cognition is not at all dependent on a person to effect it or not effect it in some other way; and here the real nature of the thing cannot be disregarded. Therefore, ध्यान is a क्रिया, but ज्ञान is not, although both of them are mental operations.

तत्रैवं सति यथाभूतब्रह्मात्मविषयमपि ज्ञानं न चोदनातन्त्रम् । तद्विषये लिङ्गादयः श्रूयमाणा अपि अनियोज्यविषयत्वात्कुण्ठीभवन्ति उपलादिषु प्रयुक्तश्चरतैक्षण्यादिवत्, अहेयानुपादेयवस्तुविषयत्वात् । किमर्थानि तर्हि 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यः' इत्यादीनि विधिच्छायानि वचनानि ? स्वाभाविकप्रवृत्तिविषयविमुखीकरणार्थानि इति वक्तुम् । यो हि बहिर्मुखः प्रवर्तते पुरुषः 'इष्टं मे भूयात्, अनिष्टं मा भूत्' इति, न च तत्रात्यन्तिकं पुरुषार्थं लभते, तस्मात्त्यन्तिकपुरुषार्थ-वाञ्छितं स्वाभाविककार्यकरणसंघातप्रवृत्तिगोचराद्विमुखीकृत्य प्रत्य-गात्मव्योतस्तथा प्रवर्तयन्ति 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः' इत्यादीनि । तस्यात्मान्वेषणाय प्रवृत्तस्याहेयमनुपादेयं चात्मतत्त्वमुपदिश्यते 'इदं सर्वं यदात्मा' (बृह० २।४।६), 'यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं पश्येत्...केन कं विजानीयात्...विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात्' (बृह० ४।५।१५), 'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म' (बृह० २।५।१९) इत्यादिभिः ।  
—(भाष्यम्)

This being the case, that knowledge also, whose content is ब्रह्मन् and the Self as they really are, is not dependent on Vedic injunction. Hence, although imperative and similar forms referring to the knowledge of ब्रह्मन् are found used (in the Vedic texts), yet they are ineffective because they refer to something which cannot be enjoined, just as the edge of a razor becomes blunt when it is applied to a stone. For they have for their object something which cannot be rejected or accepted. But what then (it will be asked), is the purpose of those sentences which have the appearance of injunctions; such as, 'The Self verily, should be seen, heard about ?' We reply that they are for the purpose of turning one away from the objects of natural activity. For, when a man acts intent on external things, saying, 'Let me have pleasant things, let me have no unpleasant things,' and does



not thereby reach the final human goal although desirous of attaining it; such texts as the 'The Self verily, should be seen, etc.,' turn him away from the objects of natural activity, namely the assemblage of effect and cause (i. e., objects and sense-organs), and divert the stream of his thoughts on the inner Self. To such a man who is engaged in the activity of the quest of the Self, there is taught by the following passages the true nature of the Self, as what cannot be rejected or accepted : 'This everything, all is that Self,' 'But when the Self only is all this, then by what and whom shall one see, by what and whom shall one know? By what shall one know the knower ?' 'This Self is ब्रह्मन्,' etc.

## NOTES

In आत्मानं पश्येत् there is लिङ् in the sense of an injunction ; in ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि, there is लोट् in the same sense; similarly, in आत्मा द्रष्टव्यः, the suffix तव्य is also in the sense of an injunction. Therefore, knowledge is dependent on injunction.

To this the आप्यकार replies that although we see the imperative suffixes yet they do not enjoin any injunction. Because an injunction can be enjoined with regard to something if it is to be rejected or accepted. And only that thing can be rejected or accepted with regard to which a man has free will to accept or reject. But the Self cannot be rejected or accepted. Hence, no injunction can be enjoined with regard to the Self. Therefore, these imperatives become powerless in respect of knowledge, as the edge of a razor becomes blunt when applied to a stone.

Then, says the objector, the passages appearing like injunctions will become useless. What is their purpose after all?

The भाष्यकार replies :—We read in the कठोपनिषद्—पराञ्छि-  
 खानि व्यतृणत् स्वयंभूः, तस्मात्पराङ् पश्यति नान्तरात्मन्. The natural  
 propensities of a man are to run after external objects. He is actuated with the desire of इष्टं मे भूयात्, अनिष्टं मा भूत्.  
 But when in his activity towards external objects, he does not  
 reach the final human goal, then the श्रुति passages having an  
 imperative sense divert the channel of his thoughts from  
 external objects to the inner Self. When, ultimately he  
 engages in the quest of the Self, then the श्रुति passages like  
 इदं सर्वं यदात्मन्, etc., teach him the true nature of the Self.

यदप्यकर्तव्यप्रधानमात्मज्ञानं हानायापोपादानाय वा न भवतीति,  
 तत्तथैवेत्यभ्युपगम्यते । अलंकारो ह्ययमस्माकम्, यद्ब्रह्मावगतौ सत्यां  
 सर्वकर्तव्यताहानिः कृतकृत्यता चेति । तथा च श्रुतिः 'आत्मानं चेद्वि-  
 जानीयादयमस्मीति पुरुषः । किमिच्छन्कस्य कामाय शरीरमनुसंज्वरेत्'  
 (बृह० ४।४।१२) इति । 'एतद्बुद्ध्वा बुद्धिमान् स्यात्कृतकृत्यश्च भारत'  
 (गीता १५।२०) इति च स्मृतिः । तस्मान्न प्रतिपत्तिविधिशेषतया  
 ब्रह्मणः समर्पणम् ।—(भाष्यम्)

That the knowledge of ब्रह्मन् refers to something which  
 is not to be done, and therefore is not concerned with the  
 pursuit or avoidance of any object, is the very thing we ad-  
 mit; for just that constitutes our glory, that as soon as we  
 realise ब्रह्मन्, all our obligations come to an end and every-  
 thing that was to be accomplished is accomplished. So says  
 the श्रुति—'If a man should realise the Self as "I am he,"  
 what could he wish or desire that he should pine after the  
 body?' And similarly स्मृति declares—'Having realised this  
 a man becomes wise and one who has accomplished all that  
 is to be accomplished, O Bhārata.' Therefore, ब्रह्मन् is not  
 represented as subsidiary to the injunction of contemplation.



## NOTES

It was formerly objected that the knowledge of the Self, not being subsidiary to some injunction, is not a human goal. To this we reply that the objection is invalid. The knowledge of the Self, being the destroyer of अविद्या, is a human goal. We have already established it. As for its not being a subsidiary to an injunction, एतदस्माकं भूषणम्, न दूषणम्. The knowledge of the Self leads to सर्वकर्तव्यताहानि and कृतकृत्यता. What more do you want? Therefore, ब्रह्मन् is not represented as subsidiary to the injunction of contemplation.

अदपि केचिदाहुः, प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिविधितच्छेषव्यतिरेकेण केवलवस्तु-  
वादी वेदभागो नास्तीति, तन्न, औपनिषदस्य पुरुषस्यानन्यशेषत्वात् ।  
योऽसावुपनिषत्स्वेवाधिगतः पुरुषोऽसंसारी ब्रह्मस्वरूपः उत्पाद्यादि-  
चतुर्विधद्रव्यविलक्षणः स्वप्रकरणस्थोऽनन्यशेषः, नासौ नास्तीति  
नाधिगम्यत इति वा शक्यं वदितुम्, 'स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा' (बृह०  
३।९।२६) इत्यात्मशब्दात्, आत्मनश्च प्रत्याख्यातुमशक्यत्वात्; य  
एव निराकर्ता तस्यैवात्मत्वात् ।—(भाष्यम्)

As regards the saying of some that there is no part of the Veda which deals with bare things, and is not either an injunction or a prohibition, or supplementary to either, (we reply) that it is wrong; for the Self propounded in the Upaniṣads is not subsidiary to anything else. Of that Self which is comprehended from the Upaniṣads alone, which is non-transmigratory, which is of the nature of ब्रह्मन्, which is distinct from the four kinds of substances, i. e., the produced, etc., which occurs in a topic of its own, which is not subsidiary to any other; of that Self it cannot be said that it does not exist or is not apprehended; because there

is the word 'Self' in 'That Self is not this, not that,' and because it is not possible to deny the Self; for, even he who denies, even for him there is Self-hood.

## NOTES

The भाष्यकार here refutes the opinion of the मीमांसकs of प्रभाकर school. According to them आत्मन् alone is the agent, and he is well-known. Why should the वेदान्त texts describe him when he is well-known? Apart from this well-known आत्मन्, there is no authority to admit any आत्मन् (who is identical with ब्रह्मन्) who is not a कर्ता (non-agent). Therefore, the वेदान्त texts also declare the आत्मन् who is an agent. There is no necessity of admitting an अक्रिय ब्रह्मन्. The वेदान्त texts also, thus, are of an injunctive nature.

No part of the Veda is free from क्रिया. Every part is either a प्रवृत्तिविधि or a निषेधविधि or subsidiary to either. No part of the Veda declares a यथाभूतवस्तु.

To this the भाष्यकार replies, well, the उपनिषद् part of the Veda does declare a यथाभूतवस्तु, namely ब्रह्मन्. The Upaniṣads do not lay down a प्रवृत्तिविधि or निषेधविधि, nor are the उपनिषद्s subsidiary to क्रियात्मकभाग of the वेद. The आत्मन्, who is known in the Upaniṣads alone, who is non-transmigratory, who is of the nature of ब्रह्मन् and who is neither उत्पाद्य, nor विकार्य, nor आप्य, nor संस्कार्य, that आत्मन् is स्वप्रकरणस्थ. That is, the प्रकरण or topic is that of आत्मन् alone. The topic in the Upaniṣads is आत्मन्. This topic is not subsidiary to any other topic. The topic of the Upaniṣads is their own; they do not teach anything which might form topic of anything else. And when we examine these Upaniṣads, we find that they teach only about the Self. Therefore, the आत्मन् taught in them is स्वप्रकरणस्थ and not शेष (subsidiary) to अन्य (any other thing).



About this आत्मन् you cannot say that he does not exist or is not known; for we find the word आत्मन् in the text स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा. Again, आत्मन् is the real substrate for प्रपञ्चविभ्र (world-delusion). Without a substrate there can be no delusion. Without a rope, there can be no delusion of snake in it. Hence, आत्मन् (that is, his existence) cannot be denied. Even when you deny the Self, you cannot deny his existence. For, who is the denier but the Self?

नन्वात्मा अहंप्रत्ययविषयत्वदुपनिषत्स्वेव विज्ञायत इत्यनुपपन्नम् । न, तत्साक्षित्वेन प्रत्युक्तत्वात् । न ह्यहंप्रत्ययविषयकर्तृव्यतिरेकेण तत्साक्षी सर्वभूतस्थः सम एकः कूटस्थनित्यः पुरुषो विधिकाण्डे तर्क-समये वा केनचिदधिगतः सर्वस्यात्मा । अतः स न केनचित्प्रत्याख्यातुं शक्यः, विधिशेषत्वं वा नेतुम् । आत्मत्वादेव च सर्वेषाम्, न ह्येयो नाप्युपादेयः । सर्वं हि विनश्यद्विकारजातं पुरुषान्तं विनश्यति । पुरुषो हि विनाशहेत्वभावादविनाशी; विक्रियाहेत्वभावाच्च कूटस्थनित्यः; अत एव नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावः; तस्मात् 'पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित्सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः' (कठ० १।३।११), 'तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि' (बृह० ३।९।२६) इति चौपनिषदत्वविशेषणं पुरुषस्योपनिषत्सु प्राधान्येन प्रकाश्यमानत्वे उपपद्यते । अतो भूतवस्तुपरो वेदभागो नास्तीति वचनं साहसमात्रम् ।—(भाष्यम्)

Now, since the Self is an object of the concept 'I', it is unreasonable to maintain that he can be understood from the Upaniṣads alone. (To this, we say)..No; because it has (already) been refuted by (propounding) that he is the witness thereof. Indeed, as distinct from the agent who is the object of the concept of 'I', the witness thereof, that Self which is present in all, equal, one, eternally unchanging, the Self of everything, has not been understood by anyone

either from the ritualistic portion of the Veda or from reasoning. Therefore, he cannot be denied by anyone, nor can he be made subsidiary to injunctions. And because he is the Self of all, he cannot become an object of rejection or acceptance. All perishable things indeed perish, because they are mere modifications, up to (i.e. exclusive of) the Self. The Self is imperishable, because of the absence of the cause of perishing; and because of the absence of the cause of modification, he is eternally unchanging; for this very reason, he is eternally pure, intelligent and free nature ; therefore in texts like 'There is nothing higher than Self; that is the limit, that is the highest goal,' and, 'But I ask about the Self taught in the Upaniṣads,' the qualification "propounded in the Upaniṣads" is intelligible as the Self is principally revealed in the Upaniṣads. To say, therefore, that there is no portion of the Veda which deals with existing things, is a mere bold assertion.

### NOTES

The objector challenges the statement that the Self can be known from the Upaniṣads alone, on the ground that everybody knows the Self as the object of the concept of 'I'. How do you say that the Self can be understood from the Upaniṣads alone? The भाष्यकार replies that the Self (viz., the object of the concept of 'I') which you talk of is not the same Self as taught in the Upaniṣads, The औपनिषद् आत्मन् is the साक्षिन्, witness of that what you call Self. The idea is that although the जीवात्मन् and परमात्मन् are really identical, yet the जीव is the conditioned form of परमात्मन्. The pure form is only the witness. And as it is impossible to understand this pure form by any other means, it is the sphere of the Upaniṣads. Neither the injunctory part of the Veda, nor reasoning establishes the pure form of the Self. Reasoning cannot refute its existence, nor can the Vedas reduce it to the position of



a subsidiary to an injunction. Because, that औपनिषद् पुरुष is the आत्मन् of all. आत्मन् is not for the sake of another; on the contrary, everything else is for the sake of आत्मन्, as is said in the श्रुति—न वा अरे सर्वस्य कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति. Again, because that पुरुष is the आत्मन् of all, he can neither be an object of rejection nor of acceptance. The true nature of the entire universe is आत्मन्; and nobody can reject his nature, as it is impossible to do so; nor can nature be accepted, because it is already there.

Everything except the Self is perishable. The पुरुष is the real truth of the entire universe. He alone is imperishable. Hence he cannot be rejected or accepted. Nor can he undergo any modification.

यदपि शास्त्रतात्पर्यविदामनुक्रमणम्, 'दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्माव-  
बोधनम्' इत्येवमादि, तत् धर्मजिज्ञासाविषयत्वाद्विधिप्रतिषेधशास्त्रा-  
भिप्रायं द्रष्टव्यम्। अपि च 'आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमत-  
दर्थानाम्' इत्येतदेकान्तेनाभ्युपगच्छतां भूतोपदेशानामानर्थक्यसङ्गः।  
प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिव्यतिरेकेण भूतं चेद्वस्तूपदिशति भव्यार्थत्वेन, कूटस्थ-  
नित्यं भूतं नोपदिशतीति को हेतुः? न हि भूतमुपदिश्यमानं क्रिया  
भवति। अक्रियात्वेऽपि भूतस्य क्रियासाधनत्वात् क्रियार्थ एव भूतो-  
पदेश इति चेत्, नैष दोषः; क्रियासाधनत्वेऽपि क्रियानिर्वर्तनशक्तिमवस्तू-  
पदिष्टमेव; क्रियार्थत्वं तु प्रयोजनं तस्य; न चैतावता वस्त्वनुपदिष्टं  
भवति। यदि नामोपदिष्टं किं तव तेन स्यादिति। उच्यते—अनवग-  
त्तात्मवस्तूपदेशश्च तथैव भवितुमर्हति; तदवगत्या मिथ्याज्ञानस्य संसार-  
हेतोर्निवृत्तिः प्रयोजनं क्रियत इत्यविशिष्टमर्थवत्त्वं क्रियासाधनवस्तूप-  
देशेन।—(भाष्यम्)

With regard to the quotation from those who are acquainted with the purport of the शास्त्र, 'Its purport is indeed seen to be the teaching of ritual,' etc., it is to be understood that they, having to do with the enquiry into Religious Duty, refer to that part of the शास्त्र which consists of injunctions and prohibitions.

— With regard to those who invariably stick to (the opinion expressed in) the text 'Since action is the purport of the Veda, whatever does not refer to action is purportless,' (in their case) it would follow that all information about existent things is meaningless.

If, on the other hand, the Veda—in addition to the injunctions of activity and cessation of activity—does teach about existent things as being subservient to some action to be accomplished, why then should it not give information also about the existent eternally unchangeable Self? For an existent thing, about which information is given, does not become an act (through being stated to be subservient to an act).

But, it will be said, although an existent thing is not an act, yet, as it is instrumental to action, the information given about such a thing is merely for the sake of an act. This, we reply, does not matter; for although it is taught for the sake of an act, still what is taught is the (existent) thing which has the capacity to accomplish an act; that it is for the sake of an act is, however, its purpose; with this much alone, the thing does not cease to be taught (i.e., to be intimated in itself).

Well, and if it is thus taught, what is gained thereby for your purpose? We reply that the teaching about the Self, which is an existent thing not comprehended from other sources, is of the same nature (as the teaching about other existent things); for by the comprehension of the Self



a stop is put to all false knowledge, which is the cause of transmigration, and thus a purpose is established which renders the passages relative to ब्रह्मन् equal to those passages which teach about things instrumental to actions.

### NOTES

In this paragraph there are five important arguments of the opponent which the आप्यकार refutes.

(1) According to the मीमांसक, the purport of the वेद is कर्मावबोधन—to teach about actions. But according to the वेदान्तिन्, the Upaniṣad part of the वेद teaches ब्रह्मन् which is absolutely free from actions. What do you say to that, Mr. वेदान्तिन्? How do you reconcile the question दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनम्? The वेदान्तिन् replies—Well, your question refers to धर्माजिज्ञासा and hence it is valid only in that part of the वेद which consists of injunctions and prohibitions. It has nothing to do with the Upaniṣad part of the वेद or the वेदान्त.

(2) “Well, what do you say to आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्थानाम्—‘those portions of the वेद which do not teach action are meaningless’?” To this the वेदान्तिन् replies—Yes, if we agree to this view then the portion of the वेद teaching about ब्रह्मन् which is a भूत पदार्थ (existent thing, and hence not an action) will be meaningless. But, similarly, in the कर्मकाण्ड portion also, the teaching about दधि and सोम in दध्ना जुहोति and सोमेन यजेत will become meaningless; for दधि and सोम are भूत, existent things. Therefore, you should not press your maxim too far, otherwise it will go against your own view.

(3) The मीमांसक further argues: The entire Veda is for teaching प्रवृत्ति or निवृत्ति (injunction or prohibition). Of course, where a भूत or already accomplished thing like दधि or सोम is taught, then it is taught for the sake of what is to

come into being. दधि and सोम become parts of some क्रिया. Hence, although in themselves they may be existent, but they are not existent as parts of some ritual. It is in the latter sense that we say they are taught. To this the वेदान्तिन् replies: Well, you have admitted that the Veda teaches about existent things; then what objection should you have about ब्रह्मन् which is also an existent thing? As regards your saying that these existent things are taught for the sake of their forming part of some ritual, well, this does not save your position very much. For, being subservient to an action, दधि and सोम (and for the matter of that any existent thing), do not themselves become actions. The existent things, in spite of all what you say, always remain distinct from actions; they cannot become actions themselves.

(4) The मीमांसक says that we admit that by उपदेश a सिद्ध or भूत पदार्थ does not become a क्रिया. But we would not teach about a सिद्ध वस्तु, if it were not a साधन or instrument of some क्रिया. Hence, the teaching of a सिद्ध पदार्थ is still क्रियार्थ, for the sake of an act. The idea is this: क्रियार्थ is that which has the capacity to produce activity; and that object which is devoid of such a capacity is अक्रियार्थ. दधि, सोम etc. have the capacity to produce the activity of a ritual; hence they are क्रियार्थ, although not क्रिया. And these objects are taught because they are क्रियार्थ. But ब्रह्मन् has no capacity to bring about the accomplishment of an action; it is अक्रियार्थ. Hence, the उपदेश about ब्रह्मन् is purposeless. To this the वेदान्तिन् replies—नैष दोषः, क्रियार्थत्वेऽपि, etc. It does not matter. We admit that a सिद्ध or भूत पदार्थ is क्रियार्थ, for the sake of an act. Still न हि क्रियार्थं भूतमुपदिश्यमानं अभूतं भवति अपि तु क्रियानिर्वर्तनयोग्यं भवेव तत्। तथा च भूतेऽर्थे अवधृत-शक्तयः शब्दाः कचिद्वनिष्ठभूतविषया दृश्यमाना भूत्वा शीर्त्वा वा न कथंचिक्रियानिष्ठतां गमयितुमुचिताः (भामती)। Indeed, the



existent अभूत taught for the sake of activity, does not become अभूत, other than existent; it is rather certainly existent, because it is capable of achieving an activity. How can you accomplish an activity by means of a thing which is yet to be accomplished, that is, which is not already existent? And thus, words which have been determined to signify existent things, which are seen in some cases to refer to the existent abiding in itself (i.e., without syntactical relation to an act), cannot properly be tortured to signify somehow relation to activity. क्रियार्थत्व is but the प्रयोजन of भूतवस्तु. Hence, the fact that a thing is भूत does not bar it from being taught.

(5) The मीमांसक says—Well, let me agree to the proposition that even a भूत or existent thing is taught ( उपदिष्ट ), and the passages containing information about existent things are admissible. But what do you gain by it? For, only that existent thing should be taught which has some प्रयोजन, not that which has no प्रयोजन. Your ब्रह्मन्, is उदासिन् (indifferent) and सर्वक्रियाशून्य (devoid of all activity). The teaching about ब्रह्मन् can render no service, as ब्रह्मन् is fruitless. To this the वेदान्तिन् replies—Although ब्रह्मन् is indifferent, still the knowledge of ब्रह्मन् culminating in realisation, destroys अविद्या (Nescience) which is the cause of false knowledge and the cause of transmigration. Thus the teaching of ब्रह्मन् will have this purpose.

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अपि च 'ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः' इत्येवमाद्या निवृत्तिरुपदिश्यते ।  
 न च सा क्रिया, नापि क्रियासाधनम् । अक्रियार्थानामुपदेशोऽनर्थकश्चेत्,  
 'ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः' इत्यादिनिवृत्त्युपदेशानामानर्थक्यं प्राप्तम् ।  
 तच्चानिष्टम् । न च स्वभावप्राप्तहन्त्यर्थानुरागेण त्वः शक्यमप्राप्त-

क्रियार्थत्वं कल्पयितुं हननक्रियानिवृत्त्यौदासीन्यव्यतिरेकेण । नवश्चैष स्वभावः, यत्स्वसंबन्धिनोऽभावं बोधयतीति । अभावबुद्धिश्चौदासीन्ये कारणम् । सा च दग्धेन्धनाग्निवत्स्वयमेवोपशाम्यति । तस्मात्प्रसक्त-क्रियानिवृत्त्यौदासीन्यमेव 'ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः' इत्यादिषु प्रतिषेधार्थं मन्यामहे, अन्यत्र प्रजापतिव्रतादिभ्यः । तस्मात्पुरुषार्थानुयोग्युपाख्यानादिभूतार्थवादविषयमानर्थक्याभिधानं द्रष्टव्यम् ।—( भाष्यम् )

Moreover, there are found (even in that part of the वेद which treats of actions) such passages as 'A Brāhmaṇa is not to be killed' which teach abstinence from certain actions. This abstinence from action is neither action nor means to an action. If, therefore, the tenet that all those passages which do not teach action are purposeless were insisted on, it would follow that all such passages as 'A Brāhmaṇa is not to be killed' which teach abstinence from action are purposeless. And that is unacceptable. Again, on the basis of the connection with the sense of killing which is naturally established, it is not possible to assume for the negative particle the signification of a non-established act, as distinct from the state of mere passivity implied in the abstinence from the act of killing. And this is the nature of the negative particle that it makes known the non-existence of that with which it is connected. And the cognition of non-existence is the cause of passivity (or indifference). (Nor can it be objected that as soon as that momentary idea has passed away, the state of indifference will again make room for activity; for) that idea subsides of its own accord (after having completely destroyed the natural impulse prompting to the murder of a Brāhmaṇa etc.), just as a fire is extinguished after having



completely consumed its fuel. Hence we are of opinion that the aim of prohibitory passages such as 'A Brāhmaṇa is not to be killed' is mere indifference consisting in the abstinence from some possible action; excepting some special cases, such as the so-called Prajāpati vow, etc. Hence the charge of want of purpose is to be considered as referring (not to the Vedānta texts, but only) to such statements about existent things as are of the nature of legends and the like and do not serve the human goal.

### NOTES

This passage contains a discussion of the prohibitory passages of the Veda and is of a very scholastic nature. In order to follow it, it is necessary to grasp the two senses of नञ् (negation), namely, (1) प्रसक्तप्रतिषेध (prohibition) and (2) पर्युदास (exclusion). Negation is expressed by न or अ (or अन्) added to a word as in अब्राह्मणः. The first form generally denotes प्रसक्तप्रतिषेध and the second पर्युदास. In प्रसक्तप्रतिषेध, the negative particle is always connected with the activity as expressed by a verbal suffix, not with the sense of the root. Let us take the sentence ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः. Here the verbal form हन्तव्यः really corresponds to हननं कर्तव्यम्. The word हननं denotes the sense of the root (प्रकृति=धातु), and the word कर्तव्य expresses the sense of activity lying in the प्रत्यय (suffix). Now, according to प्रसक्तप्रतिषेध, the natural connection of न in ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः should be expressed as ब्राह्मणस्य हननं न कर्तव्यम्. That is, न is connected with the क्रिया (activity) expressed by the प्रत्यय 'तव्य' added to the root हन्. ब्राह्मणहननं, which is (प्रसक्त) स्वभावप्राप्त is prohibited here. स्वभावप्राप्त means, naturally established, because it has natural motives— not dependent on the injunction of the Veda, viz. passion, greed, etc. If we were to connect न with the root

इन् (that is प्रकृति), then ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः would mean ब्राह्मणस्य अहननं कर्तव्यम्. That is, it is no more a prohibition, but an injunction, some positive order of doing something to ब्राह्मण, which something must be other than हनन (killing); it may be beating. This excludes हनन from the actions which are enjoined to be done to a ब्राह्मण. This is called पर्युदास.

So, truly speaking the real sense of negation is in प्रसक्तप्रतिषेध or prohibition and not in पर्युदास or exclusion.. For, पर्युदास is tantamount to positive assertion—ब्राह्मणस्याहननं कर्तव्यम्. If the निषेधवाक्यs in the वेद were to be explained in the sense of पर्युदास, then they would not differ from विधिवाक्यs, and it will be futile to divide the Vedic texts into विधिवाक्यs and निषेधवाक्यs. (For further discussion on the senses of नञ्, see अर्थसङ्ग्रह, sections 81 ff, pages 120 ff, edited by D. V. Gokhale, Oriental Book Agency, Poona).

Now, let us come back to our subject in hand. The वेदान्तिन् says that if you insist on your principle of आश्रयस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्शानाम्, another difficulty would be about such statements as ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः. The Veda teaches here abstinence from activity; न हन्तव्यः means हननं न कर्तव्यम्—one should desist from the activity of killing. This abstinence or desisting from activity, is not an activity itself, nor does it help activity. Hence, ब्राह्मणा न हन्तव्यः, not denoting any activity, or means to an activity, becomes a purposeless statement. But this position is unacceptable. Therefore, abstinence from activity (निवृत्ति) is nothing more than indifference (औदासीन्य) from activity.

You cannot, of course, connect the negative particle with हनन, in order that the sentence ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः might indicate a non-established action; that is, the sentence



might be construed as ब्राह्मणस्य अहिननम् which was not already established outside the Veda (for the natural impulse is to kill a ब्राह्मण) is being taught by this sentence; this sentence teaches us 'a determination (संकल्प) of not killing a ब्राह्मण is to be formed'.

Because, wherever we can, we should take the negative particle in its primary sense. The natural or primary sense of नञ् is that it indicates the non-existence of that to which it is joined; so that the passages in which this नञ् is joined to words denoting action must be considered to have for their purport the entire absence of action, which is indifference.

Of course in exceptional cases, this negative particle although joined to words denoting action, is yet interpreted as of positive character. For instance, in the प्रजापति-vow to be taken by a ब्रह्मचारिन्, we read न ईक्षेत उद्यन्तमादित्यम्, etc. These commands begin with तस्य वदोर्ग्रतम्. The vows are always of the nature of positive determinations to do something. Hence, here the context not allowing us to take the primary sense of नञ् (प्रसज्यप्रतिषेध), we are obliged to take the secondary or लाक्षणिक sense of नञ्.—He is to form a determination of not seeing the rising sun.

As said above, the primary sense of नञ् is to indicate the non-existence (अभाव) of that to which it is joined. And this cognition of non-existence leads to indifference. But, अभावबुद्धि is not of permanent nature. Will not its destruction lead to the destruction of its effect, i.e., औदासीन्य? Will not a man become again प्रवृत्त्यन्मुख, intent on activity, after the अभावबुद्धि is destroyed? To this the वेदान्तिन् says, No. The अभावबुद्धि or the cognition of non-existence, first completely destroys all प्रवृत्ति and, then, having nothing else to destroy, it subsides by itself; just as fire does.

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यदप्युक्तम्—कर्तव्यविध्यनुप्रवेशमन्तरेण वस्तुमात्रमुच्यमानमनर्थकं स्यात्, 'सप्तद्वीपा वसुमती' इत्यादिवदिति, तत्परिहृतम्; 'रञ्जुरियम्, नायं सर्पः' इति वस्तुमात्रकथनेऽपि प्रयोजनस्य दृष्टत्वात् ।

ननु श्रुतब्रह्मणोऽपि यथापूर्वं संसारित्वदर्शनान्न रञ्जुस्वरूपकथन-चदर्थवत्त्वमित्युक्तम् । अत्रोच्यते—नावगतब्रह्मात्मभावस्य यथापूर्वं संसारित्वं शक्यं दर्शयितुम्, वेदप्रमाणजनितब्रह्मात्मभावविरोधात् । न हि शरीराद्यात्माभिमानिनो दुःखमयादिमत्त्वं दृष्टमिति तस्यैव वेद-प्रमाणजनितब्रह्मात्मावगमे तदभिमाननिवृत्तौ तदेव मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तं दुःखमयादिमत्त्वं भवतीति शक्यं कल्पयितुम् । न हि धनिनो गृहस्थस्य धनाभिमानिनो धनापहारनिमित्तं दुःखं दृष्टमिति, तस्यैव प्रव्रजितस्य धनाभिमानरहितस्य तदेव धनापहारनिमित्तं दुःखं भवति । न च कुण्डलिनः कुण्डलित्वाभिमाननिमित्तं सुखं दृष्टमिति, तस्यैव कुण्डलवियुक्तस्य कुण्डलित्वाभिमानरहितस्य तदेव कुण्डलित्वाभिमान-निमित्तं सुखं भवति । तदुक्तं श्रुत्या 'अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृगतः' (छां० ८।१२।१) इति ।

शरीरे पतितेऽशरीरत्वं स्यात्, न जीवत इति चेत्, न; सशरीर-त्वस्य मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तत्वात् । न ह्यात्मनः शरीराभिमानलक्षणं मिथ्याज्ञान मुक्त्वा अन्यतः सशरीरत्वं शक्यं कल्पयितुम् । नित्यम-शरीरत्वम्, अकर्मनिमित्तत्वात् इत्यवोचाम । तत्कृतधर्माधर्मनिमित्तं सशरीरत्वमिति चेत्, न; शरीरसंबन्धस्यासिद्धत्वात्, धर्माधर्म-योरात्मकृतत्वासिद्धेः, शरीरसंबन्धस्य धर्माधर्मयोस्तत्कृतत्वस्य चेतरे-तराश्रयत्वप्रसङ्गात् । अन्धपरम्परैवैषा अनादित्वकल्पना । क्रियासम-वायाभावाच्चात्मनः कर्तृत्वानुपपत्तेः । संनिधानमात्रेण राजप्रभृतीनां दृष्टं कर्तृत्वमिति चेत्, न; धनदानाद्युपार्जितभृत्यसंबन्धित्वात्तेषां कर्तृत्वो-



पपत्तेः, न त्वात्मनो धनदानादिवच्छरीरादिभिः स्वस्वामिभावसंबन्ध-  
निमित्तं किञ्चिच्छक्यं कल्पयितुम् । मिथ्याभिमानस्तु प्रत्यक्षः संबन्धहेतुः।  
एतेन यजमानत्वमात्मनो व्याख्यातम् ।—( भाष्यम् )

As to what was said : Without entering into any relationship with an injunction to do something, a mere statement of fact is fruitless, like the statement 'the Earth having seven islands'—we have already refuted it; for, purpose is found to exist even in mere statement of fact like 'this is a rope and not a snake'.

Well, we had also said that (the statement of bare fact-like) the nature of rope is not purposeful, for it is found that a man even after hearing about ब्रह्मन् continues as before to belong to this transmigratory world. We reply—You cannot show that a person, who has realised ब्रह्मन् as his Self, continues as before to belong to this transmigratory world; because it would go against his realisation, by means of Veda, of ब्रह्मन् as his Self. It is not possible to assume that—because we find a person, having the conceit of Self in his body, etc., is subject to misery, fear, etc., therefore, the same person, even when he has realised, by means of Veda, ब्रह्मन् as his Self, and has thus become free from that conceit (of Self in his body), will be subject to misery, fear, etc. caused by illusory knowledge. Because a rich householder, puffed up by the conceit of his riches, is seen to suffer pain if his riches are stolen, it does not follow that if the same person retires from the world and thus becomes free from the conceit of riches, he will still suffer pain if his riches are stolen. Nor, again, because a man possessed of ear-rings derives pleasure from the conceit of the ownership of ear-rings, does it follow that even when the same person gives up his ear-rings and thus becomes free from

the conceit of their ownership, he will still derive pleasure from the conceit of the ownership of ear-rings. Thus it is said; 'When he is non-embodied, pleasure and pain do not touch him.'

If it be said that non-embodied state is possible only when the body is destroyed, not as long as a person is alive, then we demur; because the embodied state has for its cause the illusory knowledge. It is not possible to assume the embodied state of the Self, except as a result of illusory knowledge consisting in the conceit of Self in the body. We have said that non-embodied state is eternal, because it is not caused by actions. If it be said that the embodied state is caused by merit and demerit effected by the Self (and therefore real), then we say, No. Because the connection of body with the Self is not established; because it is not proved that merit and demerit are effected by the Self; and because there would result reciprocal dependence between the connection with a body and the acquisition of merit and demerit by the Self. As regards the assumption of beginninglessness, it is certainly like a chain of the blind. The Self cannot possibly become an agent, because there is no inherence of activity (in the Self). If it should be said that the Self may be considered as an agent in the same way as kings and other great people are (who without acting themselves make others act) by their mere presence, we deny (the appositeness of this instance). It is possible for kings, etc., to become agents, because they are related to servants procured through payment of money. But, in respect of the Self, you cannot assume anything like payment of money, etc., which could become the cause of the relationship of master and servant between the Self and the bodies. Illusory



conceit, on the other hand, is the manifest reason of connection between the two. This also explains in how far the Self can become a sacrificer.

## NOTES

In the beginning of this passage, the भाष्यकार reiterates the objection—the statement of bare fact, unless it forms part of an injunction, is purposeless—and his reply—that such a statement has some purpose. रज्जुरियं नायं सर्पः is a statement whose purpose is the destruction of illusory knowledge (मिथ्याज्ञान). As regards the objection that even after hearing the texts relating to ब्रह्मन्, मिथ्याज्ञान and संसारित्व are not removed, the भाष्यकार replies : Yes, mere hearing of such texts will not lead to the destruction of संसारित्व. What is wanted for the destruction of संसारित्व is the hearing of such texts culminating in the realisation, of the truth contained in the texts. But what is this realisation of ब्रह्मन्? It is a mental state arising out of श्रवण, मनन, निदिध्यासन. This mental state completely destroys the perception of this entire illusory universe and destroys itself also as it (mental state) is a part of the illusory universe. Hence, when a person realises ब्रह्मन्, he is not effected by fear and pain; his संसारित्व is altogether destroyed when, as a result of the realisation of ब्रह्मन्, that person is freed from the conceit of Self in his body. This is what is said by the श्रुति also—when he is unembodied (i.e., free from the conceit of Self in his body), he is no more subject to pain and pleasure.

This unembodied state of the Self is natural and eternal. If the embodied state of the Self were real, then that state would not cease during life-time. But the embodied state is due to illusory knowledge. Therefore, once the truth is realised, then this embodied state can be removed even during the life-time.

On this an objection is raised. 'Well, the embodied state results from धर्म and अधर्म effected by the Self; it is not caused by illusory knowledge. Hence, as long as धर्म and अधर्म do not cease to produce their effect, the embodied state also would not cease. And at the cessation of धर्म and अधर्म, there is but death. Therefore, the unembodied state cannot be attained during the life-time. To this, the reply is—The Self cannot directly acquire धर्म and अधर्म. The धर्म and अधर्म can be acquired by the exertion of speech, mind and body. Hence, they cannot be acquired unless the Self is related to the body. Ultimately, the position will be that embodiedness becomes dependent on धर्म and अधर्म; and, धर्म and अधर्म become dependent on embodiedness. Thus it will lead to the logical fault of reciprocal dependence (परस्पराश्रय).

If, on the other hand, परस्पराश्रयता is admitted as a necessary evil, as it is अनादि (beginningless) like the relation of seed and sprout, then the भाष्यकार replies that the assumption of अनादित्व is like a chain of blind men, who are unable to lead one another.

It is now said that there is no परस्पराश्रयत्व in बीज and अङ्कुर. Because the particular बीज, generating a certain अङ्कुर, is not produced by the same अङ्कुर which it has generated. The अङ्कुर which is the cause of a बीज, is different from that अङ्कुर which is produced from that बीज. Thus, this अनादित्व is not like a blind men's chain. Similarly, the धर्म and अधर्म acquired by the Self in previous birth, which have caused a particular body before us, are different from the धर्म and अधर्म now acquired by the Self which will cause a future body.

To this, the भाष्यकार replies—You can say this when you establish the inherence of activity in the Self. But this is



not established. Hence, the Self is not an agent, and therefore cannot acquire धर्म and अधर्म.

This also explains the illusion of regarding the Self as sacrificer. When the Self is not at all an agent, how can he be a sacrificer? So, this assumption of यज्ञकर्तृत्व in the Self is an outcome of मिथ्याज्ञान.

अत्राहुः—देहादिव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनः आत्मीये देहादावहंभिमानो गौणः, न मिथ्येति चेत्, न; प्रसिद्धवस्तुभेदस्य गौणत्वमुख्यत्वप्रसिद्धेः। यस्य हि प्रसिद्धो वस्तुभेदः—यथा केसरादिमानाकृतिविशेषोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां सिंहशब्दप्रत्ययभाङ् मुख्योऽन्यः सिद्धः; ततश्चान्यः पुरुषः प्रायिकैः क्रौर्यशौर्यादिभिः सिंहगुणैः संपन्नः सिद्धः—तस्य तस्मिन्पुरुषे सिंहशब्दप्रत्ययौ गौणौ भवतः, नाप्रसिद्धवस्तुभेदस्य। तस्य त्वन्यत्रान्यत्रशब्दप्रत्ययौ भ्रान्तिनिमित्तावेव भवतः, न गौणौ; यथा मन्दान्धकारे स्थाणुरयमित्यगृह्यमाणविशेषे पुरुषशब्दप्रत्ययौ स्थाणुविषयौ; यथा वा शुक्तिकायामकस्माद्रजतमिदमिति निश्चितौ शब्दप्रत्ययौ, तद्वद्देहादिसंघाते अहं इति निरूपचारेण शब्दप्रत्ययावात्मानात्माविवेकेनोत्पद्यमानौ कथं गौणौ शक्यौ वदितुम् ? आत्मानात्मविवेकिनामपि पण्डितानामजाविपालानामिवाविविक्तौ शब्दप्रत्ययौ भवतः। तस्माद्देहादिव्यतिरिक्तात्मास्तित्ववादिनां देहादावहंप्रत्ययौ मिथ्यैव, न गौणः। तस्मान्मिथ्याप्रत्ययनिमित्तत्वात्सशरीरत्वस्य सिद्धं जीवतोऽपि विदुषोऽशरीरत्वम्। तथा च ब्रह्मविद्विषया श्रुतिः 'तद्यथाहिनिर्व्वयनी वस्मीके मृता प्रत्यस्तः शयीतेवमेवेदं शरीरं शेते अथायमशरीरोऽमृतः प्राणो ब्रह्मैव तेज एव' (बृह० ४।४।७) इति; 'सचक्षुरचक्षुरिव सकर्णोऽकर्ण इव सवागवागिव समना अमना इव सप्राणोऽप्राण इव' इति च। स्मृतिरपि च 'स्थितप्रज्ञस्य का भाषा'

ब्र.च....१।

(भ० गी० २।५४) इत्याद्या स्थितप्रज्ञस्य लक्षणान्याचक्षाणा विदुषः सर्वप्रवृत्त्यसंबन्धं दर्शयति। तस्मान्नावगतब्रह्मभावस्य यथापूर्वं संसारित्वम्; यस्य तु यथापूर्वं संसारित्वं नासावगतब्रह्मभाव इत्यनवद्यम्।  
—(भाष्यम्)

Here it is objected that the conceit of 'I' in his body, etc., by the Self who is distinct from the body, etc., is secondary and not false. To this we say, No; for the distinction of primariness and secondariness are well-known to him who understands the difference between the things. For him to whom the difference between the things is well-known—for example, a certain thing having a mane and a particular appearance is established through co-presence and co-absence as the principal signification of the word and concept 'lion', and another, a man, established as possessing cruelty, courage, etc., which are the ordinary qualities of a lion—for that one, the word and concept 'lion' have secondary signification in respect of that man, not for him to whom the difference between the things is not well-known. For this (latter) one, however, the use of one word and concept in place of another is caused only delusively and not secondarily; as the word 'man' and its concept (are delusive) in respect of a post whose particularity is not apprehended in the twilight, in the form 'This is a post'. Or, for example, in the nacre, the word and concept which for some unknown reason are determined in the form 'This is silver'.

Similarly, how can the word and concept of 'I' which arise in respect of the assemblage of the body, etc., non-figuratively through the non-discrimination of the Self and the Non-Self, be said to be secondary? Even learned men who know the difference between the Self and the Non-Self



fail to discriminate the word and concept just as common shepherds and goat-herds do. Therefore, for those who maintain the existence of a Self different from the body, etc., the concept of 'I' in respect of the body, etc. is simply false and not secondary. Hence, because the embodied state is caused by false cognition ( i. e. illusory knowledge ), it is established that the person who has reached true knowledge is in the unembodied state even while still alive. The same is declared in the श्रुति passages concerning him who knows ब्रह्मन्: 'Therefore, as the slough of a snake lies dead and cast off on the ant-hill, in the very same way lies this body; then that disembodied immortal spirit is ब्रह्मन् only, is only light'; 'With eyes he is without eyes as it were, with ears without ears as it were, with speech without speech as it were, with a mind without mind as it were, with vital airs without vital airs as it were.' Even the Smṛti 'What are the characteristics of one whose mind is steady,' etc. while describing the characteristics of one whose mind is steady, shows that a wise person has no connection with action of any kind. Therefore, for the person who has realised ब्रह्मन् as his Self, there is no transmigratoriness as before; as for the person who has transmigratoriness as before, it is clear that he has not realised ब्रह्मन् as his Self; ( thus our conclusion ) is faultless.

### NOTES

Here, the भाष्यकार attacks the view of प्रभाकर, the upholder of अद्वैतातिवाद ( see under अध्यास ). According to प्रभाकर, there is no knowledge which is मिथ्या. Every cognition is correct. Hence, अध्यास or superimposition is caused by विवेकाग्रह or भेदाग्रह. Therefore, the conceit of 'I' in the body is not मिथ्या, but secondary. गौण, just as the word सिंह

and the idea of a lion are secondarily applied to a man in सिंहो देवदत्तः. This being so, it is futile for the वेदान्तिन् to assert that the conceit of 'I' in the body is caused by मिथ्याज्ञान.

To this the भाष्यकार replies:—The idea of गौणत्व or figurativeness presupposes the knowledge of the difference between the two things; unless we know that सिंह and देवदत्त are two absolutely distinct entities, we cannot apply the word and the idea of सिंह to देवदत्त. What we really do is that when we find साधर्म्य between two distinct objects, we transfer the designation and idea of one to another. Hence, the most important thing for उपचार or गौण or secondary use of words is भेदग्रह (and not भेदाग्रह as प्रभाकर holds it). In भेदाग्रह, however, i. e., where distinction or difference between the two things is not cognised, the application of the designation of one thing to another is caused by भ्रम and is not secondary. For example, in the twilight we are in a doubt with reference to a post before us—whether it is a man or a post; if we apply the word and the concept of man to that post, then this cannot be regarded as गौण or secondary; it is certainly caused by delusion or भ्रम.

The same is the case in regard to nacre, where the cognition of silver arises. This cognition also is not secondary, but caused by मिथ्याज्ञान. Therefore, this principle should be recognised—गृहीतभेदयोरभेदप्रत्ययो गौणः, अगृहीतभेदयोरभेदप्रत्ययो मिथ्या. (प्रदीप). The idea of identity (non-distinction, अभेदप्रत्यय), if it exists between two things whose difference is cognised, is गौण (secondary); but the idea of identity between two things whose difference is not cognised is मिथ्या (false). On the basis of this principle, the idea of the identity established between the Self and the body must be recognised to be मिथ्या and not गौण. The idea of identity between the Self and



the body is निरूपचार, free from उपचार(figurativeness), which is based on similarity (सादृश्य) apprehended between two really distinct things. In this identity of देह and आत्मन्, one is not conscious of their difference as one is conscious of the difference of सिंह and देवदत्त even while identifying them in सिंहो देवदत्तः. Even learned men fail to discriminate between the word and concept of देह, and आत्मन्. They resemble, in this respect, the shepherds and goatherds (Cf. पञ्चादिशिष्टा-विशेषात् in the introductory भाष्य of the 1st Sūtra).

अहिनिर्व्वयिनी = slough of a snake.

In support of his conclusion जीवतोऽपि विदुषः अक्षरीरत्वम्, the भाष्यकार quotes the two श्रुति passages and a स्मृति passage.

Therefore, if transmigratoriness persists as before in respect of a person who has heard of ब्रह्मन्, the only conclusion is that he has not yet realised ब्रह्मन् as his Self. After this realisation, transmigratoriness cannot accrue, nor can it continue as before.

यत्पुनरुक्तं श्रवणात्पराचीनयोर्मनननिदिध्यासनयोर्दर्शनाद्विधिशेषत्वं ब्रह्मणः न स्वरूपपर्यवसायित्वमिति, तन्न; अवगत्यर्थत्वान्मनननिदिध्यासनयोः। यदि ह्यवगतं ब्रह्मान्यत्र विनियुज्येत, भवेत्तदा विधिशेषत्वम्; न तु तदस्ति, मनननिदिध्यासनयोरपि श्रवणवदगत्यर्थत्वात्। तस्मान्न प्रतिपत्तिविधिविषयतया शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वं ब्रह्मणः संभवतीत्यतः खतन्त्रमेव ब्रह्म शास्त्रप्रमाणकम्, वेदान्तवाक्यसमन्वयादिति सिद्धम्।

एवं च सति 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' इति तद्विषयः पृथक् शास्त्रारम्भ उपपद्यते। प्रतिपत्तिविधिपरत्वे हि 'अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा' इत्येवारब्धत्वान्न पृथक् शास्त्रमारभ्येत। आरभ्यमाणं चैवमारभ्येत 'अथातः परिशिष्टधर्मजिज्ञासा' इति, 'अथातः क्रत्वर्थपुरुषार्थयो-

जिज्ञासः' (जै. सू. १।१।१) इतिवत् । ब्रह्मात्मैक्यावगतिस्त्वप्रति-  
ज्ञातेति तदर्थो युक्तः शास्त्रारम्भः 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' इति ।

तस्मात् 'अहं ब्रह्मास्मि' इत्येतदवसाना एव सर्वे विधयः सर्वाणि  
चेतराणि प्रमाणानि । न ह्यहेयानुपादेयाद्वैतात्मावगतौ सत्याम्, निर्विष-  
याण्यप्रमातृकाणि च प्रमाणानि भवितुमर्हन्तीति ।

(अपि चाहुः—

‘गौणमिध्यात्मनोऽसत्त्वे पुत्रदेहादिबाधनात् ।

सद्ब्रह्मात्माहमित्येवंबोधि कार्यं कथं भवेत् ॥

अन्वेष्टव्यात्मविज्ञानात्प्राक् प्रमातृत्वमात्मनः ।

अन्विष्टः स्यात्प्रमातैव पाप्मदोषादिवर्जितः ॥

देहात्मप्रत्ययो यद्वत्प्रमाणत्वेन कल्पितः ।

लौकिकं तद्वदेवेदं प्रमाणं त्वात्मनिश्चयात् ॥’ इति ।

इति श्रीशङ्करभगवत्पादकृतौ शारीरकमीमांसाभाष्ये चतुर्थं

सवन्वयाधिकरणं संपूर्णम् ॥

As for the assertion that since reflection and contem-  
plation are seen to follow hearing, ब्रह्मन् is subsidiary to an  
injunction and is not fully determined in its own nature,  
we say that it is wrong; because, reflection and contem-  
plation are for the sake of realisation. If the realised ब्रह्मन्  
were to be employed elsewhere; then there could be subsi-  
diariness to an injunction; but that is not so, for reflection  
and contemplation also are, like hearing, for the purpose  
of realisation. Therefore, ब्रह्मन् does not come to have the  
Scripture as the means of valid knowledge in virtue of  
being the object of an injunction of contemplation; and for  
this reason, it is established that ब्रह्मन् even independently  
has the Scripture as the means of valid knowledge, because  
of the harmony (i.e., the uniform meaning) of the Vedā-  
nta texts.



This being so, it is quite appropriate to begin the new Śāstra pertaining to ब्रह्मन्, as indicated in the first Sūtra—‘Now, therefore, the enquiry into ब्रह्मन्.’ If it (viz., the Vedānta Śāstra) had the injunction of contemplation as its purpose, then having been already begun even with the Sūtra ‘Now, therefore, the enquiry into Religious Duty’, there was no necessity of beginning a new (i.e. separate) Śāstra. Or, if it were to be commenced then it ought to have been commenced as ‘Now, therefore, the enquiry into the remaining Religious Duty’, just as (a new portion of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā is introduced with the words) ‘Now, therefore, the enquiry into what subserves the purpose of the sacrifice and what subserves the purpose of man.’ But as the realisation of unity of ब्रह्मन् and the Self has not been promised (in the previous Śāstra), it is quite appropriate that a new Śāstra for that purpose should be commenced in the form of ‘Now, therefore, the enquiry into ब्रह्मन्’. Therefore, all injunctions and all other means of valid knowledge terminate in this alone—‘I am ब्रह्मन्’. When there is the realisation of the non-dual Self, which is to be neither rejected nor accepted, all objects and knowing agents vanish, and hence there can no longer be means of valid knowledge.

Further it is said :—

When the secondary and the illusory selves are non-existent, then because of the sublation of son, body, etc. (etc., includes the knower), how can there arise the effect which is of the nature of the knowledge ‘I am of the nature of the real ब्रह्मन्’? The Self remains a knower till the cognition of the Self which is to be sought. What is searched after is the knower alone, as free from sin, defect, etc. As the cognition of the Self as body is assumed to be valid (in

ordinary life), even so all the ordinary sources of knowledge (perception and the like are assumed to be valid) only up to the ascertainment of the Self.

### NOTES

In the Upaniṣads we read श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः; that is, श्रवण, मनन and निदिध्यासन of ब्रह्मन् are prescribed. Now, the पूर्वपक्षिन् says that as श्रवण alone has been shown to be निश्चित, for श्रुतब्रह्मणोऽपि सांसारिकत्वं दृष्टम्, we shall not treat it as a विधि or an injunction. But, after श्रवण, the श्रुति mentions मनन and निदिध्यासन. Let us take विधिश्च in the two latter. Let us admit that the श्रुति lays down an injunction with regard to मनन (reflection) and निदिध्यासन (contemplation) of ब्रह्मन्. If you do not admit it, then why should they be prescribed? And if they are admitted to be विधि, then ब्रह्मन् becomes subsidiary to an injunction. Thus, you will have to admit that the Vedānta texts lay down an injunction of reflection and contemplation. In this way, it will be impossible for you to hold that the Scriptures propound ब्रह्मन् as an independent entity, but will have to admit that the Scriptures propound ब्रह्मन् as subsidiary to the injunction of contemplation.

To this the भाष्यकार replies :— Although the sentence enumerating मनन and निदिध्यासन appears like an injunction or विधि, yet it is not so. Because even मनन and निदिध्यासन have only the साक्षात्कार of ब्रह्मन् for their fruit. Hence they are similar to श्रवण. Again, if the realised ब्रह्मन् could be employed elsewhere, and if मनन and निदिध्यासन were referring to realised (साक्षात्कृत) ब्रह्मन्, then only could ब्रह्मन् be subsidiary to an injunction, and मनन and निदिध्यासन could be injunctions. The idea is this that only that thing can become विधिश्चेष्ट (subsidiary to an injunction) which is existent and which is known (realised). In the first place the realised ब्रह्मन् cannot serve any purpose; it is not prescribed for the



sake of any action; hence it cannot be विधिशेष. Secondly मनन and निदिध्यासन are the *means* to realisation; how can they refer to the realised ब्रह्मन्? Is there any necessity of reflection and contemplation even after the realisation of ब्रह्मन्? No. We require reflection and contemplation only before we have realised ब्रह्मन्. They are indeed the means which, like श्रवण, lead to the fruit of the realisation of ब्रह्मन्. Therefore, like श्रवण, even मनन and निदिध्यासन are for the purpose of realisation. The Scriptures deal with the independent ब्रह्मन् and not with ब्रह्मन् as subsidiary to an injunction.

Again, if ब्रह्मन् were विधिशेष, then he could have formed the subject-matter of पूर्वमीमांसा, the Śāstra dealing with धर्म. There was no necessity of a separate शास्त्र like the present one. But as ब्रह्मन् is not विधिशेष, so an enquiry into it cannot be included in the शास्त्र beginning with अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा, but has to be separately dealt with in a different शास्त्र beginning with अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा. Again, in case ब्रह्मन् were विधिशेष, if we wanted to write a new treatise about ब्रह्मन्, then we ought to have commenced it as—अथातः परिशिष्टधर्मजिज्ञासा, as जैमिनि himself, while introducing a new portion uses the सूत्र—अथातः क्रत्वर्थपुरुषार्थयोजिज्ञासा. Hence, we are justified in writing a new and separate treatise, as the old treatise of मीमांसा does not promise to propound the realisation of unity of ब्रह्मन् and the Self.

If the purport of the Vedānta texts is non-duality (अद्वैत), then what is the position of कर्मकाण्डशास्त्र, etc.; which rest on the idea of duality (द्वैत)? To this the भाष्यकार replies, that कर्मकाण्डशास्त्र and other means of knowledge which are based on the idea of duality, are valid only up to the time that the knowledge of अद्वैत is attained. After अद्वैतज्ञान, they are not

valid. Because, when अद्वैत is realised, then all means of knowledge (whether शास्त्र or प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान, etc.) become invalid; for there remains no knower nor the object of knowledge;—all vanish in अद्वैत.

गौणमिथ्यात्मनोः etc. The conceit of the Self in son, wife, etc., is secondary. Because, just as a person feels miserable by his own misery and happy by his own happiness; so does he feel miserable or happy when he sees his son or wife miserable or happy. Here, he is conscious that his Self and the son are two distinct objects, and hence the conceit of the Self in son is गौण or secondary. But when a person has the conceit of the Self in his body, it is मिथ्या, for that person does not experience the distinctness of the Self and the body. He regards both to be identical.

So, when on account of the sublation of the conception of पुत्र, the secondary Self (गौणात्मन्) becomes non-existent, and when on account of the sublation of the conception of देह, the illusory Self (मिथ्यात्मन्) becomes non-existent, then not only the business of ordinary life will come to an end, but even the knowledge अहं ब्रह्मात्मन् cannot arise. For all this division or distinction of the knower and the knowledge remains only prior to the knowledge of the Self who is to be sought after. And what is to be sought is the knower alone, as free from sin, defect etc.

This explanation of the first verse is in accordance with सामती which reads सद्ब्रह्मात्माहमित्येवं बोधि. But, other commentators read सद्ब्रह्मात्माहमित्येवं बोधे. According to these, the verse will mean:

“When on account of the sublation of the conception of body, son etc., the secondary and the illusory Selves become non-existent and when there has arisen (in a man's mind) the knowledge, ‘I am of the real nature of ब्रह्मन्’.



how should then the effect ( i. e., the apparent world with all its distinctions ) exist any longer ?”


Well, if the idea of the knower, knowledge, etc., is not real, but only assumed, then how is it valid ? To this the reply is देहात्मप्रत्ययः, etc. As the cognition of the Self as body is assumed to be valid in ordinary life, even so all the ordinary sources of knowledge (like the knower, the knowledge, the means of knowledge as प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान, etc.,) are assumed to be valid. But how long does this assumption last ? To this we reply आ आत्मप्रत्ययात्—up to the ascertainment of the Self.

---

Here ends the चतुःसूत्री and the 4th topic called समन्वय ( Harmony ).

श्रीकृष्णार्पणमस्तु ।

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# BRAHMA-SŪTRA CATUḤSŪTRI

## INDEX

Abstinence, is not action, 152.  
*Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, context of—and the remaining *bhāṣya*, 34-35.  
*Āhavanīya*, the *Kriyāvidhi-śeṣatā* of *Yūpa* and—, 109  
*Anyathākhyāti*, 9.  
*Aśarīratva*, Does *Upāsana* lead to—? 116;—or *Mokṣa*, is *nitya* e. 118.  
*Ātaḥ*, the sense of the word,—54.  
*Ātha*, sense of the word—, 37; senses of—, examined, 39; sense of—is immediate succession, but not to a knowledge of ritual, 40-41  
*Ātmakhyāti*, 9.  
*Ātman* cannot be denied,, 145;—cannot be rejected or accepted, 147.  
*Avidyā*, 20; the nature of—, 21; even *Śāstrīya-vyavahāra* is based on—, 29.  
 Behaviours, non-difference of human and animal—, 26-27.  
 Being, modifications of—are included in *janmasthitibhaṅgam*, 76.  
*Bhāvanā*, 93; varieties of—, 94.  
*Bhrānti*, not removed by *Vedānta* text, 111.  
*Brahmacodanā*, merely instructs, 52.  
*Brahma-jijñāsā*, possible before *Karmāvabodhana*, 42; — not subsidiary to *Dharmajijñāsā*, 49; fruit and object of—different from *Dharmajijñāsā*,

51; objections to—, 55; reply to the above, 56; explanation of the word—, 57-58, difference between *Dharmajijñāsā* and—; 81.  
*Brahma-jñāna*, is beyond other *pramāṇas* because *Brahman* is *atīndriya*, 83-84;—and *Ī. okṣa* are simultaneous, 123; —is human goal, 142;—is not subsidiary to injunctions, 143.  
*Brahman*, desire to know—, 36; Is—known? 64; natures of—; 65; special nature of— not known, 66; conflicting views about—67-68; Definition of—, 70;—is the cause of this universe, 74; Inference proves— as cause, 77;—is beyond *nidhi-niṣedha*, etc., 82;—is *atīndriya*, 84; further evidence about *sarvajñatva* of—, 86; —is *sarvajña*, 88; — is the source of *Ścripture*, 87;—is beyond *pramāṇasa*, though it is an already existent thing, 100-101; —is the object of *pratipatti-vidhi*, 106; *vidyā* and *phala* of *Karma* and—different, 112-114; *mithyājñāna* removed by realisation of—, 159; *Objection* :— is subsidiary to action because *manana*, etc., follow *śravaṇa*, 166-167.  
*Brahmaṇah*, is not *Śeṣaṣaṣṭhi*, 59-  
*Karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhi* in —established, 61.

*Brahmāvagati*, is the human goal, 63.

*Brahmasvarūpa*, *Mokṣa* is the manifestation of—, 124,

*Brahmātmaikatvavijñāna*, is not imaginary or super-imposed or subsidiary to ritual, 125-126.

Cognition, nature of—, 6.

Conceit of 'I', Is-in body *gauṇa*? 161—is *mithyā*, 162.

*Dehī*, Is—not *Saniskārya* ? 134; No, it is not, 135.

*Dharmavijñāsa*, *Brahmavijñāsa* not subsidiary to—, 49; fruit and object of *Brahmavijñāsa* different from those of—51; difference between—and *Brahmavijñāsa*, 81.

Error, theory of—, 7; five theories of—, 8; Buddhist theory of—10; its criticism by Vedāntin, 11 *Mīmāṃsā* theory of—, 12; its criticism by Vedāntin, 13; —acc. to *Sūnyavādin*, 14; its criticism by Vedāntin, 15; the siddhānta view of *advaita* about—, 16.

Exclusion, sense of *nañ* is not—, 154.

*Gauṇa*, Is conceit of 'I' in body —? 161.

Inference, *prāmāṇya* of *Sāstra* not dependent on—, 104.

*Janmādi*, compound in—explained, 72.

*Jijñāsa*, explanation of—, 62.

*Jñāna*, not connected with actions 129;—alone is means to *Mokṣa*, 137;—is not a mental activity, 138; —is not dependent on injunction, 139-141.

*Karman*, *vidyā* and *phala* of—and *Brahman* are different; 112-114; Is the fruit of—*nitya* or *anitya* ? 115; difference between *Upāsana* and—, 117.

*Kartṛdevatādipra kāśana*, the purpose of Vedānta is—or laying down of *Upāsana*, as *Śruti* texts are *vidhi* or its *aṅga*, 95-97.

Knowledge, after relation, all means of—become invalid, 170-171.

*Kriyāvidhiśeṣatā* of *Yūpa* and *āhavanīya* 109.

*Manana*, Objection :—*Brahman* is subsidiary to action, because— etc. follow *Śravaṇa*, 166-167; Reply:—etc., not injunctions, 168;—etc. means to realisation, 169.

*Mīmāṃsaka*, views of—criticised, 148-151.

*Mithyā*, conceit of 'I' in body is —, 162; *jñāna*, *Saśarīratva* is caused by—, 158;—removed by realisation of *Brahman*, 159.

*Mokṣa*, *aśarīratva* or—is *nitya*, 118; *nityatā* of—is immutable, 120;—is not subsidiary to ritual, 121; nothing intervenes between *Brahma-jñāna* and—, 122; *Brahmajñāna* and—are simultaneous, 123; — is the manifestation of *Brahmasvarūpa* 124; —is not transitory, 130; is not to be produced, 131; is not to be attained, 132; is not an object of *Saniskāra*, 133; *jñāna* alone is means to— 137; attainable during life-time, 160, 165.



*Nañ*, senses of—discussed, 153;  
 sense of—is not exclusion, 154;  
 sense of—is prohibition, 155.  
*Nescience*, all usages are based  
 on—, 129. See also *Avidyā*.  
*Nityatā*, different varieties of—,  
 119;—of *Mokṣa* is immutable,  
 120.  
*Nivṛtti* purpose of *Śāstra* is *pr-*  
*avṛtti* or—, 110.  
 Object, different from Subject, 2;  
 attributes of,—different from  
 those of Subject, 3.  
*Phala vidyā*, and—of *Karman* and  
*Brahman* are different, 112-114.  
*Prabhākara*, his opinion refuted,  
 144; his view attacked, 163-  
 164.  
*Pramāṇas*, nature of—examined,  
 24-25.  
*Pravṛtti*, purpose of *Śāstra* is—or  
*nivṛtti*, 110.  
 Prohibition, sense of *nañ* is—,  
 155.  
*Puruṣārthasiddhi*, *Vedānta* leads  
 to—, 102.  
*Sādhanas*, the four—, 53.  
*Samśkāra*, *mokṣa* is not an object  
 of—, 133.  
*Samśkārya*, Is *dehin* not? 134;  
 No, he is not,—135; body is—,  
 136.  
*Saśarīratva*, caused by *mithyā-*  
*jñāna*, 158.  
*Śāstra*, purpose of—, 110.  
 Self, how objects are imposed on  
 —, 17 ; Superimposition on—  
 explained, 18-19; — known  
 from *Upaniṣads* alone, 146.  
 Sequence, determinants of— 44  
 —48.

*Śeṣa-śaṣṭhī brahmaṇaḥ* is not—  
 59; some uphold—, 60.  
*Śravaṇa*, *manana* etc., follow—,  
 167.  
*Śruti*, alone is not *pramāṇa* in  
*Brahmajñānsā*, 80 ;— declares  
 'I am *Brahman*.' 128;—texts,  
 as—are *vidhi* or its *aṅga*, the  
 purpose of *Vedānta* is laying  
 down of *upāśanā*, 90-97;  
 violence to—, 127.  
 Subject, different from Object, 2;  
 attributes of—, different from  
 those of Object, 3.  
 Superimposition, definition of—,  
 5;—is a natural procedure, 4;  
 —is basis of all usages, 23 ;  
 varieties of—, 30-32.  
*Tātparya*, determinants of—, 99.  
 Universe, different causes of  
 this —, 73; *Brahman* is the  
 cause of this—, 74.  
*Upaniṣads*, Self known from—  
 alone, 146.  
*Upāśanā*, as *Śruti* texts are *vidhi*  
 or its *aṅga*, the purpose of  
*Vedānta* is laying down of—,  
 95-97; does — lead to *aśari-*  
*ratva* ? 116; difference between  
 —and *karmans*, 117; *Vedānta*  
 texts are—*vidhis*, 92.  
*Vaiśeṣika*. contrasted with  
*Vedāntin*, 79.  
*Vaśumātra*, statement of—is  
 purposeful, 156-157.  
*Vedānta*, the purport of the study  
 of—, 33; the purpose of the  
 study of—is laying of *upāśanā*,  
 95-97; — leads to *puruṣārtha-*  
*siddhi*, 102 ;— texts are useless  
 as they enjoin no action, 90-91;

—texts are *vidhiśeṣas upāsā-nāvidhis*, 92;—texts are unable to remove *bhrānti*, 111.

*Vedāntin*, contrasted with *Vaiśeṣika* 70.

*Vidhi*, 93; varieties of—, 94, *Vedānta* texts are of the nature of—, 107-108.

*Vidhiśeṣas*, *Vedānta* texts are— 92.

*Vidyā*, 20; the nature of —; 21 —and *phala* of *karman* and *Brahman* are different, 112-114.

*Yūpa*, the *Kriyāvidhiśeṣatā* of— and *āhavanīya*, 109:

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
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
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